Thanks Glen,
> On Dec 10, 2022, at 2:04 PM, glen <[email protected]> wrote: > > Ah, sorry. It was just the SEP entry: > https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intuitionism-ethics/ > I recommend Michael Huemer > <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fphilpapers.org%2fs%2fMichael%20Huemer&c=E,1,GCAjVsLoRwQbraVFFet0wN9K5TC-LyJMknzc6tkNO6qO8gY6c5hdskjYh2mbSV3nYOFzPmgj8kWNSzhWoh2zW2-L8fzUQDYGjFOsPo3SmhUl5tS-3uxpaCokZARm&typo=1> > ... though I disagree with almost everything he writes. 8^D > > > On 12/10/22 07:45, David Eric Smith wrote: >> Glen, it looks like there were two copies of the same pain link there. The >> one on ethical intuitionism seems to have been missing. Do you still have >> it handy? >> Eric >>> On Dec 9, 2022, at 4:11 PM, glen <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> Well, sure. You can always split hairs. But, generally, they're not such >>> divergent uses of the word. The difference between a testable scientific >>> thesis and an as yet unproven math sentence isn't that large. Science, in >>> general, is more tolerant to inconsistency than math languages. But as >>> EricS broached, things like intuitionism, hott's univalence, proof >>> assistants, etc. seem to me similar to some well-honed domains of science. >>> >>> I do see a stark difference when we get up to the higher order languages >>> like psychology, though. In particular, I'm trying to make sense of the >>> psycho part of the biopsychosocial [cough] model (BPS): >>> https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fcoepes.nih.gov%2fmodule%2fmr-lane-acute-farm-injury-chronic-pain%2fbiopsychosocial-model-health&c=E,1,rdU9xOlBczOzL-oUXcUH7nFJTLCyAERIIxyENQJOC5cTrdQkJuCJyA8yZtH10cNdmUPU-Xgn1Tn0Pcc1DTlMGTHG1Nu4erAxILXmQZpVlQ,,&typo=1 >>> >>> It reminds me of "ethical intuitionism": >>> https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fcoepes.nih.gov%2fmodule%2fmr-lane-acute-farm-injury-chronic-pain%2fbiopsychosocial-model-health&c=E,1,OlgPHfTROYLaKSGwpwtboiBkbroLvIXHUDR_iadGfT5k2QlRuyMBiSGCI64AUiwopal3SvdixbcA2y0Tqe8kV031dIy3BfGJUgCmBY-0knThW7U,&typo=1 >>> or things like "natural law": >>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-law-ethics/ Or perhaps Nick's >>> definition of "logic". All these uses of "theory" seem closer to some sort >>> of anthropocentric sense of *mind* or mental activity. And that's pretty >>> far away from math's usage. But it still feels like a spectrum, not so much >>> a difference in kind. The main parameter(s) is(are) whatever methodology >>> for error correction, validation. *How* one claims to predict with and >>> validate the BPS is as diverse as the people who use the term. At best, the >>> methods are difficult to export from your mind/lab. At worst, it's not a >>> coherent theory at all. >>> >>> >>> On 12/9/22 11:11, Frank Wimberly wrote: >>>> The use of the word "theory" in mathematics is different than in other >>>> realms. For example group theory and measure theory are, to >>>> mathematicians, self contained systems of axioms and theorems. >>>> --- >>>> Frank C. Wimberly >>>> 140 Calle Ojo Feliz, >>>> Santa Fe, NM 87505 >>>> 505 670-9918 >>>> Santa Fe, NM >>>> On Fri, Dec 9, 2022, 11:50 AM glen <[email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>> Following a common thread between EricS' and SteveS' responses, I'm >>>> compelled to say that "model" is a useless term and we should find any and >>>> every reason to *stop* using it. I've found "analog" to be a more useful >>>> term. To EricS' point, an analog is something outside our selves. And to >>>> SteveS' point, it refines one's intention down to a more manageable subset >>>> of whatever some other might be trying to say. (And it further addresses >>>> the maps we call analogies and [ptouie] metaphors.) It's not objective, of >>>> course. But it's better than the nonsensical mess whatever yahoo might >>>> mean when they use the useless word "model". >>>> As for "theory", my own arbitrary interactions with that word imply >>>> that a theory is nothing but a collection of hypo-theses. The extent to >>>> which the theses are more than hypo then tells us the extent to which the >>>> "theory" is operationally reliable (thanks for that phrase, Eric). The >>>> composition of theses into a theory isn't trivial. Again, in my limited >>>> and arbitrary experience, people vary a great deal in the extent to which >>>> they consider the ways one thesis can be combined with another. If >>>> composition of theses into theory is *not* explicitly considered, the >>>> result is garbage, even if you're composing hyper-theses. c.f. my prior >>>> screeds on the unjustified dominance of *consistency* as fundamental to >>>> theoretical coherence, almost totally ignoring completeness. >>>> <story> At a recent conference, a friend presented knowledge graphs >>>> (KGs) as a way to organize "facts" (actually just cryptically justified >>>> sentences). We'd intended for me to give my arching presentation couching >>>> KGs in the larger space of computation, data lakes, warehousing, etc. But >>>> my friend had to talk first because we were late and he had a hard time >>>> wall. At the end of his talk (without the context I intended to paint), an >>>> audience member asked a "question": 'How is this any different than what >>>> we used to do in the '60s, writing ideas on index cards and laying them >>>> out on the floor? That's a KG!' My friend gave a polite and professional >>>> answer ... way more polite than how I would have answered. >8^D You've >>>> been warned. Do not invite me to your cocktail party. >>>> Then I gave my talk, wherein I explained how multigraphs might resolve >>>> the apparent contradiction between data (lakes) and knowledge (lakes). >>>> Nobody asked me any questions. [crickets] But the moderator targeted the >>>> audience member who asked my friend that "question" with: 'Surely you have >>>> some thoughts.' The audience member replied with 'No. There was a lot of >>>> clarity there.' WTF does that mean? [sigh] >>>> </story> >>>> On 12/8/22 18:44, Prof David West wrote: >>>> > I missed this morning's vFriam, but had I attended I would have >>>> raised the following questions for discussions. Perhaps the list will >>>> indulge me. >>>> > >>>> > The central question: is there a difference between a 'model' of >>>> something and a 'theory' of something? >>>> > >>>> > To me: a model is a representation of a subset of what we know about >>>> something; a theory is the complete body of knowledge. >>>> > >>>> > In my book-in-development I talk about how to create a shared theory >>>> by having people come together and tell stories about their domain. The >>>> telling of stories creates a shared theory of the domain (or some subset >>>> of it that is of immediate concern) that continues to exist—in the >>>> participant's heads. While the story telling proceeds two graphics are >>>> generated: one with the stories themselves (as 'index cards') and >>>> relations among stories, e.g., story a extends story b, story c provides >>>> an alternative case for a, x is a revision of a, etc.; and two, a Gestalt >>>> Map that shows objects as bubbles and connecting lines as relations among >>>> those objects. >>>> > >>>> > Those on the other side of the debate contend that these are models, >>>> just like the models they typically use in software development.. >>>> > >>>> > I say they are not, they are merely a form of 'external memory' a >>>> collection of evocative triggers whose sole purpose is to prompt a 'recall >>>> to mind' of the actual stories that were told involving those objects or >>>> those relations. The Gestalt Map, in my mind, represents nothing and could >>>> not—as is assumed about all other models—convey information to anyone who >>>> had not participated in the story telling session. >>>> > >>>> > Specific questions: >>>> > 1- Is the Wheel of Life mandala, (attached) a model of Tibetan >>>> Buddhist Cosmology? Or, does it merely serve the purpose of recalling to >>>> mind the stories that a Tibetan would have heard about the world and how >>>> it works. >>>> > 2- Is a card catalog (forgive me, I am old) a model of a library, or >>>> even of its collection? >>>> > 3- Are the Dewey Decimal or the Library of Congress numbering >>>> systems, models of human knowledge? >>>> > 4- Is it correct to say that Quantum Physics has a superlative >>>> model, but no theory? (The dictum to, "to shut up and compute" seems to >>>> support an affirmative answer to this question. >>>> > 5- is a metaphor a model? >>>> > >>>> > For a short time, Model Driven Development garnered attention in >>>> software development: The idea was you could build a complete, accurate, >>>> and unambiguous model of a domain, then use a series of formal transforms >>>> (ala mathematics) to generate executable code. No one, outside of >>>> academia, believes this much anymore, but, in less drastic form, dominates >>>> all of software development and has nearly from the beginning, e.g., CASE >>>> and Rationale's 'round-trip-engineering'. >>>> > >>>> > I am writing about what might be called Theory-Driven Development >>>> and it is important that I be able to explain the difference between >>>> theory and model. >>>> > >>>> > Thanks for any thoughts any of you might have. > > > -- > ꙮ Mɥǝu ǝlǝdɥɐuʇs ɟᴉƃɥʇ' ʇɥǝ ƃɹɐss snɟɟǝɹs˙ ꙮ > > -. --- - / ...- .- .-.. .. -.. / -- --- .-. ... . / -.-. --- -.. . > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom > https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fbit.ly%2fvirtualfriam&c=E,1,5Sr_LKARsCn5bGyHStpdj18YHsWRcIiWRQhvroQVT2xjNWGoRVS3bIt1JWErHzKOYPXuXg_ImtJ8ObeJm1xDhDDYuEqqv78yjeHb4Op0vO9254OqDBkeM4vhLA,,&typo=1 > to (un)subscribe > https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2fredfish.com%2fmailman%2flistinfo%2ffriam_redfish.com&c=E,1,1PEWVEO8eg7EyhnhGUKdatvLNKexWmZWsCV84UsAo_q6LHEV0Fd5Jq8-gAzWleJ8L-74G26-aly6ylB0LOszaZBmZPCEQqq-pvlPIWUrZg,,&typo=1 > FRIAM-COMIC > https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2ffriam-comic.blogspot.com%2f&c=E,1,z4AW4vABT0_eUFu7PvWFqZOmY_E-buII1Wc46dJvDkAdpNftmPArtrquwqfLtaGI-kt1g2x6GJGQ1AFOa4pzBkP2SzMMDxXACVxV4BLGHKSI&typo=1 > archives: 5/2017 thru present > https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fredfish.com%2fpipermail%2ffriam_redfish.com%2f&c=E,1,wde0lFQI2Ix1yTbGNwOWoQXSxuYN0jv8Px0r-sQ8x3lNBIEU-zF4WdrtgVXr5a22HCxK1uzbbiBH2D8VoOoEs5hQNYJT2ZTcHY5a6NYdj44vl0P5uiyo&typo=1 > 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ -. --- - / ...- .- .-.. .. -.. / -- --- .-. ... . / -.-. --- -.. . 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