Good question. Yes, without experimental confirmation it is just fancy
mathematics. The model used for the proofs is an abstract model. It describes
how mindsets/worldviews of adaptive agents diverge and converge.In a simple toy
model it works like this:A context/node can be: the places the agent moves
through like home, school, work, street.An edge means stepping from one context
to another: home-street, home-work, ....Moving along the edges changes the
internal valuation matrix of the agent. Every time an agent moves along an
edge, their internal valuation frame gets rotated or updated by an edge matrix.
The experience of making that specific transition reshapes how they evaluate
things.If we reach the same context again we get a loop. A holonomy H measures
how a valuation changes after a loop of contexts. It is the total, combined
shift in the agent's worldview after completing that full loop.A "breaking bad"
model of two agents would include two agents who start with slightly similar
worldviews. One interacts with a group that thinks breaking the rules is bad,
and the other joins a group that believes breaking the rules is necessary to
survive because the world is cruel or rules have been imposed by bad people.A
more complex model would be cultural dissemination. As you know Robert Axelrod
created an agent-based model of cultural dissemination based on local
convergence global polarization. It would be interesting to combine his model
with the new gauge theory model.Other areas of experimental verification would
be+ Group psychology and organizational psychology (group formation and
fragmentation, group influence in individual)+ Political science (emergence of
new movements, radicalization pathways, the threshold of schisms, etc)+
Sociology (what holds societies together, and what is the role of socialization
and institutions in maintaining social cohesion, to what extent is the
individual shaped by society)-J.
-------- Original message --------From: glen <[email protected]> Date: 10/5/26
8:00 PM (GMT+01:00) To: [email protected] Subject: Re: [FRIAM] A field theory
of understanding I haven't finished reading Jochen's theorems yet. But it seems
obvious to me that he's not claiming experiences are private so much as they
are unique. It seems more about irreversibility or unreachability than
closedness.And I'm no expert on Wittgenstein, but my own perspective has been
that his dictum was more about coherent form as opposed to ontology. I.e. if
your language/formalism is inadequate for its target, then it's useless for
talking about that target. It's similar to Rosen's argument that predicativity
is inadequate for describing complex systems. Maybe some of us just toss up our
hands and give up when our language seems inadequate. But others of us develop
new language. And still others push the current language as far as it can
possibly be pushed until we're convinced of its [in]adequacy.But back to the
first theorem. This seems much closer to a theory (by which I mean a body of
assertions falsifiable through measurement). But what still seems missing are
the bindings. We don't need bindings for *every* symbol in the math. Some
symbols can be internal. (What that _means_ is debatable.) The "numerical"
sections for both give a good indication of what we have to bind. Theorem 1
uses {x,y,z,roll,pitch,yaw,t}. Theorem 2 doesn't seem to have a clear binding
point. Maybe I just missed it. So we can stick to T1.I find the binding
mysterious. I have no idea what the points in the space might be. It seems to
rely on the word "concept", as in "returning to the same baseline situation or
concept". But that seems like assuming the consequent to assume something like
a concept, then prove something about independent loops returning to it. So
that can't be the binding point. Maybe H_x is the binding point, some kind of
Δconcept. That's easier to bind because we *can* measure the changes in the
brain/CNS before an after an experience (e.g. showing you a picture while
you're in the MRI machine).So my question is: Which of these symbols are bound
to measurements we can (or may one day) be able to make? Without that binding,
all this math is merely decorative, great for hypnotizing your math-envious
friends but useless for science.On 10/4/26 7:40 AM, Eric Charles wrote:> As
some of you know, I recently finished a draft of The Book (the one I have been
writing for around 15 years now, with a foundation in Nick's writing, but
extended beyond that). I have circulated drafts to some readers... so if any of
you are interested....> > This appears in the epilogue and speaks directly to
the question here:> > Wittgenstein laid down a gauntlet to 21^st century
philosophers, “Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen,”
which is often translated to, “About what one can not speak, one must remain
silent.” This has been broadly taken to indicate that we should shut the heck
up about a wide range of topics regarding the mind, under the assumption that
/all/ such talk is a prime example of that-about-which-we-cannot-speak. /If/
mind-body dualism is true, either in its classical form or its modern neural
form, then your “feeling of anger” or “experience of blue” is something that
exists only in your mental space, that only you could access, and my “feeling
of anger” or “experience of blue” is something that exists only in my mental
space, that only I could access. And /if/ that is how minds work, then we can
try to talk about such things all we want, but ultimately it is /impossible/
for us to talk about them sensibly. Wittgenstein’s various thought experiments
> demonstrated this repeatedly. Understood in this fashion — understood in
combination with a /separate/ commitment to dualism — many people have
understood Wittgenstein to be one more philosopher offering proof that a
science of psychology is impossible.> > However, given [William] James’s
influence on Wittgenstein, we do not see his dictum as pointing to a fatal
flaw. Instead, we understand his dictum as pointing out a dilemma faced by the
field of psychology: Those interested in psychology must /decide/ whether the
phenomena they are discussing are, inherently, an example of
that-of-which-we-/cannot/-speak, or if the phenomena they are discussing might
very well be the types of thing we /can/ speak about sensibly.> > We assume, if
you got this far, that you are the type of person deeply interested in
psychological happenings. If, after all the scrutinizing you can muster, you
believe you are interested in something that cannot be talked about sensibly,
then you should find a way to deal with the inevitable sadness and
disappointment of that situation, and then you should try to find other things
to be interested in. We, however, prefer the other option. We believe
psychological phenomena are the types of things that /can/ be talked about
sensibly, and we have endeavored to show that such a position can work, in
practice. We believe there is nothing within our attempt to understand
psychological terms that is fundamentally different than Lavoisier’s attempt to
understand the elements. Like Lavoisier, we may be right or wrong about
particular details, but only in the types of ways that can be readily corrected
over time… because the things we are talking about can be investigated readily,
> with no magic or vital essence, or other mystical factors having been
included.> > We believe that psychological phenomena are the types of things
that /can/evolve, that /can/develop, and that /can/be studied. They are aspects
of behavioral design. And that design deserves to be recognized and accounted
for, to be both described accurately and explained well.> > > > Best,> Eric> >
> <mailto:[email protected]>> > > On Sun, Oct 4, 2026 at 4:40 AM
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:> > If this is a
polite way to say shut up then please ignore the rest. What Wittgenstein wants
to say by "whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must remain silent" is
apparently that things like anxiety, pain, nothingness, religion, the meaning
of life, subjective experience or feelings lie outside the logical world and
cannot be meaningfully described in words. That is one way to see it. I see it
differently. The problem is if we remain silent we will never understand it. I
prefer Karl Popper's optimistic view to the depressive pessimism of
Wittgenstein. Popper argued that substantial, real-world problems exist in
philosophy, not just linguistic puzzles as Wittgenstein claims.> > For me
the things we cannot describe meaningful (yet) are the interesting ones. We
just need to find the right languages, theories, perspectives or metaphors. One
useful metaphor for pain is as you said "an emergency organization of behavior
in which the agent deploys physical and social defenses of various sorts". If
we describe pain as a mechanism to protect a person it is personal by
definition. And yet we all can understand what it is like to feel pain in
general. If we watch the movie "Marley & Me" for instance we can understand
what it is like to lose a loved dog because most of us have experienced such a
loss of a cat or dog or hamster or horse ourselves ( by the way we have a new
horse now named Mack which looks like this
https://www.youtube.com/shorts/VDyNyTsMccg
<https://www.youtube.com/shorts/VDyNyTsMccg> ).> > This is in my opinion
the solution to the hard problem: the film maker turns a 1st-person view in a
3rd-person view, the cinema conveys the 3rd-person view to the persons in the
audience, and they are able to understand roughly what-it-is-like-to-be the
lead actor because they see and hear what it goes through and they know what it
feels like to experience pain, loss, and suffering. According to Wittgenstein
cinemas should not be allowed to exist ("one must remain silent"). But people
like them because they want to know what-it-is-like-to-be someone else. Cinemas
help to solve the hard problem.> > -J.> > On 2026-10-04 03:35, Nicholas
Thompson wrote:> > You can say that. But you end by reasserting the
privacy of pain. And> > …> >> > Wovon man nicht sprechen kann,
darüber muss man schweigen> >> > You just cannot have it both ways.>
>> > N> >> > Sent from my Dumb Phone> >> > On Oct
3, 2026, at 2:26 PM, [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> wrote:>
>> > Claude was not happy about the theorem proofs that Gemini created.>
> And Jon also mentioned that they are not waterproof. So I asked Claude>
> and Gemini if they could write a new proof. They could. I asked them>
> if we could use gauge theory to explain subjective experience - gauge>
> invariance to describe objectivity, and symmetry breaking for> >
subjectivity. Both Claude and Gemini said yes, and Claude was able to> >
formulate a proof that both could agree on (combining two AIs which> >
have different personalities often gives better results than just> > using
one). Gemini is curious and creative, Claude is accurate and> > precise.
The result was a proof for a theorem of a new "field theory> > of
understanding". I understand only half of the mathematics, but the> >
physicist who use gauge theory for quantum field theories also> >
understand only half of it.> >> > I have uploaded the new proofs
here. The theorems are named the same,> > only the proofs are different.
If they are more convincing than the> > old ones, then the idea is to
replace the proofs in the appendix with> > this version. In my opinion the
solution to the hard problem looks> > similar to this - in combination
with the other things written in the> > rest of the book.> >
https://jochenfromm.github.io/PhilosophyBook/QualiaTheorems.pdf
<https://jochenfromm.github.io/PhilosophyBook/QualiaTheorems.pdf>> >>
> Paradoxically the qualia part that is most mysterious for some> >
researchers is not a problem for others at all. Nick for example wrote> >
he does not believe in qualia and sees emotions as regulations. In a> >
post he argued "To me, pain is an emergency organization of my> > behavior
in which I deploy physical and social defenses of various> > sorts.... To
me, the question, “What is it like to be X?”, has> > been fully answered
when you have said where X-like people can be> > found and what they will
be doing there... for me, feeling is a kind> > of doing, an exploring of
the world". I would agree to most of it but> > for me what an animal is
doing alone gives us only a hint what it> > feels. If a horse for example
is injured and feels pain, it does not> > scream or cry, and you see no
tears. Only if you know the animal well> > you realize that the behavior
is slightly different, for example by> > the things it is not doing. I am
certain animals feel pain just as> > intense as we do, but it is hard to
recognize from th> > eir behavior alone. If it would be better visible,
would we still eat> > pigs and cows in large amounts (this reminds me of
"Why We Love Dogs,> > Eat Pigs, and Wear Cows" from Melanie Joy)?> >>
> -J.> >-- 8647 ⊥ ɐןןǝdoɹ ǝ uǝןƃὅτε oi μὲν ἄλλοι κύνες τοὺς ἐχϑροὺς
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