> On Oct 6, 2026, at 8:09, Prof David West <[email protected]> wrote: > > If a human perceives a color, acknowledges its existence, would you not > expect the language used by that human would include a name for that color?
I don’t think my question here affects any of what you have below, or your point. But the above question seems to me underspecified. All words have polysemy scope, because more-precise meaning is almost-always generated by larger compositions (phrases, sentences, etc.) So to “include a name for” a color doesn’t say anything about the name’s being part of a name set that discriminate some particular pair of colors we may be asking about. Hence a two-color scheme could, I assume, include “names for” all the colors that people can perceive, but the job of the two names is not to make all the subsequent distinctions. I guess there is a giant literature by now on the lexicography of color reference, and since I haven’t read it, I should stay quiet. Eric > > - languages with only two color terms exist, and those colors, always, are > black and white, or closer to 'warm' and 'cold'. > - languages with exactly three color terms exist and those colors, always, > are black, white, and red > - languages with exactly four color terms exist and those colors, always, > are black, white, red, and green > - languages with exactly five color terms exist and those colors, always, > are black, white, red, green, and brown > - languages with exactly six color terms exist and those colors, always, are > black, white, red, green, brown, and purple > after that there is no pattern > > Similar differences in the areas of pain/pleasure and the five(six) tastes. > > This would suggest, to me, that the physical can be no more than 'signal" [ > on | off ] and anything other than that, linguistic term or expressed > perception, e.g., "ouch" is probably cultural, definitely not simply physical. > > davew > > > On Mon, Oct 5, 2026, at 5:13 PM, Jochen Fromm wrote: >> I also see only some emails. Don't know why. >> >> Yes, a subjective experience is always linked to a specific subject. I would >> say we can divide subjective experience into >> >> a) a physical part that depends on molecular biology and genes: receptors >> for pain and pleasure, for red, green and blue colors or sweet, salty, sour >> and bitter taste. this part is irreducible and depends on our species >> b) a cultural part that defines subjective meaning (in China for example the >> colors white and red have different meaning than in Europe) >> c) a personal part that depends on the history of a person >> >> The mathematics used in the proofs describes more the personal part c) and >> perhaps part b) if we model the history of whole countries. >> >> -J. >> >> >> -------- Original message -------- >> From: Santafe <[email protected]> >> Date: 10/5/26 8:08 PM (GMT+01:00) >> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[email protected]> >> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] A field theory of understanding >> >> For whatever reason, Jochen’s posts don’t forward to me, so I only see them >> in the later context of somebody else’s replies. In this case EricC’s, on >> Nick’s. >> >> I will clip to the focal sentence (acknowledging all that was clipped): >> >>> > Claude was not happy about the theorem proofs that Gemini created. >>> > And Jon also mentioned that they are not waterproof. So I asked Claude >>> > and Gemini if they could write a new proof. They could. I asked them >>> > if we could use gauge theory to explain subjective experience - gauge >>> > invariance to describe objectivity, and symmetry breaking for >>> > subjectivity. >> >> I think there was a time when I had enthusiasm for using these >> mathematical-physics metaphors. Something has apparently happened. >> >> I probably said, a while ago (so if you feel like it, forgive the >> repetition), that since I don’t know what philosophers mean by objective and >> subjective, I could take the more defensive posture of being a linguistic >> semanticist, which to me seems like a more pragmatist standing-point anyway, >> leaving many further mistakes for the future rather than making them all at >> once. >> >> I could take “objective” and “subjective” to be two speech registers, in an >> ordinary lexical/grammatical-semantics sense. A sentence in an “objective” >> register is one that I can parse to a meaning (in the everyday sense; not in >> some formal logic that everyday speech doesn’t use and that would need to be >> invented) without needing as input who said it. A sentence in a >> “subjective” register is one that cannot be parsed to a meaning without >> reference to some speaker (in whatever representation; maybe more or less >> explicit), which must thus be supplied. >> >> _Why_ we use those registers, why we have been handed them down from past >> speakers innumerable, and how our experienced lives reward or discourage the >> adoption of such registers, looks to me like a question that can to some >> degree (as good a degree as anything in semantics) be separated or factored >> from the classification of the locutions. >> >> Eric >> >> >> .- .-.. .-.. / ..-. --- --- - . .-. ... / .- .-. . / .-- .-. --- -. --. / >> ... --- -- . / .- .-. . / ..- ... . ..-. ..- .-.. >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom >> https://bit.ly/virtualfriam >> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fbit.ly%2fvirtualfriam&c=E,1,W17qoNpJAR2qf08Xu2YoLxVS87YEpant0MLLIi-a5gkDZysUaHQ-OIpxvVSVzIDmd4yIT00NPX230lb_FzL0bcIMNYqcOCyRY6fYlVwRJETZgw,,&typo=1> >> to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2fredfish.com%2fmailman%2flistinfo%2ffriam_redfish.com&c=E,1,qLZkIjsC1McJmibCCb1AsQeS_Lwt4ZMl5LHURGGq_AWHCi6wRc6U7dqDKzGBM0s9PGAguGFExOKSubIBLOW0Gu0hf7rO-3Gn05GsyKQpIdX78WBkdnCdswM,&typo=1> >> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com >> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2ffriam-comic.blogspot.com&c=E,1,KdY-_Xs0nAtNWGxPybRR1N15XG-B5FqKCCqWhNgOILIFOd4Zujw2FOt_GqEaQY1LJpEc0LC-5Na3qn8wf7ijR3zl_lYQu6bVhZwnJTEcGFJic-o,&typo=1>/ >> archives: 5/2017 thru present >> https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ >> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fredfish.com%2fpipermail%2ffriam_redfish.com%2f&c=E,1,3se50MWOevyt3Hx0hZ-SMrTqOzjugXHXY8hIkbx-bO7La6XnjGiQqdvAI44Crer4fJ4VmrIG3v_uCXG68ukYStj4pGZeytXBLz0AX0D_DjAuaUwx-TVruTJGFA,,&typo=1> >> 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com >> <http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/>/ >> > .- .-.. .-.. / ..-. --- --- - . .-. ... / .- .-. . / .-- .-. --- -. --. / ... > --- -- . / .- .-. . / ..- ... . ..-. ..- .-.. > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom > https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fbit.ly%2fvirtualfriam&c=E,1,21HxJj7Vx62Tq4Kv4Khziy9U0rDkrT4Yx0JnOqvJpLt9f2MZ63IL6CnCXjh80RQ9J3Wkuu4z5mWnweDHbNr2lGuf-TMJA0W3bQ2vkh4bb9BZf_g,&typo=1 > to (un)subscribe > https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2fredfish.com%2fmailman%2flistinfo%2ffriam_redfish.com&c=E,1,J_1C1SyIup1YNo_E1LHkP6CYbjstJ0U9SJWWQ3eI9Iys4n2Dq4ySTo00MS7UmnR5pqDlaDguTYVHh4Zqn5xr8NL31F4upR9_eeTH_AT-z0P_rqIcXrM,&typo=1 > FRIAM-COMIC > https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2ffriam-comic.blogspot.com%2f&c=E,1,MVp92ba3KqK316vzOeW0A7viWH7Fw-pKi-OzFs8I1KM7Xya_CWWlmPS-n0EelGNKpM3WODOyxlaphEh7BVcedj7gLH1wcL2dgt1s-43H7Fgu&typo=1 > archives: 5/2017 thru present > https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fredfish.com%2fpipermail%2ffriam_redfish.com%2f&c=E,1,8-AaJMoaWKKEkNJZaXAkR0URsHEGtLW5T3wH_01xVzpAc64woSt08oHLnLOn2rRyvODqK_iQKFg-dLIVW89eQAMoSJIt9hfsnn261PsSt-IB4rw,&typo=1 > 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/
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