Tackling 'hard' problems is always interesting and frequently valuable. However, instead of "using the tools we have invented over time," I would suggest a different perspective.
As Alan Kay once said, "the right perspective is worth 80 IQ points." And, (annoying glen and many others on this list), because the hard problems are at the fringe and W.V.O.Quine has stated, "only metaphor can guide us here;" my current work, an essay, is grounded in a metaphor. One I borrowed from Hopfield who proposed the metaphor of a landscape to "explain" the operation of a neural net. I have extended that metaphor and am using it to provide a different foundation for discussing, not solving the problem of, "intelligence" and consciousness. I call my new model the vTAO for virtual Topographic Adaptive Organism. glen has seen a bit of this idea and should feel free to denounce me as a fool or charlatan if he thinks it appropriate. davew On Tue, Nov 3, 2026, at 12:34 PM, [email protected] wrote: > We clearly have a different point of view here. I tried to find a > solution for the really hard problems, esp. the problem of free will and > the hard problem of subjective experience, because they are hard. As JFK > said "We choose to go to the moon in this decade and do the other > things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard". Your > point of view seems to be that this is nonsense, because there are > problems that cannot not solved, where you simply cannot find a > solution, and if you still try to solve them you have not understood the > problem. A legitimate position. If this is the case then these problems > should be renamed as "impossible problems", which might be accurate, > because they are often impossible to solve completely. > > The name for the hard problem still fits though. It is not only hard to > find a solution, it is also hard to find a consensus about what a > solution looks like, and if there is a solution at atll. I believe you > can find a solution and bridge the explanatory gap, not exactly, but > approximately, and to find a good approximate solution is indeed hard. > For me the hard problems are where it gets interesting, not where you > give up. For example there are many differential equations that cannot > be solved analytically as a finite combination of elementary functions. > But mathematicians have not given up, they can use numerical methods > (like Runge-Kutta) to approximate the behavior. > > In the same way we are able to understand the hard problem by using > using all the tools we have invented over time to reach a approximate > understanding. This approximate understanding is not 100% the same > experience, but close enough to narrow the explanatory gap from Joseph > Levine. Humans can't fly. But we can build machines that help us to > reach the sky and go to the moon. Similarly Humans can't see what it is > like to be another human. But we can build machines (movie cameras, > go-pro cameras, cinemas) that help us to do it. Humans also don't know > what its like to be an owl or cat that can see 10 times better than we > do in the night. But if we use night-vision goggles, we can imagine what > it is like to view things in the night. Humans don't know what its like > to be a sperm whale or bat that can navigate in complete darkness. But > if we consider the sonars that are common for submarines, we can imagine > what it is like to view things by hearing: by sending out clicks and > listening for echoes. > > Solving the hard problem is an achievement which is possible if we try > to bridge the explanatory gap by using the tools we have invented over > time. The interesting part is how the gap can be closed, although we > normally cannot do it. Different sensory organs can be partially bridged > by "goggles" like night night-vision goggles that extend our senses. > Different life paths can be partially bridged by cinemas and movies > which allow us to peek into the lives of others. Or simply by spending > time with the person you try understand, by sharing the same path for a > while. > > Every hard philosophical problem that can be solved approximately is an > achievement. Free will is an achievement too, as Daniel Dennett wrote. > It remains an illusion unless you try to have it. Even then it is hard. > The interesting part to me is how we can achieve it, and how good this > solution is, although we normally cannot find a solution. It is also > interesting why the explanatory gap exists - which often has > evolutionary reasons. > > Best > Jochen > > > On 2026-11-02 23:01, Eric Charles wrote: >> Yeah.... Jochen... >> I'm a bit confused by your reply as well... I am neither expressing >> professional jealousy nor trying to angle for co-authorship on your >> project... I'm trying to help you out here... >> >> I'm pointing out that "The Hard Problem" is more like a Zen Koan than >> a clearly-specified problem. Those who buy into "The Hard Problem" >> will insist that any success you might have in "solving it" is >> indicative of your not understanding it. That isn't to denigrate your >> work, it is specifically to address any expectation you might have >> that when you are done someone, anyone, might agree that you have >> "solved The Hard Problem." That's just not how the weird >> socio-cultural game surrounding that "problem" works. >> >> IF you want to try to formalize our discussions of psychological >> phenomenon, there are two reasonable ways approaches to The Hard >> Problem: 1) Decide the "The Hard Problem" is legitimately pointing out >> aspects of our experience about which we cannot speak sensibly... and >> then really and truly let that stand... not trying to speak beyond >> perhaps trying to demarcate the border, on the other side of which you >> let silence reign. 2) Decide that there are only things about which we >> can speak... and thereby fundamentally reject "The Hard Problem." >> >> As such: If you are trying to formalize psychology, and you think you >> can provide words and formulae to talk meaningfully about everything >> in that domain, i.e., if _you _think the domain contains only things >> that words and formulae are capable of getting at, then _you _are >> rejecting The Hard Problem. >> >> Of course, as Dave and Glen and others point out, there is no need to >> care about any of this at all if formalizing (to whatever extent) >> isn't your goal. Zen Koans aren't useless. Questions that ultimately >> don't make sense can still transform our lives in meaningful ways, and >> the world is often made better by virtue of containing people who >> contemplate such questions. It may also be possible to get at things >> artistically (poetically, musically, etc.) that cannot be gotten at >> with formal systems of words and equations; that is a different >> discussion. >> >> Formal systems have limits created by the fact of their formality, and >> some people believe there are things that exist fundamentally beyond >> the limitations of any such systems. The Hard Problem is a postulation >> of exactly the latter sort of things. As a result: You may find >> benefit in working on The Hard Problem, but what you can't find is "a >> solution", because it is crucial to the premise that no solution can >> work. >> >> Best, >> Eric >> >> On Mon, Nov 2, 2026 at 1:35 PM glen <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> FWIW, I agree, though I like my phrasing better than yours: "if your >>> language/formalism is inadequate for its target, then it's useless >>> for talking about that target." >>> >>> The problem with natural languages like English is that you *can* >>> express anything (or non-thing) in them. [⛧] And I'd argue without >>> nonsense, paradox, or "non-truth". This is because it's not the >>> *language* that forces those outcomes but the inferential system to >>> which the language is bound. Most people in my network are very >>> metaphorical thinkers, which allows them to slip and slide all over >>> the place when they hear/read an expression whose bindings are >>> ambiguous or unregistered. More literal thinkers like me aren't >>> incapable of metaphorical flex-and-slop. But we tend to resist it, >>> complain when we spot unregistered slippage. >>> >>> More cognitively powered people than me, have at their "fingertips" >>> a suite of possible bindings they can don and doff as the tokens >>> come in, setting the context. Those in this class who are >>> charitable, either ask you helpful questions to choose which >>> inferential system to bind to. Uncharitable ones (e.g. >>> Wittgenstein?) balk and shunt, usually because they feel like their >>> time would be better spent elsewhere (as Eric & Nick say in the >>> blurb below). I'm OK with either type. I grew up with all sorts >>> yelling RTFM at me. 8^D >>> >>> But it's important to place the blame where it belongs, at the >>> inferential system, not the slippery language atop it. So I applaud >>> Jochen's attempt(s) to whatever extent I can. "ὅτε oi μὲν >>> ἄλλοι κύνες τοὺς ἐχϑροὺς >>> δάκνουσιν, ἐγὰ δὲ τοὺς φίλους, ἵνα >>> σώσω." >>> >>> [⛧] A friend of mine is fond of asking "Why is there something >>> rather than nothing?" It's a bit of a litmus test for a crowd's >>> charitability. E.g. Sean Carroll is very charitable >>> <https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.02231>. I'm not. To me, it's a nonsense >>> question and demonstrates the extent to which the asker is confused. >>> But you can *still* express it. And if you're amongst a crowd of >>> charitable people, especially if they're cognitively endowed, tokens >>> like "nothing" can be well-defined if you bind to the right >>> inferential system. I wonder if Wittgenstein ever met Dr. Seuss? >>>> 8^D >>> >>> On 11/2/26 7:08 AM, Prof David West wrote: >>>> I seem to have missed some entries in this thread (mockery?? >>> successor??), but I want to make a very specific comment about >>> Wittgenstein. >>>> >>>> Reducing a theory to an aphorism almost always leads to >>> misunderstanding. Wittgenstein did not mean, IMHO, don't speak; he >>> merely said it is pointless to try to force fit something into a >>> language that has been formally defined to exclude expressions of >>> that thing. >>>> >>>> Or another way of thinking about it: if you define a language game >>> with strict, formal, rules, and want to make a play in that game >>> that is contravenes those rules you either have to cheat or not make >>> the play. >>>> >>>> If our language game is English, with the verb 'to be' at its >>> core, there are all kinds of things—keeping the context of >>> psychology—"experiences" that are not, keeping with the rules, >>> expressible in that language without creating nonsense, paradox, or >>> "non-truth." >>>> >>>> A simple example" 'Nothing" is at least a concept, that, in >>> English is necessarily a paradox because simply expressing the word >>> makes it "Something." >>>> >>>> Wittgenstein never said, "shut up." >>>> >>>> davew >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sun, Nov 1, 2026, at 7:25 AM, [email protected] wrote: >>>>> Eric, >>>>> >>>>> I am still a bit speechless about this reply. My impression is >>> that >>>>> behind the mockery there seems to be a feeling of outrage that >>> someone >>>>> else may try to cut the line in which you and others have been >>> waiting >>>>> patiently (to become Nick's successor as a psychology professor >>> at an >>>>> university) by unfair means of cheating and stealing. This was >>> and is >>>>> not my intention. >>>>> >>>>> My idea of solving is the hard problem is probably different than >>>>> yours. >>>>> For me the hard problem can be solved by path dependence and the >>>>> cinemas >>>>> I mentioned earlier. There remains an irreducible, biological >>> residue. >>>>> This article which I wrote in the last days with the help of our >>> new AI >>>>> friends should help to understand it (I like the saddle node >>>>> bifurcations in section 3.2). We could try to publish it together >>> if it >>>>> looks interesting to you or you could you reuse some of the ideas >>> and >>>>> write your own paper. Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee >>> Group >>>>> solves hard problem. How does this sound? Maybe it would help you >>> to >>>>> get >>>>> that academic position too. >>>>> >>> >> https://github.com/JochenFromm/PhilosophyBook/blob/main/GeometryOfActionReadiness.pdf >>>>> >>>>> Best wishes, >>>>> Jochen >>>>> >>>>> On 2026-10-04 16:40, Eric Charles wrote: >>>>>> As some of you know, I recently finished a draft of The Book >>> (the one >>>>>> I have been writing for around 15 years now, with a foundation >>> in >>>>>> Nick's writing, but extended beyond that). I have circulated >>> drafts to >>>>>> some readers... so if any of you are interested.... >>>>>> >>>>>> This appears in the epilogue and speaks directly to the question >>> here: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Wittgenstein laid down a gauntlet to 21st century philosophers, >>>>>> “Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man >>> schweigen,” >>>>>> which is often translated to, “About what one can not speak, >>> one >>>>>> must remain silent.” This has been broadly taken to indicate >>> that we >>>>>> should shut the heck up about a wide range of topics regarding >>> the >>>>>> mind, under the assumption that _all_ such talk is a prime >>> example of >>>>>> that-about-which-we-cannot-speak. _If_ mind-body dualism is >>> true, >>>>>> either in its classical form or its modern neural form, then >>> your >>>>>> “feeling of anger” or “experience of blue” is something >>> that >>>>>> exists only in your mental space, that only you could access, >>> and my >>>>>> “feeling of anger” or “experience of blue” is something >>> that >>>>>> exists only in my mental space, that only I could access. And >>> _if_ >>>>>> that is how minds work, then we can try to talk about such >>> things all >>>>>> we want, but ultimately it is _impossible_ for us to talk about >>> them >>>>>> sensibly. Wittgenstein’s various thought experiments >>> demonstrated >>>>>> this repeatedly. Understood in this fashion — understood in >>>>>> combination with a _separate_ commitment to dualism — many >>> people >>>>>> have understood Wittgenstein to be one more philosopher offering >>> proof >>>>>> that a science of psychology is impossible. >>>>>> >>>>>> However, given [William] James’s influence on Wittgenstein, we >>> do >>>>>> not see his dictum as pointing to a fatal flaw. Instead, we >>> understand >>>>>> his dictum as pointing out a dilemma faced by the field of >>> psychology: >>>>>> Those interested in psychology must _decide_ whether the >>> phenomena >>>>>> they are discussing are, inherently, an example of >>>>>> that-of-which-we-_cannot_-speak, or if the phenomena they are >>>>>> discussing might very well be the types of thing we _can_ speak >>> about >>>>>> sensibly. >>>>>> >>>>>> We assume, if you got this far, that you are the type of person >>> deeply >>>>>> interested in psychological happenings. If, after all the >>> scrutinizing >>>>>> you can muster, you believe you are interested in something that >>>>>> cannot be talked about sensibly, then you should find a way to >>> deal >>>>>> with the inevitable sadness and disappointment of that >>> situation, and >>>>>> then you should try to find other things to be interested in. >>> We, >>>>>> however, prefer the other option. We believe psychological >>> phenomena >>>>>> are the types of things that _can_ be talked about sensibly, and >>> we >>>>>> have endeavored to show that such a position can work, in >>> practice. We >>>>>> believe there is nothing within our attempt to understand >>>>>> psychological terms that is fundamentally different than >>> Lavoisier’s >>>>>> attempt to understand the elements. Like Lavoisier, we may be >>> right or >>>>>> wrong about particular details, but only in the types of ways >>> that can >>>>>> be readily corrected over time… because the things we are >>> talking >>>>>> about can be investigated readily, with no magic or vital >>> essence, or >>>>>> other mystical factors having been included. >>>>>> >>>>>> We believe that psychological phenomena are the types of things >>> that >>>>>> _can_ evolve, that _can_ develop, and that _can_ be studied. >>> They are >>>>>> aspects of behavioral design. And that design deserves to be >>>>>> recognized and accounted for, to be both described accurately >>> and >>>>>> explained well. >>>>>> >>>>>> Best, >>>>>> Eric >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sun, Oct 4, 2026 at 4:40 AM <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> If this is a polite way to say shut up then please ignore the >>> rest. >>>>>>> What Wittgenstein wants to say by "whereof one cannot speak, >>> thereof >>>>>>> one must remain silent" is apparently that things like anxiety, >>>>>>> pain, nothingness, religion, the meaning of life, subjective >>>>>>> experience or feelings lie outside the logical world and cannot >>> be >>>>>>> meaningfully described in words. That is one way to see it. I >>> see it >>>>>>> differently. The problem is if we remain silent we will never >>>>>>> understand it. I prefer Karl Popper's optimistic view to the >>>>>>> depressive pessimism of Wittgenstein. Popper argued that >>>>>>> substantial, real-world problems exist in philosophy, not just >>>>>>> linguistic puzzles as Wittgenstein claims. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> For me the things we cannot describe meaningful (yet) are the >>>>>>> interesting ones. We just need to find the right languages, >>>>>>> theories, perspectives or metaphors. One useful metaphor for >>> pain is >>>>>>> as you said "an emergency organization of behavior in which the >>>>>>> agent deploys physical and social defenses of various sorts". >>> If we >>>>>>> describe pain as a mechanism to protect a person it is personal >>> by >>>>>>> definition. And yet we all can understand what it is like to >>> feel >>>>>>> pain in general. If we watch the movie "Marley & Me" for >>> instance we >>>>>>> can understand what it is like to lose a loved dog because most >>> of >>>>>>> us have experienced such a loss of a cat or dog or hamster or >>> horse >>>>>>> ourselves ( by the way we have a new horse now named Mack which >>>>>>> looks like this https://www.youtube.com/shorts/VDyNyTsMccg ). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This is in my opinion the solution to the hard problem: the >>> film >>>>>>> maker turns a 1st-person view in a 3rd-person view, the cinema >>>>>>> conveys the 3rd-person view to the persons in the audience, and >>> they >>>>>>> are able to understand roughly what-it-is-like-to-be the lead >>> actor >>>>>>> because they see and hear what it goes through and they know >>> what it >>>>>>> feels like to experience pain, loss, and suffering. According >>> to >>>>>>> Wittgenstein cinemas should not be allowed to exist ("one must >>>>>>> remain silent"). But people like them because they want to know >>>>>>> what-it-is-like-to-be someone else. Cinemas help to solve the >>> hard >>>>>>> problem. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -J. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 2026-10-04 03:35, Nicholas Thompson wrote: >>>>>>>> You can say that. But you end by reasserting the privacy of >>> pain. >>>>>>> And >>>>>>>> … >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> You just cannot have it both ways. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> N >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Sent from my Dumb Phone >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Oct 3, 2026, at 2:26 PM, [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Claude was not happy about the theorem proofs that Gemini >>>>>>> created. >>>>>>>> And Jon also mentioned that they are not waterproof. So I >>> asked >>>>>>> Claude >>>>>>>> and Gemini if they could write a new proof. They could. I >>> asked >>>>>>> them >>>>>>>> if we could use gauge theory to explain subjective experience >>> - >>>>>>> gauge >>>>>>>> invariance to describe objectivity, and symmetry breaking for >>>>>>>> subjectivity. Both Claude and Gemini said yes, and Claude was >>> able >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> formulate a proof that both could agree on (combining two AIs >>>>>>> which >>>>>>>> have different personalities often gives better results than >>> just >>>>>>>> using one). Gemini is curious and creative, Claude is accurate >>> and >>>>>>>> precise. The result was a proof for a theorem of a new "field >>>>>>> theory >>>>>>>> of understanding". I understand only half of the mathematics, >>> but >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> physicist who use gauge theory for quantum field theories also >>>>>>>> understand only half of it. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I have uploaded the new proofs here. The theorems are named >>> the >>>>>>> same, >>>>>>>> only the proofs are different. If they are more convincing >>> than >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> old ones, then the idea is to replace the proofs in the >>> appendix >>>>>>> with >>>>>>>> this version. In my opinion the solution to the hard problem >>> looks >>>>>>>> similar to this - in combination with the other things written >>> in >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> rest of the book. >>>>>>>> >>> https://jochenfromm.github.io/PhilosophyBook/QualiaTheorems.pdf >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Paradoxically the qualia part that is most mysterious for some >>>>>>>> researchers is not a problem for others at all. Nick for >>> example >>>>>>> wrote >>>>>>>> he does not believe in qualia and sees emotions as >>> regulations. In >>>>>>> a >>>>>>>> post he argued "To me, pain is an emergency organization of my >>>>>>>> behavior in which I deploy physical and social defenses of >>> various >>>>>>>> sorts.... To me, the question, “What is it like to be X?”, >>> has >>>>>>>> been fully answered when you have said where X-like people can >>> be >>>>>>>> found and what they will be doing there... for me, feeling is >>> a >>>>>>> kind >>>>>>>> of doing, an exploring of the world". I would agree to most of >>> it >>>>>>> but >>>>>>>> for me what an animal is doing alone gives us only a hint what >>> it >>>>>>>> feels. If a horse for example is injured and feels pain, it >>> does >>>>>>> not >>>>>>>> scream or cry, and you see no tears. Only if you know the >>> animal >>>>>>> well >>>>>>>> you realize that the behavior is slightly different, for >>> example >>>>>>> by >>>>>>>> the things it is not doing. I am certain animals feel pain >>> just as >>>>>>>> intense as we do, but it is hard to recognize from th >>>>>>>> eir behavior alone. If it would be better visible, would we >>> still >>>>>>> eat >>>>>>>> pigs and cows in large amounts (this reminds me of "Why We >>> Love >>>>>>> Dogs, >>>>>>>> Eat Pigs, and Wear Cows" from Melanie Joy)? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -J. >>>>>>>> >>> -- >>> 8647 ⊥ ɐןןǝdoɹ ǝ uǝןƃ >>> ὅτε oi μὲν ἄλλοι κύνες τοὺς ἐχϑροὺς >>> δάκνουσιν, ἐγὰ δὲ τοὺς φίλους, ἵνα >>> σώσω. >>> >>> .- .-.. .-.. / ..-. --- --- - . .-. ... / .- .-. . / .-- .-. --- -. >>> --. / ... --- -- . / .- .-. . / ..- ... . ..-. ..- .-.. >>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>> Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom >>> https://bit.ly/virtualfriam >>> to (un)subscribe >>> http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >>> archives: 5/2017 thru present >>> https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ >>> 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ >> .- .-.. .-.. / ..-. --- --- - . .-. ... / .- .-. . / .-- .-. --- -. --. >> / ... --- -- . / .- .-. . / ..- ... . ..-. ..- .-.. >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom >> https://bit.ly/virtualfriam >> to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >> archives: 5/2017 thru present >> https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ >> 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ > > > .- .-.. .-.. / ..-. --- --- - . .-. ... / .- .-. . / .-- .-. --- -. --. > / ... --- -- . / .- .-. . / ..- ... . ..-. ..- .-.. > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom > https://bit.ly/virtualfriam > to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > archives: 5/2017 thru present > https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ > 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ .- .-.. .-.. / ..-. --- --- - . .-. ... / .- .-. . / .-- .-. --- -. --. / ... --- -- . / .- .-. . / ..- ... . ..-. ..- .-.. FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom https://bit.ly/virtualfriam to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ archives: 5/2017 thru present https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/
