Hi Mike,
Let me try to restate my argument. Economic growth requires certain basic
conditions. I would not pretend to know what all of these are, but stability
and the possibility of upward mobility would, I suspect, be among them. I
would also include the existence of capital; not only capital itself, but
the financial infrastructure through which capital can be mobilized. You
mention three other possibles in your comparison between England and Korea,
namely improvements in agricultural technology, a warming climate and a
perfectionist ideology. The presence of "outgroups" such as the Jews or
Chinese may or may not be a factor.
These factors were not lacking in China, Korea and Taiwan. These were well
organized and, in some important respects, progressive, societies before
Europeans came with their gunboats.
What I believe was historically unique about western Europe was both an
insatiable curiosity and an overwhelming greed. It is highly probable that
the Chinese navigated the west coast of the Americas well before Europeans
found the east coast. But that is all the Chinese did, navigate. They did
not set up colonies and plunder the lands they found. They didn't feel they
had to. China was complete in itself. Colonizing and plundering the "New
World" was left to the Europeans, and the Chinese, the Koreans and many
other "complete in themselves" peoples ultimately paid dearly for it.
In finding the New World, Europeans found treasure, which is how the
Mercantilist thinkers of the time saw it. The prosperity of Europe prior to
the industrial revolution and in the early phases of industrialization was
largely based on plunder. Plunder abroad plus plunder at home, such as the
enclosures, generated the resources for industrialization. Once the
industrial revolution took off, it generated its own capital, and the
colonies, their products and their markets were then less needed. The
colonial powers of Europe relaxed their grip. What you have now is a
non-European world which consists of countries which have lost much of what
they had, in which people are fighting for the few scraps which are left
(Africa), and countries which were able to retain much of what they had, and
to adopt some of Europe's capability for plunder and accumulation (China,
Korea, Southeast Asia).
Is it possible to have another era of explosive growth such as took place in
Europe and North America during the past five hundred years? Perhaps in the
rich world, but not likely in the poor. In the poor world there are far too
many people and far too few resources. There is far too little wealth, and
those who have it want to hold onto it, investing it in safe havens outside
of the country.
I spent a month in Jamaica recently, a country which gained independence
with the highest of hopes in 1962 and which, by global standards, is still
relatively well off. But now you can almost feel it grinding down. Roads,
hospitals, schools and public institutions in general are deteriorating, and
there is not much that can be done to repair them. Anyone with an education
wants to leave, and even the uneducated want to do so. Why? With nearly
three million people living on a mountainous island the size of Prince
Edward Island there is simply not enough for people to do. Many people have
found a role in the drug trade. Jamaica has become a major transshipment
point for drugs for drugs moving from South America to the US. Others make
a living as hold-up men and petty criminals. There simply are no
alternatives.
By now you must be wondering if I see any possibilities at all. I am
thinking about it. I tend to reject grand scale solutions such as mass
education. For much of the world it is not affordable even if it were
acceptable. Pouring concrete across rivers, as the World Bank has done or
trying to bail out corrupt and leaky regimes such as the IMF has, does not
seem to have worked very well either. However, what I have seen in a few
rather grim and grimy places is the ability of people to look after
themselves as long as their circumstances don't become totally desperate. A
little seed money, strategically placed, can make a big difference, as can
building a community center around which people can organize activities for
themselves and their children.
Sorry about being so long winded, and best regards.
Ed
PS. I hope I'm still not being too much of a moving target or too post hoc
ergo propter hoc in my arguments. I know that I tend to stretch things a
little, hoping people won't notice. I'm putting this on the list so that
others can beat me about the head and shoulders if they feel like it.
> Hi Ed,
>
> We seem to have a moving target here. I entered this discussion on your
> statement that English conditions that produced trade unionism were
unique.
> You gave reasons how other areas of the world differed in ways that made
it
> unlikely for trade unions to emerge. I replied that the conditions you
> described in the other areas as inimical to trade union development were
> also typical of the English environment in the early days of trade
unionism
> there.
>
> Now you seem to be talking about prospects for stability and prosperity.
>
> RE: the Asian tigers etc and your statement that "presumably they must
have
> had the right conditions historically or how could they have got where
they
> are, is a post hoc ergo propter hoc argument and is therefore not
> acceptable. England was not under the occupation of a foreign power for
> much of the modern period, like Korea was. Korea had no out group like
the
> Jews or non-conformists in Europe to provide a development yeast (nor like
> the expatriate Chinese in Malaysia and Indonesia). Thailand has no
> outgroup of this kind either. Any past commercial traditions they might
> have built on were extinguished by the Dutch, English, Spanish and
> Portuguese in the 16th and 17th centuries. (The Europeans basically
sailed
> in and used their cannon to usurp existing, native commercial and trading
> systems - see McNeill). Yet they all underwent phenomenal economic and
> social development in little more than a generation. It took England at
> least six. Relying on the idea of constants in conditions for successful
> economic development goes against the evidence.
>
> Looking at the history of industrialism, it is interesting to note that in
> cultures as different as those of medieval China and medieval Europe,
> commercial and industrial cultures with a sense of progress could emerge
> (see Gimpel and McNeill). They had little of the factors commonly thought
> to be essential to the English Industrial Revolution of the 18th century.
> The only things they shared in common were improvements in agricultural
> technology, a warming climate and a perfectionist ideology. Everything
> else about them was different.
>
> Thus it seems that commercialism and industrialism can arise in a variety
> of social and cultural circumstances, that the constants are relatively
few
> in number and can take varied forms e.g progressive ideology came from
> quite different sources - Cistercian monasticism in medieval Europe,
> Neo-confucianism in Medieval China and Protestant non-conformism in Modern
> England.
>
> As to education, you can change that in a generation, as Europeans did in
> the 19th century. Not for everyone, to begin with, but for enough to make
> a difference. And with computer communications you could do it a lot
> quicker and without the huge capital outlay the Europeans found necessary.
> India has trained a cadre of nuclear scientists capable of designing a
bomb
> in two generations and a cadre of computer engineers and programmers (who
> wrote much of the code for the Soviet space program, I have heard) in one.
> Numerically it has a huge middle class which one can unfancifully compare
> with the English commercial and industrial class of the 17th and 18th
> centuries in its capacity to leaven the national loaf with notions of
> progress and social progressivism. Sure, it has a class ridden society,
> but so did England (still does) and backward elements (the English had the
> Highland Scots and the Irish, still living a medieval lifestyle into this
> century in the form of the crofters. Highland armies invaded England
three
> times in the early modern period. It was their emigration to the Canadian
> Maritimes and the persistence of that culture that has much to do with
that
> areas inability to transition successfully into the industrial way of
life.)
>
> Africa had Great Zimbabwe and Timbuktu - thriving medieval, commercial,
> urban cultures. I don't see any reason why they can't do it again now
that
> the Europeans are off their backs.
>
> Mike
>
> >Mike, the difference between us may be that I see the glass as half
empty.
> >The industrial revolution required a tremendous build up of capital but
also
> >a tremendous build up of labour. Because it was so heavily involved in
the
> >new processes of production, and because of the fluidity of society
compared
> >with, say, feudal society, labour was able to move into a position to
demand
> >a larger share of the rapidly growing product. I would argue that in
> >Canada, the US and western Europe, it was able to get this share because,
> >ultimately, its demands did not diminish the wealth of the capitalists.
> >Everyone's wealth grew.
> >
> >Various trade-offs and saw-offs occurred. Workers recognized that they
had
> >an interest in keeping the machine going and bought into the system. It
> >became a system of common, not opposed, interests. The political process
> >became liberal and democratized, able to smooth out such rough spots as
> >continued to exist, etc.
> >
> >You mention Taiwan, South Korea and China. I would see Taiwan and South
> >Korea as already part of the rich world and China as getting there.
They
> >appear to have undergone radical transformations, but I'm not sure they
were
> >all that radical. The seeds for what they were able to accomplish were
> >probably already there, much like they were in 18th Century England and
19th
> >Century Germany. The same is probably true of other parts of Asia; for
> >example, the "Tigers" which have lost some of their teeth, but which are
now
> >growing them back.
> >
> >However, I don't much possibility of the same kinds of things happening
in
> >much of the rest of Asia or in Sub-Saharan Africa. The conditions are
> >simply not there or, if they are, the politics are simply too repressive
or
> >too chaotic to permit them to flourish. As I mentioned in a previous
> >posting, India strikes me as being too rigid. There is simply not enough
> >wealth to go around, so those who have it cling to it tenaciously, using
> >ancient and venerable systems of caste and inter-ethnic and
inter-religious
> >rivalries to buttress their positions. It is a system so tied in knots
that
> >any mobility is virtually impossible. Sub-Saharan Africa is simply too
> >poor, too chaotic and too violent. One can blame much of this on
European
> >colonialism, but whether it was that or something indigenous doesn't
really
> >matter when we are dealing with peoples chances of having better lives in
> >the world of today.
> >
> >I don't really see the prospect of tremendous technological change
forcing
> >tremendous social and economic change. Unlike the technological change
that
> >took place 200 years ago, technological change today is essentially
labour
> >eliminating. It means that one person and a computer can now do the work
of
> >six people a few decades ago. Participation in the use of such
technology
> >requires a much higher level of education than was needed for machines
that
> >produced textiles or even automobiles. If the poor world were to use
such
> >technology as a basis for growth, a much higher investment in education
> >would be needed, and this would not likely be affordable even if it were
> >seen as politically desirable by the governing elites. Peace, order and
> >good government would also be needed, and this is something that is not
> >abundant in much of the world.
> >
> >So, I'm pessimistic, but supported by some evidence that the rich are
> >getting richer and the poor are falling behind.
> >
> >Ed
> >
> >> Ed,
> >>
> >> The more you describe what you believe to have been the situation
> >> historically in Europe, the more I see parallels in contemporay East
Asia,
> >> India and Latin America. Tremendous technological change forcing
> >> tremendous economic and social change, and, instead of the philosophes
the
> >> Modern people in their own countries and what they see of the West on
the
> >> TV screens. And political elites going with the flow - see the coup in
> >> Asia, the political changes in South Korea and Taiwan and, of course,
the
> >> Deng Zaoping reforms in China.
> >>
>
>
>
