Hi Ed,
I agree with the role of plunder and greed in the English Industrial
Revolution. They played a role. But it has not been true of all
industrial revolutions. There was no plundering and greed in the medieval
European industrial revolution. The driving actors were a religious order
(the Cistercians) and a group of religous fanatics who thought that only
the afterlife was real (the Cathars or Albigensians). I am not aware of
greed and plunder in the medieval Chinese industrial revolution either.
The Neoconfucianists had lot in common with the Cathars - a pretty austere
lot, like the nonconformist protestants who drove the English Industrial
Revolution of the 18th century.
So, I return to my point - industrial revolutions have occurred in widely
differing cultures and societies which did not share all of the
characteristics of England in the 18th century, except the ones I mentioned
- warmer climate, agricultural revolution, ideology of perfection.
Mike
>Hi Mike,
>
>Let me try to restate my argument. Economic growth requires certain basic
>conditions. I would not pretend to know what all of these are, but stability
>and the possibility of upward mobility would, I suspect, be among them. I
>would also include the existence of capital; not only capital itself, but
>the financial infrastructure through which capital can be mobilized. You
>mention three other possibles in your comparison between England and Korea,
>namely improvements in agricultural technology, a warming climate and a
>perfectionist ideology. The presence of "outgroups" such as the Jews or
>Chinese may or may not be a factor.
>
>These factors were not lacking in China, Korea and Taiwan. These were well
>organized and, in some important respects, progressive, societies before
>Europeans came with their gunboats.
>
>What I believe was historically unique about western Europe was both an
>insatiable curiosity and an overwhelming greed. It is highly probable that
>the Chinese navigated the west coast of the Americas well before Europeans
>found the east coast. But that is all the Chinese did, navigate. They did
>not set up colonies and plunder the lands they found. They didn't feel they
>had to. China was complete in itself. Colonizing and plundering the "New
>World" was left to the Europeans, and the Chinese, the Koreans and many
>other "complete in themselves" peoples ultimately paid dearly for it.
>
>In finding the New World, Europeans found treasure, which is how the
>Mercantilist thinkers of the time saw it. The prosperity of Europe prior to
>the industrial revolution and in the early phases of industrialization was
>largely based on plunder. Plunder abroad plus plunder at home, such as the
>enclosures, generated the resources for industrialization. Once the
>industrial revolution took off, it generated its own capital, and the
>colonies, their products and their markets were then less needed. The
>colonial powers of Europe relaxed their grip. What you have now is a
>non-European world which consists of countries which have lost much of what
>they had, in which people are fighting for the few scraps which are left
>(Africa), and countries which were able to retain much of what they had, and
>to adopt some of Europe's capability for plunder and accumulation (China,
>Korea, Southeast Asia).
>
>Is it possible to have another era of explosive growth such as took place in
>Europe and North America during the past five hundred years? Perhaps in the
>rich world, but not likely in the poor. In the poor world there are far too
>many people and far too few resources. There is far too little wealth, and
>those who have it want to hold onto it, investing it in safe havens outside
>of the country.
>
>I spent a month in Jamaica recently, a country which gained independence
>with the highest of hopes in 1962 and which, by global standards, is still
>relatively well off. But now you can almost feel it grinding down. Roads,
>hospitals, schools and public institutions in general are deteriorating, and
>there is not much that can be done to repair them. Anyone with an education
>wants to leave, and even the uneducated want to do so. Why? With nearly
>three million people living on a mountainous island the size of Prince
>Edward Island there is simply not enough for people to do. Many people have
>found a role in the drug trade. Jamaica has become a major transshipment
>point for drugs for drugs moving from South America to the US. Others make
>a living as hold-up men and petty criminals. There simply are no
>alternatives.
>
>By now you must be wondering if I see any possibilities at all. I am
>thinking about it. I tend to reject grand scale solutions such as mass
>education. For much of the world it is not affordable even if it were
>acceptable. Pouring concrete across rivers, as the World Bank has done or
>trying to bail out corrupt and leaky regimes such as the IMF has, does not
>seem to have worked very well either. However, what I have seen in a few
>rather grim and grimy places is the ability of people to look after
>themselves as long as their circumstances don't become totally desperate. A
>little seed money, strategically placed, can make a big difference, as can
>building a community center around which people can organize activities for
>themselves and their children.
>
>Sorry about being so long winded, and best regards.
>
>Ed
>
>PS. I hope I'm still not being too much of a moving target or too post hoc
>ergo propter hoc in my arguments. I know that I tend to stretch things a
>little, hoping people won't notice. I'm putting this on the list so that
>others can beat me about the head and shoulders if they feel like it.
>
>> Hi Ed,
>>
>> We seem to have a moving target here. I entered this discussion on your
>> statement that English conditions that produced trade unionism were
>unique.
>> You gave reasons how other areas of the world differed in ways that made
>it
>> unlikely for trade unions to emerge. I replied that the conditions you
>> described in the other areas as inimical to trade union development were
>> also typical of the English environment in the early days of trade
>unionism
>> there.
>>
>> Now you seem to be talking about prospects for stability and prosperity.
>>
>> RE: the Asian tigers etc and your statement that "presumably they must
>have
>> had the right conditions historically or how could they have got where
>they
>> are, is a post hoc ergo propter hoc argument and is therefore not
>> acceptable. England was not under the occupation of a foreign power for
>> much of the modern period, like Korea was. Korea had no out group like
>the
>> Jews or non-conformists in Europe to provide a development yeast (nor like
>> the expatriate Chinese in Malaysia and Indonesia). Thailand has no
>> outgroup of this kind either. Any past commercial traditions they might
>> have built on were extinguished by the Dutch, English, Spanish and
>> Portuguese in the 16th and 17th centuries. (The Europeans basically
>sailed
>> in and used their cannon to usurp existing, native commercial and trading
>> systems - see McNeill). Yet they all underwent phenomenal economic and
>> social development in little more than a generation. It took England at
>> least six. Relying on the idea of constants in conditions for successful
>> economic development goes against the evidence.
>>
>> Looking at the history of industrialism, it is interesting to note that in
>> cultures as different as those of medieval China and medieval Europe,
>> commercial and industrial cultures with a sense of progress could emerge
>> (see Gimpel and McNeill). They had little of the factors commonly thought
>> to be essential to the English Industrial Revolution of the 18th century.
>> The only things they shared in common were improvements in agricultural
>> technology, a warming climate and a perfectionist ideology. Everything
>> else about them was different.
>>
>> Thus it seems that commercialism and industrialism can arise in a variety
>> of social and cultural circumstances, that the constants are relatively
>few
>> in number and can take varied forms e.g progressive ideology came from
>> quite different sources - Cistercian monasticism in medieval Europe,
>> Neo-confucianism in Medieval China and Protestant non-conformism in Modern
>> England.
>>
>> As to education, you can change that in a generation, as Europeans did in
>> the 19th century. Not for everyone, to begin with, but for enough to make
>> a difference. And with computer communications you could do it a lot
>> quicker and without the huge capital outlay the Europeans found necessary.
>> India has trained a cadre of nuclear scientists capable of designing a
>bomb
>> in two generations and a cadre of computer engineers and programmers (who
>> wrote much of the code for the Soviet space program, I have heard) in one.
>> Numerically it has a huge middle class which one can unfancifully compare
>> with the English commercial and industrial class of the 17th and 18th
>> centuries in its capacity to leaven the national loaf with notions of
>> progress and social progressivism. Sure, it has a class ridden society,
>> but so did England (still does) and backward elements (the English had the
>> Highland Scots and the Irish, still living a medieval lifestyle into this
>> century in the form of the crofters. Highland armies invaded England
>three
>> times in the early modern period. It was their emigration to the Canadian
>> Maritimes and the persistence of that culture that has much to do with
>that
>> areas inability to transition successfully into the industrial way of
>life.)
>>
>> Africa had Great Zimbabwe and Timbuktu - thriving medieval, commercial,
>> urban cultures. I don't see any reason why they can't do it again now
>that
>> the Europeans are off their backs.
>>
>> Mike
>>
>> >Mike, the difference between us may be that I see the glass as half
>empty.
>> >The industrial revolution required a tremendous build up of capital but
>also
>> >a tremendous build up of labour. Because it was so heavily involved in
>the
>> >new processes of production, and because of the fluidity of society
>compared
>> >with, say, feudal society, labour was able to move into a position to
>demand
>> >a larger share of the rapidly growing product. I would argue that in
>> >Canada, the US and western Europe, it was able to get this share because,
>> >ultimately, its demands did not diminish the wealth of the capitalists.
>> >Everyone's wealth grew.
>> >
>> >Various trade-offs and saw-offs occurred. Workers recognized that they
>had
>> >an interest in keeping the machine going and bought into the system. It
>> >became a system of common, not opposed, interests. The political process
>> >became liberal and democratized, able to smooth out such rough spots as
>> >continued to exist, etc.
>> >
>> >You mention Taiwan, South Korea and China. I would see Taiwan and South
>> >Korea as already part of the rich world and China as getting there.
>They
>> >appear to have undergone radical transformations, but I'm not sure they
>were
>> >all that radical. The seeds for what they were able to accomplish were
>> >probably already there, much like they were in 18th Century England and
>19th
>> >Century Germany. The same is probably true of other parts of Asia; for
>> >example, the "Tigers" which have lost some of their teeth, but which are
>now
>> >growing them back.
>> >
>> >However, I don't much possibility of the same kinds of things happening
>in
>> >much of the rest of Asia or in Sub-Saharan Africa. The conditions are
>> >simply not there or, if they are, the politics are simply too repressive
>or
>> >too chaotic to permit them to flourish. As I mentioned in a previous
>> >posting, India strikes me as being too rigid. There is simply not enough
>> >wealth to go around, so those who have it cling to it tenaciously, using
>> >ancient and venerable systems of caste and inter-ethnic and
>inter-religious
>> >rivalries to buttress their positions. It is a system so tied in knots
>that
>> >any mobility is virtually impossible. Sub-Saharan Africa is simply too
>> >poor, too chaotic and too violent. One can blame much of this on
>European
>> >colonialism, but whether it was that or something indigenous doesn't
>really
>> >matter when we are dealing with peoples chances of having better lives in
>> >the world of today.
>> >
>> >I don't really see the prospect of tremendous technological change
>forcing
>> >tremendous social and economic change. Unlike the technological change
>that
>> >took place 200 years ago, technological change today is essentially
>labour
>> >eliminating. It means that one person and a computer can now do the work
>of
>> >six people a few decades ago. Participation in the use of such
>technology
>> >requires a much higher level of education than was needed for machines
>that
>> >produced textiles or even automobiles. If the poor world were to use
>such
>> >technology as a basis for growth, a much higher investment in education
>> >would be needed, and this would not likely be affordable even if it were
>> >seen as politically desirable by the governing elites. Peace, order and
>> >good government would also be needed, and this is something that is not
>> >abundant in much of the world.
>> >
>> >So, I'm pessimistic, but supported by some evidence that the rich are
>> >getting richer and the poor are falling behind.
>> >
>> >Ed
>> >
>> >> Ed,
>> >>
>> >> The more you describe what you believe to have been the situation
>> >> historically in Europe, the more I see parallels in contemporay East
>Asia,
>> >> India and Latin America. Tremendous technological change forcing
>> >> tremendous economic and social change, and, instead of the philosophes
>the
>> >> Modern people in their own countries and what they see of the West on
>the
>> >> TV screens. And political elites going with the flow - see the coup in
>> >> Asia, the political changes in South Korea and Taiwan and, of course,
>the
>> >> Deng Zaoping reforms in China.
>> >>
>>
>>
>>
