Selma, The question is whether or not you are a Jeb/George Bush fan.
Bill On Wed, 9 Jul 2003 10:41:15 -0400 "Selma Singer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > I'm sorry to be so dense; perhaps I misread the article. My > understanding > was that this egregious situation has NOT been corrected. > > Selma > > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Sent: Wednesday, July 09, 2003 10:10 AM > Subject: Re: [Futurework] Fw: Bigger Than Watergate! > > > > We dun gottit and it dun did its job in 2000. > > > > On Wed, 9 Jul 2003 10:10:25 -0400 "Selma Singer" > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > writes: > > > Are you saying the system to cheat the voters has been > implemented or > > > that it has been corrected? > > > > > > Selma > > > > > > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > > From: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > > To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > > Sent: Wednesday, July 09, 2003 9:29 AM > > > Subject: Re: [Futurework] Fw: Bigger Than Watergate! > > > > > > > > > > That is a lot of work to create a system that we already have > > > implemented > > > > here in Florida. > > > > > > > > Bill > > > > > > > > On Wed, 9 Jul 2003 08:57:11 -0400 "Selma Singer" > > > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > > > writes: > > > > > > > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > > > > Sent: Tuesday, July 08, 2003 9:11 PM > > > > > Subject: Bigger Than Watergate! > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > URL: http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0307/S00064.htm > > > > > > > > > > Sludge Report #154 - Bigger Than Watergate! > > > > > Tuesday, 8 July 2003, 6:13 pm > > > > > Column: C.D. Sludge > > > > > > > > > > IMPORTANT NOTE: Publication of this story marks a > > > > > watershed in American political history. It is > > > > > offered freely for publication in full or part on > > > > > any and all internet forums, blogs and > > > > > noticeboards. All other media are also encouraged > > > > > to utilise material. Readers are encouraged to > > > > > forward this to friends and acquaintances in the > > > > > United States and elsewhere. > > > > > > > > > > See Also Companion Article For Detail And Screenshots Of An > > > Election > > > > > HackS > > > > > Inside A U.S. Election Vote Counting Program > > > > > > > > > > http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0307/S00065.htm > > > > > > > > > > Sludge Report #154 > > > > > > > > > > Bigger Than Watergate! > > > > > > > > > > The story you are about to read is in this > > > > > writer's view the biggest political scandal in > > > > > American history, if not global history. And it > > > > > is being broken today here in New Zealand. > > > > > > > > > > This story cuts to the bone the machinery of > > > > > democracy in America today. Democracy is the only > > > > > protection we have against despotic and arbitrary > > > > > government, and this story is deeply disturbing. > > > > > > > > > > Imagine if you will that you are a political > > > > > interest group that wishes to control forevermore > > > > > the levers of power. Imagine further that you > > > > > know you are likely to implement a highly > > > > > unpopular political agenda, and you do not wish > > > > > to be removed by a ballot driven backlash. > > > > > > > > > > One way to accomplish this outcome would be to > > > > > adopt the Mugabe (Zimbabwe) or Hun Sen (Cambodia) > > > > > approach. You agree to hold elections, but > > > > > simultaneously arrest, imprison and beat your > > > > > opponents and their supporters. You stuff ballot > > > > > boxes, disenfranchise voters who are unlikely to > > > > > vote for you, distort electoral boundaries and > > > > > provide insufficient polling stations in areas > > > > > full of opposition supporters. > > > > > > > > > > However as so many despots have discovered, > > > > > eventually such techniques always fail - often > > > > > violently. Hence, if you are a truly ambitious > > > > > political dynasty you have to be a bit more > > > > > subtle about your methods. > > > > > > > > > > Imagine then if it were possible to somehow > > > > > subvert the voting process itself in such a way > > > > > that you could steal elections without anybody > > > > > knowing. > > > > > > > > > > Imagine for example if you could: > > > > > > > > > > - secure control of the companies that make the > > > > > voting machines and vote counting software; > > > > > - centralise vote counting systems, and politicise their > > > > > supervision; > > > > > - legislate for the adoption of such systems > > > > > throughout your domain, and provide large > > > > > amounts of money for the purchase of these > > > > > systems; > > > > > - establish systems of vote counting that > > > > > effectively prevent anybody on the ground in the > > > > > election - at a booth or precinct level - from > > > > > seeing what is happening at a micro-level; > > > > > - get all the major media to sign up to a single > > > > > exit-polling system that you also control - > > > > > removing the risk of exit-polling showing up your > > > > > shenanigans. > > > > > > > > > > And imagine further that you; > > > > > > > > > > - install a backdoor, or numerous backdoors, in > > > > > the vote counting systems you have built that > > > > > enable you to manipulate the tabulation of > > > > > results in real time as they are coming in. > > > > > > > > > > Such a system would enable you to intervene in > > > > > precisely the minimum number of races necessary > > > > > to ensure that you won a majority on election > > > > > night. On the basis of polling you could pick > > > > > your marginal seats and thus keep your tweaking > > > > > to a bare minimum. > > > > > > > > > > Such a system would enable you to minimise the > > > > > risks of discovery of your activities. > > > > > > > > > > Such a system would enable you to target and > > > > > remove individual political opponents who were > > > > > too successful, too popular or too inquisitive. > > > > > > > > > > And most importantly of all, such a system would > > > > > enable you to accomplish all the above without > > > > > the public being in the least aware of what you > > > > > were doing. When confronted with the awfulness of > > > > > your programme they would be forced to concede > > > > > that at least it is the result of a democratic > > > > > process. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > How To Rig An Election In The United States > > > > > > > > > > So how would such a system actually work? > > > > > > > > > > Well one way to run such a corrupt electoral system might > look > > > like > > > > > this. > > > > > > > > > > - Each voting precinct (or booth) could be fitted > > > > > with electronic voting systems, optical scanning > > > > > systems, punch card voting systems or the more > > > > > modern touchscreen electronic voting machines; > > > > > > > > > > - At the close of play each day the > > > > > booth/precinct supervisor could be under > > > > > instructions to compile an electronic record of > > > > > the votes cast in their booth; > > > > > > > > > > - They might print out a report that contains > > > > > only the details of the total votes count for > > > > > that precinct/booth, and then file via modem the > > > > > full electronic record of votes through to the > > > > > County supervisor; > > > > > > > > > > - The County Supervisor could be equipped with a > > > > > special piece of software and a bank of modems > > > > > that enables all these results to be received and > > > > > tabulated in the internals of the computer; > > > > > > > > > > - The County Supervisors themselves could be > > > > > assured that their system was bullet proof, > > > > > certified and contained tamper-protection > > > > > mechanisms par excellence; > > > > > > > > > > - The Country Supervisor could be given a range > > > > > of tools for looking at the data within this > > > > > software, but nothing to enable them to directly > > > > > manipulate the results; > > > > > > > > > > - But unbeknownst to the County Supervisor the > > > > > software could actually create three separate > > > > > records of the voting data; > > > > > > > > > > - Meanwhile - also unbeknownst to the County > > > > > Supervisor - these three tables of voting data > > > > > could be in fact completely insecure and > > > > accessible simply through a common database > > > > > programme, say Microsoft Access; > > > > > > > > > > - Having the three tables would enable you to > > > > > keep the real data in place - so the system could > > > > > pass spot tests on individual precincts and booth > > > > > results (should a precinct supervisor be > > > > > particularly astute) -while simultaneously > > > > > enabling you to manipulate the bottom line result; > > > > > > > > > > - Finally you might also enhance the election > > > > > hacker's powers by including within the software > > > > > a utility to enable them to cover their tracks by > > > > > changing the date and time stamps on files and > > > > > remove evidence of your tampering. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Fantasy Becomes Reality > > > > > > > > > > The above description of a corrupt voting system > > > > > is not the result of an overactive imagination. > > > > > Rather it is the result of a extensive research > > > > > by computer programmers and journalists working > > > > > around the globe. Principally it is the work of > > > > > investigative Journalist Bev Harris, author of > > > > > the soon to be published book " Black Box Voting: > > > > > Ballot Tampering In The 21st Century " > > > > > > > > > > And most important of all it is the result of > > > > > research focussed on investigating the actual > > > > > software distributed by one of the largest voting > > > > > systems companies operating in the recent U.S. > > > > > Elections. > > > > > > > > > > CAVEAT: It is important to note that the research > > > > > into this subject has not established that the > > > > > files we have been working on were in fact in > > > > > situ in County Election Supervisors offices at > > > > > the last election - nor have we proof that the > > > > > back door we have discovered - which might > > > > > enable the rigging of elections - was actually > > > > > used in any recent election. However it is the > > > > > considered opinion of all those involved in this > > > > > investigation that it is not up to us as > > > > > journalists or programmers to prove that > > > > > elections were rigged, rather it is a > > > > > responsibility of the electoral system itself to > > > > > prove its integrity. > > > > > > > > > > What you read here amounts to revelation of > > > > > evidence of motive, opportunity,method, prior > > > > > conduct, and a variety of items of, consistent > > > > > unexplained circumstantial evidence. > > > > > Significantly we do not believe we have > > > > > sufficient resources to complete this > > > > > investigation to its conclusion and are therefore > > > > > making available our findings to the media, > > > > > community organisations, political parties, > > > > > computer scientists and geeks in the anticipation > > > > > that they will pick up the torch and take extend > > > > > this inquiry into every county in the United > > > > > States. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > How We Discovered The Backdoor > > > > > > > > > > The story of how this story emerged is a great > > > > > tale in itself, most of which has already been > > > > > told in this report by Bev Harris. > > > > > > > > > > SYSTEM INTEGRITY FLAW DISCOVERED AT DIEBOLD ELECTION SYSTEMS > > > > > http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0302/S00052.htm > > > > > > > > > > The short version of the story is relatively simple. > > > > > > > > > > In the course of investigating the issue of the > > > > > integrity of new electronic voting machines Bev > > > > > Harris learned that people around the world had > > > > > been downloading from an open FTP site belonging > > > > > to Diebold Election Systems, one of the leading > > > > > manufactures of voting systems. > > > > > > > > > > This website contained several gigabytes of files > > > > > including manuals, source codes and installation > > > > > versions of numerous parts of the Diebold voting > > > > > system, and of its vote counting programme GEMS. > > > > > > > > > > Realising we had stumbled across what might be > > > > > the equivalent of the Pentagon Papers for > > > > > elections, the full contents of this website have > > > > > been secured around the world at several > > > > > locations. The original website was itself taken > > > > > down on January 29th 2003. > > > > > > > > > > We can now reveal for the first time the location > > > > > of a complete online copy of the original data > > > > > set. As we anticipate attempts to prevent the > > > > > distribution of this information we encourage > > > > > supporters of democracy to make copies of these > > > > > files and to make them available on websites and > > > > > file sharing networks. > > > > > > > > > > http://users.actrix.co.nz/dolly/ > > > > > > > > > > As many of the files are zip password protected > > > > > you may need some assistance in opening them, we > > > > > have found that the utility available at the > > > > > following URL works well: > > > > > > > > > > http://www.lostpassword.com > > > > > > > > > > Finally some of the zip files are partially > > > > > damaged, but these too can be read by using the > > > > > utility at: > > > > > > > > > > http://www.zip-repair.com/ > > > > > > > > > > At this stage in this inquiry we do not believe > > > > > that we have come even remotely close to > > > > > investigating all aspects of this data. I.E. > > > > > There is no reason to believe that the security > > > > > flaws discovered so far are the only ones. > > > > > > > > > > Therefore we expect many more discoveries to be > > > > > made. We want the assistance of the online > > > > > computing community in this enterprise and we > > > > > encourage you to file your findings at the forum > > > > > HERE, > > > > > > > > > http://www.liberalisnotadirtyword.com/cgi-bin/dcforum/dcboard.cgi > > > > > > > > > > Finally, for obvious reasons it is important that > > > > > this information is distributed as widely as > > > > > possible as quickly as possible. We encourage all > > > > > web bloggers, web publishers and web media to > > > > > re-publish and link to this article and to its > > > > > companion article by Bev Harris which contains > > > > > detailed descriptions of how to use the GEMS > > > > > software to rig an election.: > > > > > > > > > > To conclude this overview article I will make a > > > > > few more comments on the evidence we have thus > > > > > far that the U.S. election system has been > > > > > compromised. As stated earlier we do not at this > > > > > stage have proof that it has in fact been been > > > > > compromised through this method, just a great > > > > > deal of circumstantial evidence that it could > > > > > have been. > > > > > > > > > > If this was Watergate, we are effectively at the > > > > > point of discovering evidence of a break-in and > > > > > have received the call from deep-throat telling > > > > > us that should dig much deeper. > > > > > > > > > > Proof will follow in time we expect, but only if > > > > > the work we have begun is completed and this > > > > > inquiry is taken into every corner of the U.S. > > > > > electoral system. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Evidence Of Motive > > > > > > > > > > This is probably the easiest part of this puzzle > > > > > to get your head around. The motivation of the > > > > > Republican Party in general and the current > > > > > administration in particular to gain ever greater > > > > > amounts of power - by whatever means possible > > > > > and damn the consequences - is evidenced most > > > > > recently in the Supreme Court's partisan > > > > > appointment of George Bush Jr. as President, the > > > > > attempt to recall California Governor Gray Davis, > > > > > and the Ken Starr investigation and attempted > > > > > impeachment of President Clinton. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Evidence Of Opportunity > > > > > > > > > > Republican connected control over the major > > > > > election systems companies in the United States > > > > > has been thoroughly researched. > > > > > > > > > > Bob Urosevich, CEO of Diebold Election Systems > > > > > is also the founder of ES&S, a competing voting > > > > > machine company. Together these two companies > > > > > are responsible for tallying around 80% of votes > > > > > cast in the United States. Also significant, from > > > > > what we can determine about the architecture of > > > > > the software, is that its basic structure was > > > > > specifically a creation of Mr Urosevich's company > > > > > I-Mark. > > > > > > > > > > For more background on Diebold Systems connections to the > > > Republican > > > > > Party > > > > > see: > > > > > > > > > > Diebold - The Face Of Modern Ballot Tampering > > > > > http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0211/S00081.htm > > > > > > > > > > Meanwhile Presidential wannabee and Republican > > > > > Party United States Senator Chuck Hagel has been > > > > > directly connected to ES&S via his campaign > > > > > finance director, Michael McCarthy, who has > > > > > admitted that Senator Hagel still owns a > > > > > beneficial interest in the ES&S parent company, > > > > > the McCarthy Group. > > > > > > > > > > Senate Ethics Director Resigns; Senator Hagel > > > > > Admits Owning Voting Machine Company > > > > > http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0301/S00166.htm > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Evidence Of Method > > > > > > > > > > The evidence of method has been detailed in a > > > > > companion article by Bev Harris, author of the > > > > > soon to be published block-buster Black Box > > > > > Voting. > > > > > > > > > > Inside A U.S. Election Vote Counting Program > > > > > http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0307/S00065.htm > > > > > > > > > > In this article - which contains screenshots from > > > > > the software and detailed instructions on how one > > > > > might rig an election - Bev Harris explains > > > > > security flaws thus: > > > > > > > > > > The GEMS election file contains more than one > > > > > "set of books." They are hidden from the person > > > > > running the GEMS program, but you can see them if > > > > > you go into Microsoft Access. > > > > > > > > > > You might look at it like this: Suppose you have > > > > > votes on paper ballots, and you pile all the > > > > > paper ballots in room one. Then, you make a copy > > > > > of all the ballots and put the stack of copies in > > > > > room 2. > > > > > > > > > > You then leave the door open to room 2, so that > > > > > people can come in and out, replacing some of the > > > > > votes in the stack with their own. > > > > > > > > > > You could have some sort of security device that > > > > > would tell you if any of the copies of votes in > > > > > room 2 have been changed, but you opt not to. > > > > > > > > > > Now, suppose you want to count the votes. Should > > > > > you count them from room 1 (original votes)? Or > > > > > should you count them from room 2, where they may > > > > > or may not be the same as room 1? What Diebold > > > > > chose to do in the files we examined was to count > > > > > the votes from "room2." > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Evidence Of Prior Conduct > > > > > > > > > > It is a recorded fact that every system of > > > > > balloting established in America has been gamed > > > > > and rigged. I.E. America's political > > > > > practitioners have a very long history of ballot > > > > > rigging and vote tampering. This is nothing new > > > > > and evidence of the sort we have uncovered has > > > > > been long predicted by computer scientists such > > > > > as Dr Rebecca Mercuri. > > > > > > > > > > In more recent history investigative Journalist > > > > > Greg Palast has documented in detail Katherine > > > > > Harris's use of electronic data matching > > > > > technologies to disenfranchise thousands of > > > > > Florida voters in advance of the 2000> > > > > Presidential election. > > > > > > > > > > We highly recommend readers purchase a copy of > > > > > "The Best Democracy Money Can Buy" by Greg Palast > > > > > to read much more about this. > > > > > > > > > > A compendium of links on Palast's investigations > > > > > can be found via a Google search on: > > > > > "greg palast florida katherine harris" > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Consistent Unexplained Circumstantial Evidence > > > > > > > > > > During the 2002 Mid-term there were numerous > > > > > reports of unusual happenings in counties > > > > > throughout the United States. > > > > > > > > > > Among the phenomena reported were voting numbers > > > > > suddenly fluctuating in the middle of the > > > > > counting process, something you might expect to > > > > > see if the backdoor identified above were used > > > > > clumsily. > > > > > > > > > > An organisation called Votewatch was set up > > > > > during the 2002 elections to record unusual > > > > > happenings and its archives can be viewed here. > > > > > > > > > > http://pub103.ezboard.com/bsoldiervoice > > > > > > > > > > It will suffice here to cite a couple of specific > > > > > examples - these are excerpts from the soon to be > > > > > published " Black Box Voting: Ballot Tampering In > > > > > The 21st Century ". These examples of actual > > > > > events are consistent with the existence and use > > > > > of an electronic vote counting hack described > > > > > above. > > > > > > > > > > November 1990, Seattle, Washington - Worse than > > > > > the butterfly ballot, some Democratic candidates > > > > > watched votes alight, then flutter away. Democrat > > > > > Al Williams saw 90 votes wander off his tally > > > > > between election night and the following day, > > > > > though no new counting had been done. At the same > > > > > time, his opponent, Republican Tom Tangen, gained > > > > > 32 votes. At one point several hundred ballots > > > > > added to returns didn't result in any increase in > > > > > the number of votes. But elsewhere, the number of > > > > > votes added exceeded the number of additional > > > > > ballots counted. A Republican candidate achieved > > > > > an amazing surge in his absentee percentage for > > > > > no apparent reason. And no one seemed to notice > > > > > (until a determined Democratic candidate started > > > > > demanding an answer) that the machines simply > > > > > forgot to count 14,000 votes. > > > > > > > > > > November 1996, Bergen County, New Jersey - > > > > > Democrats told Bergen County Clerk Kathleen > > > > > Donovan to come up with a better explanation for > > > > > mysterious swings in vote totals. Donovan blamed > > > > > voting computers for conflicting tallies that > > > > > rose and fell by 8,000 or 9,000 votes. The swings > > > > > perplexed candidates of both parties. For > > > > > example, the Republican incumbent, Anthony > > > > > Cassano, had won by about 7,000 votes as of the > > > > > day after the election but his lead evaporated > > > > > later. One candidate actually lost 1,600 votes > > > > > during the counting. "How could something like > > > > > that possibly happen?" asked Michael Guarino, > > > > > Cassano's Democratic challenger. "Something is > > > > > screwed up here." > > > > > > > > > > November 1999, Onondaga County, New York - > > > > > Computers gave the election to the wrong > > > > > candidate, then gave it back. Bob Faulkner, a > > > > > political newcomer, went to bed on Election Night > > > > > confident he had helped complete a Republican > > > > > sweep of three open council seats. But after > > > > > Onondaga County Board of Elections staffers > > > > > rechecked the totals, Faulkner had lost to > > > > > Democratic incumbent Elaine Lytel. > > > > > > > > > > April 2002, Johnson County, Kansas - Johnson > > > > > County's new Diebold touch screen machines, > > > > > proclaimed a success on election night, did not > > > > > work as well as originally believed. Incorrect > > > > > vote totals were discovered in six races, three > > > > > of them contested, leaving county election > > > > > officials scrambling to make sure the unofficial > > > > > results were accurate. Johnson County Election > > > > > Commissioner Connie Schmidt checked the machines > > > > > and found that the computers had under- and > > > > > over-reported hundreds of votes. "The machines > > > > > performed terrifically," said Bob Urosevich, CEO > > > > > of Diebold Election Systems. "The anomaly showed > > > > > up on the reporting part." > > > > > > > > > > The problem, however, was so perplexing that > > > > > Schmidt asked the Board of Canvassers to order a > > > > > hand re-count to make sure the results were > > > > > accurate. Unfortunately, the touch screen > > > > > machines did away with the ballots, so the only > > > > > way to do a hand recount is to have the machine > > > > > print its internal data page by page. Diebold > > > > > tried to re-create the error in hopes of > > > > > correcting it. "I wish I had an answer," > > > > > Urosevich said. In some cases, vote totals > > > > > changed dramatically. > > > > > > > > > > November 2002, Comal County, Texas - A > > > > > Texas-sized lack of curiosity about > > > > > discrepancies: The uncanny coincidence of three > > > > > winning Republican candidates in a row tallying > > > > > up exactly 18,181 votes each was called weird, > > > > > but apparently no one thought it was weird enough > > > > > to audit. Conversion to alphabet: 18181 18181 > > > > > 18181 ahaha ahaha ahaha > > > > > > > > > > November 2002, Baldwin County, Alabama - No one > > > > > at the voting machine company can explain the > > > > > mystery votes that changed after polling places > > > > > had closed, flipping the election from the > > > > > Democratic winner to a Republican in the Alabama > > > > > governor's race. "Something happened. I don't > > > > > have enough intelligence to say exactly what," > > > > > said Mark Kelley of ES&S. Baldwin County results > > > > > showed that Democrat Don Siegelman earned enough > > > > > votes to win the state of Alabama. All the > > > > > observers went home. The next morning, however, > > > > > 6,300 of Siegelman's votes inexplicably had > > > > > disappeared, and the election was handed to > > > > > Republican Bob Riley. A recount was requested, > > > > > but denied. > > > > > > > > > > November 2002, New York - Voting machine tallies > > > > > impounded in New York: Software programming > > > > > errors hampered and confused the vote tally on > > > > > election night and most of the next day, causing > > > > > elections officials to pull the plug on the > > > > > vote-reporting Web site. Commissioners ordered > > > > > that the voting machine tallies be impounded, and > > > > > they were guarded overnight by a Monroe County > > > > > deputy sheriff. > > > > > > > > > > November 2002, Georgia - Election officials lost > > > > > their memory: Fulton County election officials > > > > > said that memory cards from 67 electronic voting > > > > > machines had been misplaced, so ballots cast on > > > > > those machines were left out of previously > > > > > announced vote totals. No hand count can shine > > > > > any light on this; the entire state of Georgia > > > > > went to touch-screen machines with no physical > > > > > record of the vote. Fifty-six cards, containing > > > > > 2,180 ballots, were located, but 11 memory cards > > > > > still were missing two days after the election: > > > > > Bibb County and Glynn County each had one card > > > > > missing after the initial vote count. When DeKalb > > > > > County election officials went home early > > > > > Wednesday morning, they were missing 10 cards. > > > > > > > > > > **** ENDS **** > > > > > > > > > > Anti�opyright Sludge 2003 > > > > > > > > > > Copyright (c) Scoop Media > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > > Futurework mailing list > > > > > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > > > > http://scribe.uwaterloo.ca/mailman/listinfo/futurework > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ________________________________________________________________ > > > > The best thing to hit the internet in years - Juno SpeedBand! > > > > Surf the web up to FIVE TIMES FASTER! > > > > Only $14.95/ month - visit www.juno.com to sign up today! > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > > Futurework mailing list > > > > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > > > http://scribe.uwaterloo.ca/mailman/listinfo/futurework > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ________________________________________________________________ > > The best thing to hit the internet in years - Juno SpeedBand! > > Surf the web up to FIVE TIMES FASTER! > > Only $14.95/ month - visit www.juno.com to sign up today! > > _______________________________________________ > > Futurework mailing list > > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > http://scribe.uwaterloo.ca/mailman/listinfo/futurework > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Futurework mailing list > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > http://scribe.uwaterloo.ca/mailman/listinfo/futurework > > ________________________________________________________________ The best thing to hit the internet in years - Juno SpeedBand! Surf the web up to FIVE TIMES FASTER! Only $14.95/ month - visit www.juno.com to sign up today! _______________________________________________ Futurework mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://scribe.uwaterloo.ca/mailman/listinfo/futurework
