-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 On 13/02/15 16:33, Nathan of Guardian wrote: >> In both cases, the Bluetooth MAC address is published in a DNS >> TXT record via Wi-Fi Direct service discovery. Reverse >> engineering the rest of the FireChat protocol is left as an >> exercise for the reader. ;-) > > I had a change to speak with the Rangzen team recently > (denovogroup.org/main/rangzen-project/) and they are doing the > exact same thing.
Cool! Maybe we should put together some docs on how to do this. > Would it make sense to publish more than the Bluetooth MAC in > there? What about public keys, onions or other decentralized > identity and routing information? I think it depends on the use case. If you want to reconnect to the same peers via Tor when they're no longer in range, maybe it makes sense to publish an onion address here. If you want to build a trust system where you prefer to connect to recognised/reputable peers, maybe it makes sense to publish identity information here. But my instinct is KISS - publish only the information needed for making a connection, then handle all the other stuff after you connect. Cheers, Michael -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJU3lKBAAoJEBEET9GfxSfMpoAH/2m03Ba8VLDuf4dgZkHTHUgN a6Us0Xam6vir4aDXtBXkdR4hWlXqIQASzTyu88u+mZXRoyB3L9O1QTNdKPItoVry wPWxA1y1G7qx1p2qOzkI9mNOI+lG/q3KtgecR+ahnXBbQI4zmICsMzSsAHZUVRaP CnnMUht15uNQxXfMY8HX0Y3Fdr9BKlbp5aTfUFBnTdUnHS/CRcbsuSXRHEArYrfE qyvUeWLHu6MJyd6Br6ySy4qzdMpwU71bVx8BjOi2BR9AGv1o9PrgOQi9Lws2geMI nGppQeDd+SGdfv2HZkY3cotW4NKb3eRW2nURySDysQcWrb4ivim+3Dp8dSRf1Ms= =G0VA -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ List info: https://lists.mayfirst.org/mailman/listinfo/guardian-dev To unsubscribe, email: guardian-dev-unsubscr...@lists.mayfirst.org
