Hello, On Tue, Feb 17, 2015 at 11:03 AM, Nathan of Guardian < [email protected]> wrote:
> > > On Mon, Feb 16, 2015, at 07:10 PM, Paul Gardner-Stephen wrote: > > Hello all, > > > > Just a heads up that we have finally been able to start working on > > merging > > the GilgaMesh functionality into Serval. This should within a month or > > two > > result in the ability to send and receive encrypted, authenticated MeshMS > > messages between nearby handsets using the Bluetooth name hack. More news > > as we make progress. > > Excellent. BTW, my proposed verb / name for this activity is "chime" > within the wind metaphor I am using. Chime is meant to be an > impl-indepedent description of async/broadcast announcing to physically > nearby peers that you are available to speak a certain protocol/scheme > via a specified hardware address or other radio identifier. > No problem from our end using "chime" as the name, although the implementations will necessarily be incompatible since there will be different protocols sitting on top. > On the net, you ping. On the web, you link. In wind, you chime! Sounds good :) Paul. > > > > > > Paul. > > > > On Sat, Feb 14, 2015 at 6:07 AM, Michael Rogers > > <[email protected]> > > wrote: > > > > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > > Hash: SHA256 > > > > > > On 13/02/15 16:33, Nathan of Guardian wrote: > > > >> In both cases, the Bluetooth MAC address is published in a DNS > > > >> TXT record via Wi-Fi Direct service discovery. Reverse > > > >> engineering the rest of the FireChat protocol is left as an > > > >> exercise for the reader. ;-) > > > > > > > > I had a change to speak with the Rangzen team recently > > > > (denovogroup.org/main/rangzen-project/) and they are doing the > > > > exact same thing. > > > > > > Cool! Maybe we should put together some docs on how to do this. > > > > > > > Would it make sense to publish more than the Bluetooth MAC in > > > > there? What about public keys, onions or other decentralized > > > > identity and routing information? > > > > > > I think it depends on the use case. If you want to reconnect to the > > > same peers via Tor when they're no longer in range, maybe it makes > > > sense to publish an onion address here. If you want to build a trust > > > system where you prefer to connect to recognised/reputable peers, > > > maybe it makes sense to publish identity information here. But my > > > instinct is KISS - publish only the information needed for making a > > > connection, then handle all the other stuff after you connect. > > > > > > Cheers, > > > Michael > > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > > > Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux) > > > > > > iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJU3lKBAAoJEBEET9GfxSfMpoAH/2m03Ba8VLDuf4dgZkHTHUgN > > > a6Us0Xam6vir4aDXtBXkdR4hWlXqIQASzTyu88u+mZXRoyB3L9O1QTNdKPItoVry > > > wPWxA1y1G7qx1p2qOzkI9mNOI+lG/q3KtgecR+ahnXBbQI4zmICsMzSsAHZUVRaP > > > CnnMUht15uNQxXfMY8HX0Y3Fdr9BKlbp5aTfUFBnTdUnHS/CRcbsuSXRHEArYrfE > > > qyvUeWLHu6MJyd6Br6ySy4qzdMpwU71bVx8BjOi2BR9AGv1o9PrgOQi9Lws2geMI > > > nGppQeDd+SGdfv2HZkY3cotW4NKb3eRW2nURySDysQcWrb4ivim+3Dp8dSRf1Ms= > > > =G0VA > > > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > > > _______________________________________________ > > > List info: https://lists.mayfirst.org/mailman/listinfo/guardian-dev > > > To unsubscribe, email: [email protected] > > > > > > -- > Nathan of Guardian > [email protected] >
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