In message <78ce7d95-48c9-4de4-9707-f11ac2a05...@cisco.com>
Ole Troan writes:
 
> > I've been reading the list with interest and have a question.
> > 
> > When various devices in the home figure out which does what,
> > and do that periodically to handle changes, there's clearly
> > the potential that a zombied host tries to try take over
> > stuff with undesirable consequences.
> > 
> > My question is whether this group are planning to think
> > about that now, or later, or never? (Or don't even think
> > there's a problem worth attempting to address.)
> > 
> > Note - I'm not trying to argue for any particular level of
> > security and certainly not for some unachievable fort knox
> > everywhere, I'm just asking what's the plan?
>  
> can we explore some fundamental principles of how and what we need to
> "secure"?

Yes.  Please do.

> using the electricity network as an analogy, can we make a distinction
> between "safety" and "security"?  the electricity network in the home
> is somewhat self protecting with breakers and earthing.  a home
> network must protect 'itself', i.e. handle any device plugged into it,
> in any topology, external and internal attacks and so on.
>  
> I don't think it is the networks job to control who has access to the
> pictures of my grandmother or who can print to my printer. that's
> application policy.

Exactly.  This is a multi-decade old debate.

Should the applications be insecure and rely on a firewall?
(Microsoft advocated this in the 1990s and it has stuck to a large
extent).  Or should the network be open and the applications secure?

I'm strongly with you on this.  The applications should take care of
any security that is necessary *for that application*.

> is it the networks job to control who has access to the network? no, I
> think that is a layer 2 function.

No. No. No.

Security is not a layer-2 function.  Security is an application
function.  You had it right the first time.  Key exchanges and
certificates are not layer-2 functions.

It is entirely possible that the same computer has pictures of Grandma
that I'm OK with you seeing and has a printer hanging off it that I
don't want anyone in the world to be able to print on.  Same MAC
address.  So that can't be a layer-2 function.

And port filtering at a firewall is a lame excuse for security.  The
bug in relying on a firewall in an enterprise (a little less so for a
home) is that once any one user downloads malware, that malware has
access to everthing behind the firewall largely because of the
assumption that security is not needed because there is a firewall.

Lets not enshine the dumbest practices of the IT world.

> I think homenet should focus on L3. (and be clear on what it expects
> from the other layers with regards to security).
>  
> cheers,
> Ole

Curtis
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