Hi, I agree with Juergen. There are already too many details that need consensus to move a YANG module forward in the IETF. It takes too long already.
We could have been tagging MIB objects all along, but we don't. Imagine if there was a debate for every single OBJECT-TYPE macro "is this leaf OK for noAuth/noPriv?" Are there even clear SEC-DIR guidelines on how one would decide this debate in a WG? Does SEC-DIR really want to be flooded with review requests so they become a bottleneck in YANG RFC publication process? Standardized insecure access is a big change from what we have done for 30 years. There could be a good reason why we left this out of scope all this time. Andy On Fri, Aug 19, 2016 at 5:20 AM, Lou Berger <[email protected]> wrote: > > Sue, > > My message said three things: > > 1) Juergen's comment resonates with me. > > 2) I think the current text is acceptable. > > 3) I see changing the SHOULD to a MUST as problematic. > I understood one of the other messages on this thread proposing this > change which is what triggered my message. If I misunderstood that > message, feel free to interpret my message as supporting the current > text in question. > > Note that I am only speaking for myself (including in my role as NETMOD > co-chair) and not representing the consensus opinion of any WG. > > Lou > On 8/19/2016 8:07 AM, Susan Hares wrote: > > Lou: > > > > I am clear that Juergen does not want not want to place transport > requirements within the data model for NETMOD. His opinion was considered > in the rough for the I2RS WG. If this requirement is a problem for > NETCONF/NETMOD, the text currently says: > > > > REQ-SEC-09 states: > > > > The default mode of transport is secure so data models SHOULD clearly > annotate what data nodes can be > > passed over an insecure connection. > > > > However, if this means the NETCONF/NETMOD WG will not even entertain > proposal for marking the insecure functions in yang text -- then the two WG > (I2RS/NETMOD) have a problem and should stop this standardization process > going forward. > > > > Sue > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Lou Berger [mailto:[email protected]] > > Sent: Friday, August 19, 2016 7:34 AM > > To: Susan Hares; 'Juergen Schoenwaelder' > > Cc: [email protected]; 'Alissa Cooper'; [email protected]; 'Kathleen > Moriarty'; 'IESG'; [email protected]; 'Joel Halpern'; > [email protected] > > Subject: Re: [i2rs] Kathleen Moriarty's Discuss on > draft-ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements-07: (with DISCUSS and > COMMENT) > > > > Sue, > > > > I don't see Juergen as arguing against model access via non-secure > transport. I read his point as that the transport security requirements > don't belong scattered within a data model. > > > > I have to say that from a model complexity (definition, process, review, > implementation - take your pick) , language and NETMOD co-chair > perspective, his comment resonates with me. > > > > I think this makes the key text: > > > > The default mode of transport is > > secure so data models SHOULD clearly annotate what data nodes can be > > passed over an insecure connection. > > > > > > As this isn't a MUST, I personally think we can live with the text and > we can debate the issue further in the context of specific solutions. I > would strongly object to this being changed to a MUST, or if the document > is changed to make transport (security) requirements identified within data > models a requirement. > > > > Lou > > > > On 8/19/2016 6:49 AM, Susan Hares wrote: > >> Juergen: > >> > >> You have laid out the two options: a) link the data-model to the > non-secure transport, and b) do not link the data to the non-secure > transport. I agree with you that past models did not link past SNMP MIB > data model to the transport. Existing NETCONF models do not link it to the > transport. As you have indicated, you disagreed in the I2RS WG and we > found consensus was to include the non-secure transport. > >> > >> I2RS was created to build things as an interface to the routing > environment. The operators clearly informed the I2RS group of this need > during the requirement setting phase prior to the time I was chair. The > reason I continue to press for this capability is their input, and the > existing use cases I listed previously in this mail: > >> > >> a) public information - BGP route views, > >> b) specific well know up events - such as public-web site up > >> c) specific network service events - interface to particular public LAN > up. > >> > >> As you know, we do not have any I2RS data models that specify this > feature at this time. I suspect after we get through this lengthy > requirement phase, the operators may begin to specify new models that have > this feature. > >> > >> Sue > >> > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: Juergen Schoenwaelder > >> [mailto:[email protected]] > >> Sent: Friday, August 19, 2016 4:58 AM > >> To: Susan Hares > >> Cc: 'Alissa Cooper'; 'Joel Halpern'; [email protected]; > >> [email protected]; 'Kathleen Moriarty'; 'IESG'; [email protected]; > >> [email protected] > >> Subject: Re: [i2rs] Kathleen Moriarty's Discuss on > >> draft-ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements-07: (with DISCUSS and > >> COMMENT) > >> > >> I repeat my technical argument: While there may be deployments where > non-secure transports may be reasonable to use, defining these situations > statically as part of data model schemas does not follow established > practices. The IETF has a long tradition of standardizing data models that > can be used in a variety of operational contexts and I do not see reasons > why we should move away from that basic approach. > >> > >> /js > >> > >> On Thu, Aug 18, 2016 at 02:35:03PM -0400, Susan Hares wrote: > >>> Alissa: > >>> > >>> Just a little input you may not know. My background is 15 years > (1995-2010) developing a routing/switching platform (denoted as GateD) > which was sold to over 200 companies. We developed XML and a binary XML > based product that configured this product. It could do 100K configuration > lines and reboot in less than a second on most hardware. We also provide > status messages in secure streams and non-secure streams. I sold early > version of this code to companies that Alia has worked for - so she has > personal viewed the code. At the height of our work, our development team > ran to 50 people which I directed (First as VP of Engineering, and then as > CTO). It is due to this level of experience that Alia selected me for the > co-chair. Russ White has understood Cisco's process, and has also > directed software development teams for routing. > >>> > >>> In order to freshen my direct experience with I2RS on open source > work, I am working on a publically available work in Quagga based on the > confD product suggested by Cisco. > >>> > >>> In contrast, Juergen is a university professor who has worked on > proto-types. He is not working on an implementation. I hope he will. > >>> > >>> I hope you will consider this background in my response to your > comments below. > >>> > >>> Sue > >>> > >>> > >>> -----Original Message----- > >>> From: Alissa Cooper [mailto:[email protected]] > >>> Sent: Thursday, August 18, 2016 12:54 PM > >>> To: Joel Halpern > >>> Cc: Susan Hares; Juergen Schoenwaelder; [email protected]; > >>> [email protected]; Kathleen Moriarty; IESG; [email protected]; > >>> [email protected] > >>> Subject: Re: [i2rs] Kathleen Moriarty's Discuss on > >>> draft-ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements-07: (with DISCUSS and > >>> COMMENT) > >>> > >>> Jumping in here because this is relevant to my DISCUSS, hope nobody > minds (but if you do, I can go back to the other thread). > >>> > >>>>> On Aug 18, 2016, at 10:30 AM, Joel Halpern < > [email protected]> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> Let me try a different take approach to this particular question. > >>>>> > >>>>> Let me start by putting aside the question of where things are > marked, and come back to that afterwards. > >>>>> > >>>>> There are a number of cases that I2RS has been asked to cover of > high rate telemetry data. This may be BGP update information, it may be > frequent information about line card activity. There are other cases, some > of which have been documented. > >>>>> > >>>>> While not completely insensitive, the operators have made clear that > they see protecting this data as unnecessary. While I would hope over time > to move to a domain where all of it is protect, that is not trivial. As > the I2RS Architecture points out, it is expected that what we describe as a > single I2RS >communication between a client and agent is actually > associated with multiple channels of communication. > >>>>> > >>>>> Now, if you want to say that the I2RS protocol requirements cannot > allow for unprotected channels, I guess we have disconnect between the IESG > and the WG. > >>>>> > >>>>> If we say that we can allow for unprotected channels, we then get to > the question of which data can be sent over such channels. While > architecturally I agree with Juergen that the model is a bad place to > specify it, the obverse is also true. Not having some limits on what can > be sent unprotected >causes concern about insufficient protection. If I > recall correctly, earlier security reviews called us to task for being too > broad in what we allowed. > >>>>> > >>>>> So, if the IESG wants us to just allow it anywhere, because the > >>>>> model is an awkward place to define the limitation, I can live with > that. What I can't live with is being told both that the model is a bad > place to define it and that there must be restrictions on what is sent > unprotected, without any proposal on how we are to move forward. > >>>> Thank you Joel, this explanation helps me a lot. I think there is a > disconnect about how the restrictions are expressed. From reading the email > traffic about this document, it strikes me that trying to express the > restrictions programmatically doesn’t make much sense in this case. > >>>> I agree with Juergen that it will be challenging to make a judgment a > priori in order to bake a restriction into a data model, because data that > is considered sensitive enough to warrant a secure transport in one > deployment may not be considered sensitive in another deployment. > >>>> So for any data elements where there is any question at all about > >>>> whether they might be sensitive (i.e., any data elements that are not > already routinely made public), I would expect data model authors to end up > indicating that they may be sent over either secure or insecure transport, > which renders the indication not useful. > >>>> Perhaps it would make more sense then to just enumerate in the text > the cases that motivate the inclusion of protocol support for insecure > transport: > >>>> > >>>> 1. For conveyance of information that is already routinely made > public. > >>>> 2. For line card activity data where there is no likely upgrade path > to support secure transports in the foreseeable future. > >>>> > >>>> Then the normative requirements would be on clients and agents to use > secure transports unless those clients and agents are deployed where either > of the operational circumstances above necessitate otherwise. > >>>> Alissa > >>> Point 1: > >>> I disagree with Juergen on the difficulty in specifying the sections > of the yang modules. I have provided a suggested solution in: > >>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hares-i2rs-protocol- > strawman-03#section-4.5.2. > >>> > >>> Given the mount schema functionality, we can mount ephemeral state > module which augment non-ephemeral state modules which are "in-secure only". > >>> > >>> Point 2: > >>> I am willing to put an enumeration of the use cases in the protocol > requirement, but I would like to understand the purpose for the > enumeration. We are not doing a use case, but a requirements document. > This information appears to be a "use case" rather than a technical > description. What purpose are you looking for this enumeration to > server. Are you looking for the enumeration in SEC-REQ-08? > >>> > >>> Point 3: Could you review -08.txt on this topic, especially the text > below. Given your comments, I believe I should change the last line to a > MUST. > >>> New/ The default mode of transport is > >>> secure so data models MUST clearly annotate what data nodes can be > >>> passed over an insecure connection. > >>> / > >>> > >>> Sue > >>> > >>> =================== > >>> As to the normative requirements (-08.txt) version: > >>> > >>> Section 3: > >>> > >>> I2RS allows the use of an insecure transport for portions of data > >>> models that clearly indicate the use of an insecure transport. > >>> Operators deploying I2RS must determine if they want to populate and > >>> deploy the portions of the data model which use insecure transports. > >>> > >>> In Section 3.2 in version -08.txt > >>> > >>> SEC-REQ-08: The I2RS protocol MUST be able to transfer data over a > >>> secure transport and optionally MAY be able to transfer data over a > >>> non-secure transport. A secure transport MUST provide data > >>> confidentiality, data integrity, and replay prevention. > >>> > >>> The default I2RS transport is a secure transport. > >>> > >>> A non-secure transport can be used for publishing telemetry data or > >>> other operational state that was specifically indicated to non- > >>> confidential in the data model in the Yang syntax. > >>> > >>> The configuration of ephemeral data in the I2RS Agent by the I2RS > >>> client SHOULD be done over a secure transport. It is anticipated > >>> that the passing of most I2RS ephemeral state operational status > >>> SHOULD be done over a secure transport. As > >>> [I-D.ietf-i2rs-ephemeral-state] notes, a data model MUST indicate > >>> whether the transport exchanging the data between I2RS client and > >>> I2RS agent is secure or insecure. > >>> > >>> The default mode of transport is > >>> secure so data models SHOULD clearly annotate what data nodes can be > >>> passed over an insecure connection. > >>> > >>>> Yours, > >>>> Joel > >>>> > >>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>> From: Susan Hares [mailto:[email protected]] > >>>> Sent: Thursday, August 18, 2016 9:17 AM > >>>> To: 'Juergen Schoenwaelder' <[email protected]> > >>>> Cc: [email protected]; [email protected]; 'Kathleen Moriarty' > >>>> <[email protected]>; 'The IESG' <[email protected]>; > >>>> [email protected]; > >>>> [email protected] > >>>> Subject: RE: [i2rs] Kathleen Moriarty's Discuss on > >>>> draft-ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements-07: (with DISCUSS and > >>>> COMMENT) > >>>> > >>>> Juergen and Kathleen: > >>>> > >>>> Let me proceed with two examples: BGP route views data model and the > event for the web-service data. > >>>> > >>>> The content of these data models are designated as exposed to > public. The routing system only populates the proposed BGP route views > data model with the data destined for the BGP looking glass. The policy on > the routing system indicates what information gets transferred. The data > model is completely available to the public. The Yang Doctors are going to > review this by seeing the whole model is public and available via > non-secure means. > >>>> The security people are going to review this seeing that the whole > model is public, and available via an unprotect means. The fact the data > model is all public should simplify the review. > >>>> > >>>> An event from the I2RS RIB that a web-service route is up is the > second case. The I2RS RIB has an event based on policy that indicates a > web-service route is up. The yang-1.1 doctors must review the content of > the event text to see it does not break privacy or provide too much > >>>> information The event mechanisms will need to work over secure > transport > >>>> and insecure transport. Most of the data will go over the secure > transport event stream. However, a small amount of information may go over > the insecure transport stream. > >>>> > >>>> First, let me know if my use cases are understandable. Second, let > me know if you disagree with this use cases. > >>>> > >>>> Fyi - IESG approved the architecture with the insecure stream. > >>>> > >>>> Sue > >>>> > >>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>> From: Juergen Schoenwaelder > >>>> [mailto:[email protected]] > >>>> Sent: Thursday, August 18, 2016 9:06 AM > >>>> To: Susan Hares > >>>> Cc: [email protected]; [email protected]; 'Kathleen Moriarty'; 'The > >>>> IESG'; [email protected]; > >>>> [email protected] > >>>> Subject: Re: [i2rs] Kathleen Moriarty's Discuss on > >>>> draft-ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements-07: (with DISCUSS and > >>>> COMMENT) > >>>> > >>>> I just do not know on which basis a data model writer can decide > whether a data object can be exposed in an unprotected way. How are YANG > doctors going to review this? How are security directorate people going to > judge this? But as promised, I leave (still puzzled) now. > >>>> > >>>> /js > >>>> > >>>> On Thu, Aug 18, 2016 at 09:00:14AM -0400, Susan Hares wrote: > >>>>> Juergen: > >>>>> > >>>>> Yes, we seem to disagree on the value of making it hardwired in the > model. > >>>>> For me, the value is a common understanding of deployment > >>>>> distribution > >>>> such > >>>>> as the route-views. Since the operators argued strongly for this > point, > >>>> I > >>>>> think the best idea is to get it working in code and then see if > >>>>> the deployment matches the requests. > >>>>> > >>>>> Sue > >>>>> > >>>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>>> From: i2rs [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Juergen > >>>>> Schoenwaelder > >>>>> Sent: Thursday, August 18, 2016 8:14 AM > >>>>> To: Susan Hares > >>>>> Cc: [email protected]; [email protected]; 'Kathleen Moriarty'; 'The > >>>>> IESG'; [email protected]; > >>>>> [email protected] > >>>>> Subject: Re: [i2rs] Kathleen Moriarty's Discuss on > >>>>> draft-ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements-07: (with DISCUSS > >>>>> and > >>>>> COMMENT) > >>>>> > >>>>> Sue, > >>>>> > >>>>> I still do not see why the 'mode of exposure' of data benefits from > >>>>> being hard-wired in the data model. For me, it is a situational and > >>>>> deployment specific question. But I shut up here since I aired this > >>>>> concern before (and we simply seem to disagree). > >>>>> > >>>>> /js > >>>>> > >>>>> On Thu, Aug 18, 2016 at 08:07:18AM -0400, Susan Hares wrote: > >>>>>> Juergen: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> My example is the looking glass servers for the BGP route views > >>>>>> project > >>>>>> (http://www.routeviews.org/) or a route indicating the presence of > a > >>>>>> web-server that is public. For the BGP I2RS route, a yang model > could > >>>>>> replace the looking glass function, and provide events for these > looking > >>>>>> glass functions. For the web-server route, an event be sent when > >>>> that > >>>>>> one route is added. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Sue > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>>>> From: Juergen Schoenwaelder > >>>>>> [mailto:[email protected]] > >>>>>> Sent: Thursday, August 18, 2016 3:32 AM > >>>>>> To: Susan Hares > >>>>>> Cc: 'Kathleen Moriarty'; 'The IESG'; [email protected]; > >>>>>> [email protected]; [email protected]; > >>>>>> [email protected] > >>>>>> Subject: Re: [i2rs] Kathleen Moriarty's Discuss on > >>>>>> draft-ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements-07: (with DISCUSS > >>>>>> and > >>>>>> COMMENT) > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Wed, Aug 17, 2016 at 09:16:48PM -0400, Susan Hares wrote: > >>>>>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------- > >>>>>>> - > >>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>> COMMENT: > >>>>>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------- > >>>>>>> - > >>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Section 3: > >>>>>>>> Can you clarify the second to last sentence? Do you mean there > >>>>>>>> are > >>>>>> sections that indicate an insecure transport should be used? > >>>>>>>> I2RS allows the use of an > >>>>>>>> insecure transport for portions of data models that clearly > >>>>>>>> indicate insecure transport. > >>>>>>>> Perhaps: > >>>>>>>> I2RS allows the use of an > >>>>>>>> insecure transport for portions of data models that clearly > >>>>>>>> indicate the use of an insecure transport. > >>>>>> I still wonder how a data model writer can reasonably decide > >>>>>> whether a piece of information can be shipped safely over an > >>>>>> insecure transport since this decision often depends on the > >>>>>> specifics of a deployment > >>>>> situation. > >>>>>> /js > >>>>>> > >>>>>> PS: I hope we do not end up with defining data multiple times (once > >>>>>> for insecure transport and once for secured transports). > >>>>>> > >>>>>> -- > >>>>>> Juergen Schoenwaelder Jacobs University Bremen gGmbH > >>>>>> Phone: +49 421 200 3587 Campus Ring 1 | 28759 Bremen | > Germany > >>>>>> Fax: +49 421 200 3103 <http://www.jacobs-university.de/> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> _______________________________________________ > >>>>>> i2rs mailing list > >>>>>> [email protected] > >>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i2rs > >>>>> -- > >>>>> Juergen Schoenwaelder Jacobs University Bremen gGmbH > >>>>> Phone: +49 421 200 3587 Campus Ring 1 | 28759 Bremen | > Germany > >>>>> Fax: +49 421 200 3103 <http://www.jacobs-university.de/> > >>>>> > >>>>> _______________________________________________ > >>>>> i2rs mailing list > >>>>> [email protected] > >>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i2rs > >>>>> > >>>> -- > >>>> Juergen Schoenwaelder Jacobs University Bremen gGmbH > >>>> Phone: +49 421 200 3587 Campus Ring 1 | 28759 Bremen | Germany > >>>> Fax: +49 421 200 3103 <http://www.jacobs-university.de/> > >>>> > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > i2rs mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i2rs >
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