Juergen: Thank you for your input.
I can find nothing new in your input that was not covered in the I2RS WG discussions. As far as I can tell you are re-iterating a discussion that occurred in the WG, and was closed. I have given example (BGP route-view, web-service up) as events which currently in the public and have been requested by some operators. Please note that the operator should have a knob that says "always" secure-transport. Sue -----Original Message----- From: Juergen Schoenwaelder [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Monday, August 22, 2016 6:08 AM To: Susan Hares Cc: 'Andy Bierman'; 'Lou Berger'; [email protected]; 'Alissa Cooper'; [email protected]; 'Kathleen Moriarty'; 'IESG'; 'Jeffrey Haas'; 'Joel Halpern'; [email protected] Subject: Re: [i2rs] Kathleen Moriarty's Discuss on draft-ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements-07: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT) On Fri, Aug 19, 2016 at 12:55:53PM -0400, Susan Hares wrote: > Andy: > > > > The easy of reviewing per leaf – is why I suggested the per leaf. > > I also agree it is important to mention this non-secure/secure requirement to > the PUSH work team we are both on. > > > > Should I change: > > Old: / > > A non-secure transport can be used for publishing telemetry data or > > other operational state that was specifically indicated to non- > > confidential in the data model in the Yang syntax. / > > New: > > / A non-secure transport can be used for publishing telemetry data or > > other operational state that was specifically indicated to non- > > confidential in the data model. / > Tagging something in the data model as 'non-confidential' remains a flawed idea. What can be considered 'non-confidential' depends on the deployment scenario. It is even worse to standardize some piece of information as 'non-confidential'. How can the IETF claim that something is always 'non-confidential'? (And note, a non-secure transport is not just about confidentiality, it also implies that boxes on the path can arbitrarily change the information.) In case this is not clear: What we have done for ~30 years is to have the decision which information goes into an insecure transport be taken by an access control model. This makes the decision runtime configurable and thus things can be deployment specific. This has worked for 30 years and I have no problem with this. What I am struggling with is the idea to standardize parts of YANG data models as 'non-confidential'. /js -- Juergen Schoenwaelder Jacobs University Bremen gGmbH Phone: +49 421 200 3587 Campus Ring 1 | 28759 Bremen | Germany Fax: +49 421 200 3103 <http://www.jacobs-university.de/> _______________________________________________ i2rs mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i2rs
