On Mon, Nov 14, 2022 at 12:26 AM Scott Kitterman <skl...@kitterman.com> wrote:
> Is compatibility with DKIM sufficient for the charter or should there be > broader language about compatibility with existing email architecture? > I'm > inclined to say "Yes", but I'm unsure about wording. I also assume "Yes". I'm having a hard time seeing a charter that allows broad disruption just to solve this problem. I would even suggest we don't have to say so, but it's probably a good idea to mention it. Similarly, at least one of them could lead to normal indirect mail flows > being > identified as replay attacks. Is something specific needed about being > compatible with existing email deployments more generally (beyond DKIM > deployment compatibility) needed? Once agian, I'd say "Yes", but am not > sure > how to word it. > I would say this falls under "don't allow for false positives"; I'm not sure a charter needs to say something about that though. -MSK
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