It appears that Michael Deutschmann <[email protected]> said: >On 25 Jul 2026, you wrote: >> He understands that our main constraint is key size, since the base64 >> version of a key needs to fit in a text RR and the longer they are, the >> harder it is for people to copy and paste them. > >About that... > >I'm skeptical that quantum computers will ever work in practice, but DKIM has >always had a related problem here. RSA keys already strain the ability of >DNS to fit them into a UDP packet. 2048-bit keys are normal today, and >4096-bit would be expected to force TCP.
Down the virtual hall in the dnsop WG they're having a similar conversation about PQ DNSSEC keys. DNSSEC keys are always signed, and it is common to have two keys, a KSK and a ZSK, and often more than one of each if there's a key rotation. Even an ordinary signed result is usually bigger than the conventional UDP limit of 512. A few of us have been asking whether the operators of root servers or other large DNS operators are concerned about more TLS queries, or if that would be a problem if a lot of clients used DoT. So far the result has been a resounding silence. I wouldn't worry about it. R's, John _______________________________________________ Ietf-dkim mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
