Hello.
Viktor Dukhovni wrote in
<[email protected]>:
|On Fri, Oct 23, 2026 at 09:37:06PM +0200, Steffen Nurpmeso wrote:
|>|So the simplest choice is just ML-DSA-44 (pure) and one or two classical
|>|alternatives, say either or both of RSA (with a 2048–3072 bit modulus)
|>|and ed25519.
|>
|> The problem with that is that the public key is so large that DNS
|> over UDP is no longer possible *per se*.
|
|This is not an argument in favour composites, which are (slightly)
|larger still. And TCP is not optional in DNS. There's already at least
|one domain with algorithm 18 (ML-DSA-44) DNSSEC keys. Its DNSKEY RRset
|(including an ML-DSA-44 KSK, ZSK and RRSIG) arrives over TCP:
|
| ;; Query time: 1395 msec
| ;; SERVER: 127.0.0.1#53(127.0.0.1) (TCP)
| ;; WHEN: Sat Oct 24 03:46:45 UTC 2026
| ;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 6546
That is in my opinion just as strange as trying to use this for
DKIM, .. but likely the TTL is even lower.
I want to believe this is an operator error of someone who is
either misinformed, or even hysteric. (As in, there are people
which plaster their walls will aluminium foil, and where "helmets"
of an equal material, to avoid secret services from manipulating
their brain waves. I think i see their problem, but i do not
think it will help, anyway.)
Yes TCP retries forever, but the musl C library for example only
ever implemented it in the not too distant past. (Four years now
that i look.)
And then, it is "very expensive", at least in my world; there it
is a fallback if the UDP did not work out.
In a modern system this thus likely sends maybe even two UDP
packets (IPv4 and IPv6), and then (hopefully only one) a TCP
fallback retry.
Sure there is TCP fastopen, now that i looked musl code.
But still.
No no no no. DNSSEC, i do not dig that myself.
But yes, likely there the new algorithms will improve the
situation a lot.
(In times where certificate rotation intervals get shrunken all
the time, coming over with PQ for DNSSEC in 2026 seems very
strange, sorry.)
|> Other algorithms (will) exist (standardized) that fit all the
|> bills, in a not too distant future --- anyway soon enough before
|> any thinkable (afaik) introduction time of CrQCs.
|
|The more compact PQ signature schemes will take some time to land in
|libraries. ML-DSA-44 is
But likely before 2030 i would at least think, if they get chosen
in 2027.
Some/most are already implemented in an OpenSSL compatible
variant, in that PQ playground library where also the others came
from (or where first). I have read the communication on the FAEST
algorithm (there).
|>|Dragging composite signatures into DKIM makes no sense.
|>
|> It does for my/the alternative DKIM/ACDC approach. (Though not
|> as "composite" but as a "stack" of two different algorithms.)
|
|It seems you're even more strongly against composites than I am, that
|you don't even support a pure PQ signature scheme at this time is a
|separate matter. Let's at least not drag in composites.
Ok. Well -- i am not a cryptographer.
For me the important thing is the upgrade path.
*If* the next series goes for composites again (there are
algorithms which are solely based on "normal" primitives), because
this "indivisible combining" is still desired, then so it may be.
DKIM/ACDC with its eddapq key type can easily obsolete the plain
ed25519 part to vanish with the PQ flag second, and take
a mathematically intertwined composite for the PQ one.
But one thing is plain: i will not add a DNS/UDP blowing algorithm
in 2026 when 2027 brings algorithms which easily fit there,
including ("normal") DNSSEC plus ("normal") DTLS, at least with
EDNS.
These algorithms of now are (hopefully) fine for HTTPS and SSH
sessions, these are per se TCP (or Quick), and the data passes
inside these sessions.
For DNS the default is (normallY) UDP, and so the key should fit.
New algorithms *will* fit, even at a security level much higher
than MLDSA44.
--steffen
|
|Der Kragenbaer, The moon bear,
|der holt sich munter he cheerfully and one by one
|einen nach dem anderen runter wa.ks himself off
|(By Robert Gernhardt)
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