On Thu, Oct 22, 2026 at 4:09 PM Viktor Dukhovni <[email protected]>
wrote:

> On Mon, Oct 19, 2026 at 04:49:37PM +0100, Richard Clayton wrote:
>
> > >1. What is signed. Section 3.4 of -07 says the algorithm "computes a
> hash over
> > >all the Message-Instance and DKIM2-Signature fields as described in
> Section 12.8
> > >using SHA-512 [FIPS-180-4] as the hash-alg.
> >
> > I think it's pretty clear we should use either the LAMPs composite
> > (where the hash is fed into ed25519 and the ML-DSA-44 gets fed the raw
> > data)
>
> I all this discussion I see no substantive motivation for introducing
> composite signature algorithms.  What realistic threat are they really
> intended to address?
>
>     - If there's not a CrQC in the next decade, classical algorithms
>       are quite sufficient for now.
>
>     - If there is a CrQC in that timeframe, the classical component of
>       the composite algorithm is needless baggage.
>
>     - If a pure PQ algorithm is selected and the choice later turns out
>       broken, the same goes for its composites.  Selectors for broken
>       algorithms can be easily removed from the DNS by the sender,
>       and a classical algorithm used instead if there is as yet no
>       known CrQC (cost-effectively available to the attackers, ...).
>
>       If CrQCs are readily available to the attackers, and fallback
>       to a classical algorithm (with sufficiently frequent key rotation)
>       is unexpectedly not an option, then a new PQ algorithm is needed,
>       and composites don't help.
>
> Also DKIM signatures do not need to meet a high bar of cryptographic
> robustness.  The DNS lookups to obtain said keys are typically not
> protected, and signature forgery just needs to be noticeably more
> expensive than various non-cryptographic attacks (look-alike domains,
> fresh free email accounts at the major too big to block providers, ...).
>
> So the simplest choice is just ML-DSA-44 (pure) and one or two classical
> alternatives, say either or both of RSA (with a 2048–3072 bit modulus)
> and ed25519.
>
> Dragging composite signatures into DKIM makes no sense.
>

I agree with Viktor that we should focus on ML-DSA-44 (pure) and the two
DKIM-specified classical algorithms: RSA and Ed25519.  I believe that if a
CRQC event occurs in the future, researchers will be able to raise a
warning, allowing senders to switch over before any sort compromise
happens.  The risk remains that ML-DSA might have some hypothetical
vulnerability, per DJB, but the risk is extremely small (as far as I can
tell as a non-cryptographer).  I think the way to bridge this is to use the
multiple signature support in DKIM2 and support switching between AND/OR
evaluation of the multiple signatures as needed.  During the bring-up of a
new algorithm, senders can use OR'ed multiple signature evaluation with a
new algorithm, e.g., ML-DSA-44 backstopped by the old widely deployed
algorithm, e.g., RSA.  When the new algorithm is widely adopted, senders
can switch to using it by itself or use multiple signature evaluation with
AND'ed evaluation if they are more cautious.  For senders who agree with
DJB's arguments, I think the latter can cover the hybrid PQC/classical
algorithms.  It's more important that specifications allow for
extensibility and that receivers have a way to monitor the adoption of new
algorithms such as ML-DSA-44.  We should also consider extending DMARC
reports to break down results by algorithm, or similarly extend Alex
Brotman's DKIM report proposal.

There is some difference in how this multiple signature support might
happen.  If I understood correctly, during Interim -06, Richard suggested a
more feature-rich syntax built into the "s=" tag's separators.  I interpret
this to mean that it would allow '|' to indicate an OR evaluation and '+'
to indicate an AND evaluation, presumably in sequential order.  I propose a
simpler approach using the "f=" flag tag to slightly simplify evaluation
and improve readability.  By default, multiple signatures evaluation is
OR'ed.  If an "f=" tag has a value of "and", then the multiple signatures
evaluation is ANDed.  The reason for the default ORing and flagged ANDing
is to improve the readability of the AND case by making it explicit.

-Wei
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