On Sat, Oct 24, 2026 at 11:54:54PM -0700, Wei Chuang wrote:

> I think the way to bridge this is to use the
> multiple signature support in DKIM2 and support switching between AND/OR
> evaluation of the multiple signatures as needed.

There's no need for any complexity of that sort.  This is DKIM signing a
message that is in flight for at most a few days.  It is not firmware
signing for a device that might last a few decades.  Any single valid
DKIM2 signature supported by the relying party should be sufficient.
Unsupported signatures can be ignored (equivalent to missing).

If ML-DSA-44 is broken, it can be replaced fairly quickly, by a
classical algorithm if there are as yet no CrQCs that can
cost-effectively attack a ML-DSA-44 DKIM signatures.  Otherwise,
by whatever PQ replacement algorithm is waiting in the wings.

If there's no viable PQ-replacement, in that hapless hypothetical
hybrids hardly help.

-- 
    Viktor.  🇺🇦 Слава Україні!
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