For shame Dave. Taking one sentence out of context is something I would not have expected from you.
When I say "It is simple" in response to Johns artificially constructed hypothetical, this is not the sweeping statement of the universe you are trying to present it as. In Johns example he is trying to conflate "I believe that someone always signs their mail" with ADSP. These are two different animals. Notice that he didn't indicate whether the person used "ALL" or "DISCARDABLE". He artificially gave us a binary set of choices when in fact there are many more choices available. The whole point of having a standard is to avoid the voodoo and guessing. If John or someone else were really that concerned about a particular domain's signing circumstances I would expect him/them to contact the domain in question. The whole point of a standard is to avoid the one-on-one checking. Now during initial rollouts I would expect people to do some validation and checking. You are absolutely correct that we should anticipate failures. That does not mean we should anticipate FAILURE from a reasonably crafted standard. We cannot protect foolish people from doing foolish things to themselves. This is another case of King Canute..... Document, yes. Educate, yes. Protect from themselves, no. BTW John, I want to thank you for teaching me to invoke this. Mike > -----Original Message----- > From: Dave CROCKER [mailto:[email protected]] > Sent: Wednesday, June 02, 2010 11:48 AM > To: MH Michael Hammer (5304) > Cc: [email protected] > Subject: Re: [ietf-dkim] list vs contributor signatures, was Wrong > Discussion > > > > On 6/2/2010 6:33 AM, MH Michael Hammer (5304) wrote: > > It's really quite simple. > > > This is the crux of the disparity of views. > > Those of use who note that none of this is simple worry about adoption and > success barriers, noting that new services have a long and problematic > history > and that more efforts fail than succeed. > > We also note that operational details often are far more complicated > and/or > costly than designers anticipate. > > In other words, as soon as the effort moves outside of a few people's > minds, > nothing about this is simple. (Well, given the track record of new > protocols, > in general and security-related protocols in particular, I suppose it is > simple > and reasonable to anticipate failure.) > > d/ > -- > > Dave Crocker > Brandenburg InternetWorking > bbiw.net _______________________________________________ NOTE WELL: This list operates according to http://mipassoc.org/dkim/ietf-list-rules.html
