A possibility is for the ISP to distribute a public/private key pair
when the host gets its IP address, then use DH to generate the session
key. Or one could distribute a shared session key through secure (via
TLS over EAP) L2 authentication when the host enters the foreign
network. We proposed something similar for ABK using id crypto, and it
would work a little more cleanly there because the IP address acts as
the public key, but id crypto suffers from being a new and therefore not
well understood algorithm.
jak
----- Original Message -----
From: "Julien Laganier" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Pekka Savola" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: "Jari Arkko" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
"Bound, Jim" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; "James Kempf"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Monday, June 17, 2002 12:49 AM
Subject: Re: Securing Neighbor Discovery BOF
> On Sat, Jun 15, 2002 at 06:11:08PM +0300, Pekka Savola wrote:
> > I'm only grasping at straws here, but the logical approach at keying
would
> > be requiring manual keying with a router in the subnet, through
which the
> > rest of the keys would then be negotiated (somehow).
> >
> > Even that may be unscalable, but manually keying like 2-4 keys is
may be
> > problematic also, but that might be workable.
> >
> > There are some issues here (like when performing DAD for
link-locals, and
> > someone telling that address is already in use, verifying whether
that is
> > legit or not as one has not been able to contact the router yet)
though.
> >
> > I haven't really thought about this enough, but I wonder if anyone
else
> > has tried to follow this path, and seen where it leads.
>
> It is logic. But how do you handle the case of public hospitality
> networks, like those which could be found in airports, conference
> rooms, etc., where there is no subscription (public wireless networks
> are an example)?
>
> By publishing the secret keys to authorized members... You cannot know
> them since the network is public.
>
> Even in the case of a private networks, there is the problem of a
rogue
> node which could compromise the keys.
>
> IMHO, manual keying only solves a few security threats in ND for a few
> networks policies. It is not appropriate for public access networks,
it
> has a poor scalability, and so on.
>
> Folks?
> --
> Julien LAGANIER, PhD Student
> RESAM Laboratory (UCB / INRIA RESO)
> Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon
>
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