On 22-10-13 09:02, Shava Nerad wrote: > uproxy.org <http://uproxy.org> -- it looks phenomenally like psiphon, > actually. I got referred to this page through Amanda Walker from Google > who says (carefully not speaking for anyone at Google) it's open source > (eventually) developed by U Washington. > > Has anyone heard of this at all? I pointed Ron Deibert at it -- I > thought he'd find it fascinating if he hadn't heard about it. ;] >
It sounds more like Lantern to me... seeing the involvement of brave new software and use of the google social graph. > quoth Amanda: > > So, Google isn't "rolling out a proxy network". uProxy was > developed at the University of Washington; they plan to release > source under the Apache 2 license (so you don't *have* to trust > anyone). It's a peer to peer proxy system, not a centralized one > that goes through Google (or anyone else). > > > http://uproxy.org/ > > > Except of course, it goes through whomever your penpal is. > > Here's a summary of the early rollout of Psiphon: > > http://www.ethanzuckerman.com/blog/2007/01/31/ron-deibert-on-the-history-and-future-of-psiphon/ > (I was at this talk ;) > > Hugely popular was 80,000 users, and there were growing pains then and > thereafter (this is not a criticism -- it's expected). Will Google be > happy with their announcement when users freak at people proxying KP > through their penpal invites? Because inevitably, people will want to > adopt activists from overseas and some will be not quite what they expect. > > Will League of Legends-like matchmaking lobbies emerge to broker > connections, rather much defeating the personal friend aspect for the > less clueful? And who will um take advantage? Will penpals in the US > report back to Teheran for example? I mean, I'm likely preaching to the > crowd, right? > > But Jared Cohen and Eric Schmidt's book reads like a post ironic > Innocents Abroad. It opens with the bald statement that the Internet is > one of the few things humans have created that they do not fully > understand. > > If you reduce "things" to generalizations such as "religion," > "government," "community," "war," and so on, I suppose they may be > right. We have not fully come to grips with the Internet as a special > case of "mass media," and we can not possibly come to a comprehensive > consensus on that. The subject matter changes faster than any consensus > could be expressed/reached -- to the universal relief of bloggers, and > of academics seeking publication and junkets to conferences. > > These are the people who are, with great sanguine big-dog enthusiasm, > pushing this out. I wish I felt confident we could keep the tail > wagging from breaking the tea service. Could be fine. Makes me > nervous. Just sayin... > > You don't have to distrust Google per se to wonder if they are wise, or > have domain expertise in all things. > > Being big and rich does not buy you wisdom to know what you don't know. > This is a lesson of empire/monarchy, even benevolent empire, even > benevolent monarchy -- it relies on the discretion of one entity, one > ego and often the people around that entity will not or can not get a > word in to say, "No. Just no." > > Carnegie knew all about libraries, but he didn't know so much about > maintaining earthen dams > (http://www.jaha.org/FloodMuseum/clubanddam.html) You can't know > everything. People can still die. > > So there are my late night ponderings... > > yrs, > > > On Tue, Oct 22, 2013 at 1:36 AM, Roger Dingledine <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > On Mon, Oct 21, 2013 at 10:25:48AM -0700, Yosem Companys wrote: > > The most ambitious product launch is uProxy, a new Web browser > > extension that uses peer-to-peer technology to let people around the > > world provide each other with a trusted Internet connection. > > It's a shame that designs like this still blur the line so much between > "censorship-resistant transport" and "proxy back-end." > > If these folks have a cool "we use xmpp through google's servers to > reach the proxy" transport, wouldn't it be even better if they publish > that part, in a modular way, so other tools (like vpn providers, or Tor) > can reuse that transport if they want to get its properties? > > And in the other direction, if their users want some more security > properties on the proxy side, wouldn't it be better if their volunteers > could choose to glue this transport onto some other back-end (like vpn > providers, or Tor)? > > We've been making great progress lately in the academic world at having > researchers split the problem so the transport can focus on being > hard to > block and then the proxy side can focus on providing whatever security > properties it wants. In the Tor world we call it pluggable transports, > but the engineers here will recognize the term 'modularity'. > > > ?It?s completely encrypted and there?s > > no way for the government to detect what?s happening because it just > > looks like voice traffic or chat traffic. > > Can somebody remind me of the State Dept quote, long ago, about > Haystack? That was a different guy though right? And surely this time > they're doing it right, with a comprehensive design document and threat > model, open source, etc before the publicity splash? > > To aim for a more productive tone, I'd like to echo what Eric said > but with a crucially different slant: the more *reuable and testable > components*, the merrier. The key is to grow the space in terms of > how we > understand what works, what doesn't work anymore (or never did), and > what > options we have for making mash-ups of these components. Otherwise it's > just yet another brief flame with its big publicity push, no > well-written > code behind it, no change to our understanding of how to solve the > problem / what problems to solve, and no re-usable parts left behind. > > --Roger > > -- > Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. > Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. > Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing > moderator at [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>. > > > > > -- > > Shava Nerad > [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > > -- Greenhost - Sustainable Hosting T: +31204890444 [email protected] https://greenhost.nl/ A digital signature can be attached to this e-mail, you need opengpg software to verify it. see: http://tinyurl.com/openpgp-manual Key fingerprint = 4F15 CE56 36AB A1C2 0D81 BE10 E12B B435 F2D5 2E48
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