Speaking of Lantern, see this fresh report on its development: http://techpresident.com/news/wegov/24444/state-department-funded-lantern-next-bigger-better-tor
Micah On Tue, Oct 22, 2013 at 10:22 AM, Sacha van Geffen <[email protected]>wrote: > On 22-10-13 09:02, Shava Nerad wrote: > > uproxy.org <http://uproxy.org> -- it looks phenomenally like psiphon, > > actually. I got referred to this page through Amanda Walker from Google > > who says (carefully not speaking for anyone at Google) it's open source > > (eventually) developed by U Washington. > > > > Has anyone heard of this at all? I pointed Ron Deibert at it -- I > > thought he'd find it fascinating if he hadn't heard about it. ;] > > > > It sounds more like Lantern to me... seeing the involvement of brave new > software and use of the google social graph. > > > > quoth Amanda: > > > > So, Google isn't "rolling out a proxy network". uProxy was > > developed at the University of Washington; they plan to release > > source under the Apache 2 license (so you don't *have* to trust > > anyone). It's a peer to peer proxy system, not a centralized one > > that goes through Google (or anyone else). > > > > > > http://uproxy.org/ > > > > > > Except of course, it goes through whomever your penpal is. > > > > Here's a summary of the early rollout of Psiphon: > > > http://www.ethanzuckerman.com/blog/2007/01/31/ron-deibert-on-the-history-and-future-of-psiphon/ > > (I was at this talk ;) > > > > Hugely popular was 80,000 users, and there were growing pains then and > > thereafter (this is not a criticism -- it's expected). Will Google be > > happy with their announcement when users freak at people proxying KP > > through their penpal invites? Because inevitably, people will want to > > adopt activists from overseas and some will be not quite what they > expect. > > > > Will League of Legends-like matchmaking lobbies emerge to broker > > connections, rather much defeating the personal friend aspect for the > > less clueful? And who will um take advantage? Will penpals in the US > > report back to Teheran for example? I mean, I'm likely preaching to the > > crowd, right? > > > > But Jared Cohen and Eric Schmidt's book reads like a post ironic > > Innocents Abroad. It opens with the bald statement that the Internet is > > one of the few things humans have created that they do not fully > > understand. > > > > If you reduce "things" to generalizations such as "religion," > > "government," "community," "war," and so on, I suppose they may be > > right. We have not fully come to grips with the Internet as a special > > case of "mass media," and we can not possibly come to a comprehensive > > consensus on that. The subject matter changes faster than any consensus > > could be expressed/reached -- to the universal relief of bloggers, and > > of academics seeking publication and junkets to conferences. > > > > These are the people who are, with great sanguine big-dog enthusiasm, > > pushing this out. I wish I felt confident we could keep the tail > > wagging from breaking the tea service. Could be fine. Makes me > > nervous. Just sayin... > > > > You don't have to distrust Google per se to wonder if they are wise, or > > have domain expertise in all things. > > > > Being big and rich does not buy you wisdom to know what you don't know. > > This is a lesson of empire/monarchy, even benevolent empire, even > > benevolent monarchy -- it relies on the discretion of one entity, one > > ego and often the people around that entity will not or can not get a > > word in to say, "No. Just no." > > > > Carnegie knew all about libraries, but he didn't know so much about > > maintaining earthen dams > > (http://www.jaha.org/FloodMuseum/clubanddam.html) You can't know > > everything. People can still die. > > > > So there are my late night ponderings... > > > > yrs, > > > > > > On Tue, Oct 22, 2013 at 1:36 AM, Roger Dingledine <[email protected] > > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > > > On Mon, Oct 21, 2013 at 10:25:48AM -0700, Yosem Companys wrote: > > > The most ambitious product launch is uProxy, a new Web browser > > > extension that uses peer-to-peer technology to let people around > the > > > world provide each other with a trusted Internet connection. > > > > It's a shame that designs like this still blur the line so much > between > > "censorship-resistant transport" and "proxy back-end." > > > > If these folks have a cool "we use xmpp through google's servers to > > reach the proxy" transport, wouldn't it be even better if they > publish > > that part, in a modular way, so other tools (like vpn providers, or > Tor) > > can reuse that transport if they want to get its properties? > > > > And in the other direction, if their users want some more security > > properties on the proxy side, wouldn't it be better if their > volunteers > > could choose to glue this transport onto some other back-end (like > vpn > > providers, or Tor)? > > > > We've been making great progress lately in the academic world at > having > > researchers split the problem so the transport can focus on being > > hard to > > block and then the proxy side can focus on providing whatever > security > > properties it wants. In the Tor world we call it pluggable > transports, > > but the engineers here will recognize the term 'modularity'. > > > > > ?It?s completely encrypted and there?s > > > no way for the government to detect what?s happening because it > just > > > looks like voice traffic or chat traffic. > > > > Can somebody remind me of the State Dept quote, long ago, about > > Haystack? That was a different guy though right? And surely this time > > they're doing it right, with a comprehensive design document and > threat > > model, open source, etc before the publicity splash? > > > > To aim for a more productive tone, I'd like to echo what Eric said > > but with a crucially different slant: the more *reuable and testable > > components*, the merrier. The key is to grow the space in terms of > > how we > > understand what works, what doesn't work anymore (or never did), and > > what > > options we have for making mash-ups of these components. Otherwise > it's > > just yet another brief flame with its big publicity push, no > > well-written > > code behind it, no change to our understanding of how to solve the > > problem / what problems to solve, and no re-usable parts left behind. > > > > --Roger > > > > -- > > Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. > > Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: > > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. > > Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing > > moderator at [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>. > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Shava Nerad > > [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > > > > > > > -- > > Greenhost - Sustainable Hosting > T: +31204890444 > [email protected] > https://greenhost.nl/ > > A digital signature can be attached to this e-mail, > you need opengpg software to verify it. see: > http://tinyurl.com/openpgp-manual > > Key fingerprint = 4F15 CE56 36AB A1C2 0D81 BE10 E12B B435 F2D5 2E48 > > > -- > Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. 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