Linux-Advocacy Digest #189, Volume #27 Mon, 19 Jun 00 14:13:04 EDT
Contents:
Re: [Fwd: Newsweek US Edition: Microsoft's Six Fatal Errors] ("Charlie Root")
Re: Windows come in, your time is up. (Cihl)
Re: Synthetic Speach on Linux (aflinsch)
Re: Why X is better than Terminal Server (Craig Kelley)
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From: "Charlie Root" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: [Fwd: Newsweek US Edition: Microsoft's Six Fatal Errors]
Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2000 17:17:21 GMT
I am still wondering why Newsweek Web site in New Yorkis being redicted to
MSNBC at Redmond, WA. Do Microsoft owns Newsweek, too? If so, no wonder.
If not, why being redirected? This special Newsweek issue is on print
anyway. M$ can't forbid people to read the print.
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote in message <394dfd91$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>...
>On Sun, 18 Jun 2000 13:50:08 -0700, Jimmy Navarro <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
>>This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
>>--------------030AA1171B29ABA0EAA9715C
>>Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
>>Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
>>
>>Early this morning I read the Newsweek June 19, 2000, article authored
>>by Jared Sandberg. I was just trying to access it, somehow seems M$
>>redirecting it to MSNBC to ERROR 404!
>>
>>
>>--------------030AA1171B29ABA0EAA9715C
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>>X-Mozilla-Status2: 00000000
>>Message-ID: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>>Date: Sun, 18 Jun 2000 03:51:24 -0700
>>From: Jimmy Navarro <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>>Organization: Los Angeles Free Net
>>X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.72 [en] (X11; I; Linux 2.2.14-3 i686)
>>X-Accept-Language: en
>>MIME-Version: 1.0
>>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>>Subject: Newsweek US Edition: Microsoft's Six Fatal Errors
>>Content-Type: multipart/mixed;
>> boundary="------------16CBEA263EFC4A57DDF392FA"
>>
>>This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
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>>It's 3:49 a.m. I was just done replying some Usenet posting. Some
>>posters and readers in the Pinoy newsgroup just post and post and post
>>but no whole idea what really the surrounding circumstances. I think
>>I'll stop going there because it's just much waste of time replying
>>their rans. Anyway, see this on-line edition of Newsweek covering the
>>trial.
>>
>>http://www.newsweek.com/nw-srv/printed/us/st/a20907-2000jun11.htm
>>
>>
>>
>
>[ quoted-printable, HTML crap snipped ]
>
>Here's the same Web page in ASCII text format (with the banners
>omitted):
>
> Microsoft's Six Fatal Errors
> [INLINE]
>
> Bill Gates
> Hanging in there: a defiant Gates after the verdict (Dan Lamont -
> Corbis-Sygma)
>
> [35]On Air
>
> Did the tactics that made Bill Gates the world's richest man provoke
> the threat of a breakup? The judge thought so. The road to a harsh
> verdict.
> [INLINE]
> By Jared Sandberg
> Newsweek, June 19, 2000
>
> It was a bleak winter day in early 1998, and [36]Microsoft's lawyers
> had come from Redmond to appear before Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson
> in the other Washington. In a legal clash predating the landmark
> [37]antitrust suit, Jackson had asked the company to remove its Web
> browser from Windows 95 on the grounds that forcing the browser on PC
> makers violated a prior pact with the Feds. Microsoft said a
> separation was technically impossible. But to comply with the judge's
> order, the company produced one browser-free version of Windows 95 so
> old that its shelf life was even shorter than [38]Bill Gates's temper.
> Another browserless version was so broken its only feature was an
> error message. The judge was clearly angry that Microsoft insisted the
> only way to comply with his order was to ship defective products. It
> was a hardball maneuver that cost Bill Gates & Co. dearly.
>
> The judge's frustration had been mounting. Already in this early
> skirmish, Microsoft had submitted a legal brief questioning the
> technical know-how of [39]Justice Department attorneys-and by
> extension the judge-who "have no vocation for software design." It
> also went over his head to the appeals court. Ultimately siding with
> Microsoft, the appellate judges overruled Jackson and told him the
> courts shouldn't be software designers. For Gates's empire, it was a
> short-lived victory. Looking back recently, one Microsoft insider said
> that first round clearly came at a high price: "We shouldn't have
> pissed off the judge."
>
> Last week Jackson ordered the biggest software redesign Microsoft has
> ever known, concluding that splitting the software giant into two
> independent companies was "imperative." In one of the few
> court-ordered breakups over the past 100 years, the judge endorsed the
> government's plan to create one company that would sell Windows and
> another that would sell everything else. Jackson's strongly worded
> opinion left little doubt why he went for the ax, as opposed to milder
> restrictions: Microsoft's bad attitude. First, he said, the company
> consistently maintained that it has done nothing wrong. Second,
> Microsoft could continue to flout the law and unfairly bully
> competitors. Last, referring to that first encounter more than two
> years ago, he called Microsoft "untrustworthy." Elaborating on the
> Windows incident, Jackson told NEWSWEEK, "I found their compliance to
> be less than genuine." Microsoft's attitude calls for the kind of
> remedy that it can't weasel out of, the judge seemed to say, because
> it has been a weasel before.
>
> If upheld, Jackson's order, aside from causing the biggest Windows
> crash in the company's 25-year history, would bring an end to a
> software empire that became the planet's most valuable company and an
> engine of the New Economy. Some-Microsofties among them-will blame the
> judge. Some will blame an overzealous government that has
> unsuccessfully tried to rein in Microsoft for more than a decade. A
> NEWSWEEK reconstruction of the key moments on the road to Microsoft's
> Judgment Day, however, suggests that the most likely culprit is the
> same defiant corporate culture that made Microsoft so successful in
> the first place. In the marketplace, rough-and-tumble tactics can be a
> virtue, but in the legal arena, Microsoft's blood sport backfired-at
> least with this judge. One critical turning point: Gates's own
> videotaped deposition in which he ducked questions and denied the
> obvious. After the tape was played in court, Jackson noted that Gates
> wasn't "particularly responsive." Watching the video, the judge wagged
> his head and rolled his eyes. And he practically double-dared the
> chairman to testify. "Microsoft took a scorched-earth approach," says
> Howard University law-school professor Andrew Gavil, "and they got
> scorched."
>
> Just after the judge's decision, Gates blasted the order as "an
> unwarranted and unjustified intrusion" but also appeared almost
> relieved to be heading to any courtroom other than Jackson's. "People
> say a lot of things about us," Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer told
> NEWSWEEK. "But never has anyone said we're untrustworthy." The company
> likes its odds on appeal. Microsoft's lawyers and executives will be
> upgraded to geniuses if their reading of the law squares as well with
> higher courts as it has in the past. Jackson has had his fair share of
> reversals. The company has plenty of supporting law to lean on, as
> well as public support from two thirds of Americans. And many
> antitrust experts think the company won't be broken up even if higher
> courts find some violations. With the exception of last week's
> disaster, Microsoft has had a string of successes in the courtroom.
> "The company is fundamentally arrogant when it comes to litigation,"
> says one company insider, "because it has historically won." Along
> with the early Windows misstep, there are five other moments that led
> Gates & Co. to its gloomy Judgment Day:
>
> Let's Not Make a Deal
>
> In May 1998, in the weeks before the government filed its latest
> antitrust action against Microsoft, antitrust chief Joel Klein and
> Gates met at the offices of Microsoft's lawyers in the capital. Their
> conversations went well enough that "it looked like we were going to
> have a settlement," recalled David Boies, Klein's chief prosecutor.
> But when William Neukom, Microsoft's natty general counsel, met with
> Klein and officials at the Justice Department on May 15 in an
> eleventh-hour effort to head off litigation, each side quickly felt
> the other wasn't serious about settling. By their Saturday-morning
> meeting, Microsoft thought the government wasn't willing to negotiate;
> the Feds thought Microsoft was backtracking on its concession to give
> consumers a choice of browsers. Talks collapsed by midday. "For
> reasons I will never understand," said one official in the
> negotiations, "Microsoft was not prepared to implement the
> settlement." The following Monday, May 18, when Microsoft started
> shipping Windows 98 with its browser built in, Klein filed the
> lawsuit, accusing the company of trying to extend its Windows
> [40]monopoly to the Internet. The news shaved $10 billion off the
> value of Microsoft shares in a single day.
>
> If Microsoft had offered to give consumers a choice of browsers and
> give PC makers more control of software they wished to promote, the
> government's case might never have been filed. "It would have blunted
> the case," conceded one government official. Such a settlement would
> have spared Microsoft the subpoena wars that allowed the government to
> rifle through more than 3 million company documents and produce one
> damning e-mail after another. ("This antitrust thing will blow over,"
> Gates purportedly said, according to one of the government's favorite
> documents.) The hunt only served to broaden the charges against the
> software giant. "At that point, we were not aware of all the powerful
> evidence that later would be disclosed," said Connecticut Attorney
> General Richard Blumenthal, "and that led to heightened demands for
> stronger remedies."
>
> Candid Camera
>
> It was August 1998, and Bill Gates was under oath. In a Redmond
> conference room filled with leather chairs and a government video
> camera, Gates sat next to three Microsoft lawyers he apparently didn't
> think he needed. He refused to answer questions on his own during the
> 30-hour deposition. Shifting and rocking in his chair, he appeared
> either petulant, contemptuous or bored. Whether Gates received good
> coaching from his lawyers or ignored it may never be known. He
> quibbled over the meaning of the simplest words ("compete" and "ask"
> were real stumpers). And on the occasions that he remembered e-mails
> he authored, he denied knowing what he meant by them. The same
> detail-oriented, driven genius who created the world's most valuable
> company-and a GDP-size fortune of his own-was seemingly out to lunch.
>
> The video was a turning point for three reasons. First, it indicated
> that Gates & Co. were more confident than careful. "Nobody realized,"
> admitted one Microsoft insider, "they were going to be able to play
> the Gates video in trial"-which they did, starting just after the
> gavel fell on day one. (Microsoft says the judge admitted the video
> into court after he originally said he wouldn't.) The video also set
> the stage for a massive credibility attack on the company, casting
> doubt on the dozen Microsoft witnesses who followed. Any judge
> weighing conflicting testimony is inclined to accept the more
> believable witness. And from his first ruling it was clear that none
> of Microsoft's witnesses convinced the judge of anything.
> "Credibility, in general and in the abstract," Jackson said last week,
> "is very important." The video seemed to head off any argument from
> Microsoft's lawyers that the company's aggressive tactics were the
> work of rogue employees. Finally, antitrust experts think the video
> was a blown opportunity to introduce themes for the defense that could
> be reinforced throughout the trial. The company failed "to use the
> deposition as a chance to create a commercial," says [41]George
> Washington University law-school professor William Kovacic. Instead,
> the government put it on heavy rotation.
>
> The E-Mail Trail
>
> By January 1999, as Microsoft began its defense, the credibility
> attack seemed to be working. Typically, each of the company's
> witnesses would give no ground in testimony, only to be embarrassed
> when Boies produced an e-mail that directly refuted his or her version
> of events. The darkest day of testimony was when Microsoft's lord of
> Windows, Jim Allchin, took the stand. Far from the stereotype of the
> rabid Microsoft executive, Allchin is a soft-spoken man whose silver
> hair and pale complexion suggest he's been weathered by years of hard
> work. Antitrust experts say Allchin was a perfect example of a missed
> opportunity to explain the wonders of Windows and how trifling with it
> would be dangerous. Instead, a videotape intended to demonstrate that
> Microsoft couldn't separate the browser from the operating system
> without damaging Windows looked doctored. Icons on the computer screen
> in the tape mysteriously appeared from one moment to the next. As
> Boies pointed out inconsistencies, the judge watched, head in hand.
> "It simply casts doubt on the reliability-the entire reliability-of
> the video demonstration," Jackson finally intoned. It was as if
> Microsoft hadn't taken the case seriously enough to make sure
> everything was Boies-proof.
>
> None of these courtroom gaffes might have mattered; they could have
> been dismissed as theatrics with no bearing on the law-a point
> Microsoft made almost every day on the courthouse steps. But in his
> findings of fact issued last November, the judge's first ruling,
> Jackson quoted Allchin's e-mail at length and identified him as the
> mastermind behind the strategy to crush rival [42]Netscape by bolting
> Internet Explorer to the operating system. It was just the kind of
> monopoly leveraging-using one monopoly product to enter into a new
> market-that sets off antitrust alarms. And there it was in Allchin's
> e-mail: "We must leverage Windows more." To the judge, no courtroom
> testimony could explain that e-mail away.
>
> By the time Microsoft's final witness took the stand in February 1999,
> the judge seemed to have had enough of Microsoft's denials.
> Microsoft's last witness, group vice president Robert Muglia, was
> trying to explain a piece of Gates's e-mail in which the chairman
> appeared to be trying to hobble a competitor. After the judge
> expressed doubt about Muglia's gentler spin, Muglia persisted. Jackson
> erupted in one of his angriest outbursts. Pointing at Muglia he
> yelled, "No! Stop!" and then called a recess.
>
> 'Still in Denial'
>
> Just days earlier Microsoft had taken its second stab at a settlement.
> In three meetings at the Justice Department beginning on Feb. 24, the
> two sides sat down to talk. Microsoft submitted several drafts to
> Klein. "We put three proposals on the table," said one Microsoft
> insider. "We felt like we were offering more." But more wasn't enough.
> The government, which was considering a breakup even then, wanted
> Microsoft to submit to curbs on its behavior. Microsoft refused many
> of them, such as putting government-appointed people on the board. To
> Microsoft, the government was simply taking control of the company and
> nationalizing it. To the government, "they were still in denial that
> they would lose," said Boies. The government believed Microsoft was
> submitting the same settlement proposal it had offered before the
> trial began. By the last meeting on June 2, the talks had stalled.
>
> A month earlier Jackson set up a procedural framework that would give
> Microsoft another opportunity to settle. In an unusual move, he
> decided not to release his findings of fact (his decisive version of
> the facts) and his conclusions of law (how those facts overstepped
> antitrust law) simultaneously. Instead, he staggered their release.
> That way, he could focus both sides on arguing the same set of
> facts-his own. And by releasing his facts first, he would tip his hand
> and give the losing side incentive to wrap up the case.
>
> That incentive arrived in Redmond on Nov. 5 last year. If Microsoft
> had missed any prior signals that things were going badly, only a
> megaphone might have been clearer than Jackson's findings of fact. Of
> the document's 412 paragraphs, no more than four looked favorably on
> Microsoft.
>
> The Last Dance
>
> Weeks later Jackson appointed Judge Richard Posner, one of the most
> respected jurists in the country, to try to make a deal. A prolific
> author and revered professor, Posner is most importantly a member of
> the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and is well schooled in the
> economic and legal gymnastics of antitrust law. In a case certain to
> be appealed by either side, there was perhaps no one better to peer
> over the legal horizon and give both sides enough to worry about to
> make a settlement look irresistible. Posner met with both sides
> separately, probing the facts and the elasticity of each side's
> stance. He met privately in Chicago with Gates, who convinced the
> judge, himself a conservative wary of government intervention, that a
> breakup was out of the question.
>
> There was a moment of hope in February. Posner asked the government if
> it was willing to set aside breakup proposals and base a settlement on
> rules that Microsoft must live by. Though some of the 19 states that
> were also parties to the suit opposed the idea, the Feds decided that
> they could live with "conduct remedies" if it meant they'd be
> implemented quickly, rather than at the end of protracted litigation.
> It was a major concession, one that could have given Microsoft one
> last opportunity to dodge the breakup bullet. But to Microsoft, the
> conduct remedies were "effective breakups anyway," said one
> Microsoftie. And the company didn't want to strike a deal with the
> Feds if the 19 states wouldn't also agree to it.
>
> The government, for its part, believed Gates & Co. weren't going far
> enough and hadn't faced the fact they were about to lose in court yet
> again when the judge issued his conclusions of law. "Microsoft's
> argument kept coming down to: we're not really a monopoly, so we
> should be able to do what we want," Boies explained last week. "They
> were not willing to constrain their conduct in any way." By Saturday
> morning, April Fools' Day, Posner, sensing that the gap between the
> two sides couldn't be bridged, called off the talks. They headed back
> to the courtroom, and last week the judge issued [43]his devastating
> ruling.
>
> Now Microsoft faces an uphill battle to reverse the judge's decision.
> It has delayed the breakup pending an appeal and is trying to hold off
> the conduct restrictions that Jackson imposed. It may be even harder
> to reverse the collateral damage from the rulings. Goldman Sachs
> analyst Rick Sherlund estimates that the lawsuit has lopped off as
> much as $175 billion from Microsoft's market capitalization. The
> expense of the suit, the distraction and the demoralization of the
> past two years have taken an emotional toll. Some employees, once true
> believers, are now skittish, wondering for the first time whether they
> should head for the exits. And what about the confidence of customers
> and software partners? "It's not something you put in a spreadsheet,"
> says Sherlund. "But it is something that concerns us."
>
> Private antitrust suits are also threatening the company. Had
> Microsoft settled, it could have prevented last week's ruling.
> Instead, for the roughly 170 law firms pressing 137 lawsuits against
> the company, the document is Exhibit No. 1 in their effort to prove
> that Microsoft harmed consumers. Though many of the cases won't
> prevail, any that do will win treble damages. That dollar figure, says
> high-octane class-action lawyer Stanley Chesley, "could be in the
> billions." That may not dent the company's $21 billion war chest. But
> Chesley vows to exercise the right "to take the deposition of every
> major officer of Microsoft."
>
> Now Microsoft's fate rests in the hands of higher courts. If the
> company wins, the victory would be more stunning than the
> government's. But it's a win so costly that it could still seem like a
> loss.
>
> � 2000 Newsweek, Inc.
>
> [44]Back to the top
>
> Web Exclusives:
>
> [45]Campaign 2000
>
> [46]Artscope
>
> Live Talks:
> [47]Cover Talk-Bill's Judgment Day:
> The verdict is in. Last week, Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson ordered
> Microsoft split into two independent companies, one that will sell
> Windows and one that will market application software. What does the
> future hold for Bill Gates & Co.? Jared Sandberg joined us for a Live
> Talk about Microsoft on Wednesday, June 14th.
> [48]Read the transcript.
>
> [49]Politics Talk-The New Odd Couple:
> Ralph Nader and Pat Buchanan are dark-horse candidates in the race for
> the White House. But with both working hard to gain the support of
> America's labor unions, they are certain to have a real impact on
> Campaign 2000. Newsweek's Matt Bai joined us for a Live Talk about the
> political season on Thursday June 15th.
> [50]Read the transcript.
>
> From Newsweek U.S. Edition
>
> The Cover: [51]Bill's Judgment Day
> National Affairs
>
> Campaign 2000: [52]The New Odd Couple
> International
>
> Syria: [53]Death of a President
> Special Report
>
> Education: [54]Why Teachers Are Cheaters
> Society
>
> Sports: [55]How Jackson Got the Lakers' Groove Back
> Arts & Entertainment
>
> Museums: [56]An Interactive Homage to Rock and Roll
>
> From Newsweek International Edition
>
> World Affairs
>
> Syria: [57]A Survivor's Legacy
> Asia
>
> The Koreas: [58]A Turning Point?
> Europe
>
> Russia: [59]Funny Money
> Business
>
> Entrepreneurs: [60]Digital Dreams
> Society & the Arts
>
> Languages: [61]The Sound of Silence
> Opinion
>
> Paul Kelley: [62]Sorry Lessons From Oxford
>
> [63][LINK]
>
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> 28. file://localhost/dept/dl/a20891-2000jun11.htm
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> 34. file://localhost/../special/front.htm
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> 36.
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> 44. file://localhost/tmp/NW.html#TOP
> 45. file://localhost/../../web/special/campaign2000/campaign_2k.htm
> 46. file://localhost/../../tnw/today/as/front.htm
> 47. file://localhost/../../talk/cover/000614/front.htm
> 48. file://localhost/../../talk/cover/000614/front.htm
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> 51. http://newsweek.com/nw-srv/printed/us/st/a20907-2000jun11.htm
> 52. http://newsweek.com/nw-srv/printed/us/na/a20887-2000jun11.htm
> 53. http://newsweek.com/nw-srv/printed/us/in/a20905-2000jun11.htm
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> 63. http://www.neodata.com/Newsweek/set1/subscriptions5.htm
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------------------------------
From: Cihl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Windows come in, your time is up.
Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2000 17:18:30 GMT
2:1 wrote:
>
> I just downloaded the latest version of Wine. it's pretty impressive.
> Soon, one of the main advantages of windows --- the applications
> avaliable (although I'm happy with the linux ones), will cease to be an
> advantages.
>
> In all other areas (except driver support), windows is playing catchup
> now. How else can windows becoming more like UNIX every release be
> explained.
>
> It's only a matter of time...
>
What's better about this version than the last? (Just curious)
--
�I live!�
�I hunger!�
�Run, coward!�
-- The Sinistar
------------------------------
From: aflinsch <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Synthetic Speach on Linux
Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2000 13:15:11 -0500
Daniel Mendyke wrote:
>
> Several years ago a friend showed me an application
> running on his Amiga that would read a standard
> text file and 'attempt' to read it over the systems
> speakers. (Naturally it sounded like a mechanical
> computer)
>
> Is there such a program for Linux?
>
festival
ViaVoice from IBM (ported to Linux)
------------------------------
Subject: Re: Why X is better than Terminal Server
From: Craig Kelley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: 19 Jun 2000 11:19:07 -0600
Jeff Szarka <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> On Sun, 18 Jun 2000 08:03:14 -0400, mlw <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> >> >> I'm going to forward a copy of this message to my grandmother and see
> >> >> what she thinks of X. The amount of the market that actually cares
> >> >> about such things is very small. My grandmother (and her friends) make
> >> >> up the other 90% Which market do you want?
> >
> >Why on earth would your grandmother want to know about software design.
> >This post was intended to show the technical difference between two
> >methodologies. The same bogus statement can be made were one to describe
> >the difference between 98SE an W2k.
>
> That's my point. She doesn't care. Linux zealots (advocates if you
> like) spend so much time telling people why they *have* to use Linux
> and NO ONE cares the least bit that X is some magical bit of a code
> for nuts around the globe to embrace and celebrate.
It seems that the Windows advocates are the ones telling everyone what
to use.
--
The wheel is turning but the hamster is dead.
Craig Kelley -- [EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.isu.edu/~kellcrai finger [EMAIL PROTECTED] for PGP block
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