On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 11:35:40PM -0500, Demi Marie Obenour wrote: > On 11/18/26 7:43 PM, Demi Marie Obenour wrote: > > On 11/18/26 7:37 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > >> On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 06:42:15PM -0500, Demi Marie Obenour wrote: > >>> On 11/18/26 9:04 AM, Rodolfo Giometti wrote: > >>>> This RFC proposes a key type, "keycrypt", whose material user space can > >>>> use for symmetric operations but never read: AES-256-CBC, HMAC-SHA256 > >>>> and an authenticated AES-256-GCM stream, through a file descriptor that > >>>> KEYCTL_CRYPT_OPEN returns for one key and one operation. > >>> > >>> I haven't looked at the API, but from a cryptographic perspective, > >>> this encourages very poor practices. AES-GCM even allows userspace > >>> to extract the secret authentication key. > >>> > >>> AES-256-CBC isn't a suitable mode on its own, unless it's combined > >>> with a MAC in encrypt-then-MAC. Even then, it has a 2^64 birthday > >>> bound, so it should only be used 2^48 times with a single key unless > >>> the key is ephemeral. > >>> > >>> AES-GCM is not a suitable algorithm either. If you allow encrypting > >>> with a key loaded from persistent storage, there is no way for the API > >>> to ensure it is only used with a unique nonce. Nonce reuse leaks the > >>> authentication key and allows forgeries. Using random nonces isn't > >>> good enough either: NIST only allows 2^32 encryptions in this case, > >>> and the API can't enforce that limit. > >>> > >>> For long-term keys, all of the following are much safer choices. > >>> They have 192-bit nonces, which means that one can generate them > >>> at random for each encryption without any problems. > >>> > >>> - XAES-256-GCM > >>> - XChaCha20-Poly1305 > >>> - AEGIS-256 > >>> > >>> AES-GCM-SIV is also okay, provided that you are fine with occasionally > >>> leaking if two plaintexts are equal. This happens whenever there is > >>> a nonce collision, so with probability 2^-32 after 2^32 encryptions. > >> > >> The exitential problem here is that KEYCTL_CRYPT_OPEN creates a circular > >> relationship between the keyrings API and a specific key type. > >> > >> At hardware level I did not see any support for TPM, which narrows down > >> the potential user base. > >> > >> The remaining potential user base is further reduced by those that use > >> trusted keys; leaving out those who need to solve the assumed problem > >> that only this patch set can presumebly sort out. > >> > >> And we don't really know at this point that cut. This is pretty much > >> the break down of what is wrong here. > >> > >> If there is/was a problem to sort out, it should be so constrained that > >> it should be as quick to describe as stepping over a nail really. > >> > >> These are the main topics what I would focus on. > > > > This whole patchset looks like a solution looking for a problem. > > > > The usual solution to something like this is a userspace service > > like ssh-agent. Then you can do whatever key management you want. > > That doesn't protect against root, but if someone can get root you > > have bigger problems. > > Also, if you need keys stored in hardware for some reason (compliance, > time-limited exfiltration), you can use a userspace library or > daemon that abstracts over whatever the hardware-specific API is.
Pro-bab-ly but I'm not a huge fan of generalization ;-) But when looking only at HSMs that is at least 99,999% true as they appear as PKCS#11 providing smart cards with a possible prorietary API. Other than generic smart card driver they ought not to require any special kernel support. > -- > Sincerely, > Demi Marie Obenour (she/her/hers) Br, Jarkko
