On 19/11/2026 15:33, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: [snip]
> And yeah, we don't have projected problems. I.e. "no users" is always > NAK. You have to step on the nail at first. A customer of mine stepped on it. Their product, on i.MX6, encrypts its rootfs with dm-crypt and a CAAM black key, never in clear. Its backups, though, are encrypted in user space with a key kept as a CAAM blob; to use it, the blob is opened and the key handed to user space in clear. The next generation is on i.MX93, and the customer now wants the backups and other encrypted archives protected like the rootfs: the key must never be in clear outside a secure world. The i.MX93 has no CAAM. OP-TEE can hold the key, but every way the mainline keyring offers to use it (a trusted key, through dm-crypt or AF_ALG) unseals its bytes into kernel memory, and AF_ALG no longer reaches hardware drivers. keycrypt's OP-TEE backend does not unseal it: a key it generates leaves the TA only sealed. Ciao, Rodolfo -- GNU/Linux Solutions e-mail: [email protected] Linux Device Driver [email protected] Embedded Systems phone: +39 349 2432127 UNIX programming
