On 19/11/2026 05:35, Demi Marie Obenour wrote: > On 11/18/26 7:43 PM, Demi Marie Obenour wrote: >> On 11/18/26 7:37 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: >>> On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 06:42:15PM -0500, Demi Marie Obenour wrote: >>>> AES-256-CBC isn't a suitable mode on its own, unless it's combined >>>> with a MAC in encrypt-then-MAC. Even then, it has a 2^64 birthday >>>> bound, so it should only be used 2^48 times with a single key unless >>>> the key is ephemeral.
CBC is there for existing formats (craf writes files that openssl enc can read) and because the CAAM path is CBC only. I take your points on it. >>>> AES-GCM is not a suitable algorithm either. If you allow encrypting >>>> with a key loaded from persistent storage, there is no way for the API >>>> to ensure it is only used with a unique nonce. Nonce reuse leaks the >>>> authentication key and allows forgeries. Using random nonces isn't >>>> good enough either: NIST only allows 2^32 encryptions in this case, >>>> and the API can't enforce that limit. You are right that a construction of our own is the wrong choice: patch 9, the only GCM in the series, has no user yet and can go. [snip] >> The usual solution to something like this is a userspace service >> like ssh-agent. Then you can do whatever key management you want. >> That doesn't protect against root, but if someone can get root you >> have bigger problems. The threat here is root, on devices where root eventually falls: a key root can copy decrypts that device's data offline and forever. A service that holds the key in its memory gives that away. keycrypt with the OP-TEE backend does not: the TA keeps the key and checks the purpose sealed with it at every use, so even a compromised kernel can only use it on that device, and only for that purpose. > Also, if you need keys stored in hardware for some reason (compliance, > time-limited exfiltration), you can use a userspace library or > daemon that abstracts over whatever the hardware-specific API is. Yes, that is the case I mean, and a daemon over a TEE would not give the key away either. What it costs here is, for OP-TEE's PKCS#11 TA, secure storage before the root filesystem exists; for the CAAM, the only user-space path is AF_ALG cbc(paes), the one off-CPU exception left in an interface the kernel documents as deprecated, privileged by default, with a key format per driver and no purpose. Ciao, Rodolfo -- GNU/Linux Solutions e-mail: [email protected] Linux Device Driver [email protected] Embedded Systems phone: +39 349 2432127 UNIX programming
