Hi Robert,

Thanks for your comment. Please see my response inline.

From: [email protected] At: 01/29/22 11:14:59 UTC-5:00To:  [email protected]
Cc:  Albert Fu (BLOOMBERG/ 120 PARK ) ,  [email protected],  
[email protected],  [email protected]
Subject: Re: [Lsr] Working Group Last Call for "OSPF Strict-Mode for BFD" - 
draft-ietf-lsr-ospf-bfd-strict-mode-04

Hi Ketan and all,

I support this draft - it is a useful addition. 

There are two elements which I would suggest to adjust in the text before 
publication. 

#1 Overpromise

Even below you say: 

> Since there is a issue with forwarding (which is what BFD detects)

and in the text we see: 

"In certain other scenarios, a degraded or poor quality link will allow OSPF 
adjacency formation to succeed   but the BFD session establishment will fail or 
the BFD session will flap." 

Reader may get an impression that if he enables strict mode he is 100% safe. 
Sure he is safer then before but not 100% safe. 

Real networks prove that there are classes of failures which BFD can not 
detect. And Albert knows them too :) 

For example some emulated circuits can experience periodic drops only at some 
MTUs and only when link utilization reaches X %. While there is ongoing 
extension to BFD to fill it with payload I don't think that BFD can be useful 
to also saturate say in 80% 10G link with probes to test it well before 
allowing OSPF to be established. 

[AF] This draft ensures that BFD can be used to detect failure quickly when 
there is a complete path failure between the nodes. You are right that there 
are many other types of failure that BFD cannot detect. For example, one other 
one we have seen from time to time is when an interface fails to forward 
configured MTU-sized packet (see the other draft that we have proposed to 
address this is 
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-bfd-large-packets). 

There are also other types of failures, such as link errors. 

Another error type that we have encountered are errors due to pattern sensitive 
pattern where BFD/Routing protocols are working fine, but user traffic cannot 
be forwarded due to bit flip.

I tend to think that these type of errors are best handled outside this draft, 
and from previous discussions with various people in the BFD working group, 
they are keen to keep BFD as simple as possible.


#2 Timer 

What I find missing in the draft is a mutually (between OSPF peers) timer fired 
after BFD session is up which in OSPF could hold on allowing BFD to do some 
more testing before declaring adj to be established. I think just bringing OSPF 
adj immediately after the BFD session is up is not a good thing. Keep in mind 
that we are bringing the interface up so by applying such a timer we are not 
dropping packets .. in fact quite the reverse we are making sure user packets 
would not be dropped. 

[AF] This is a good point you brought up. Both router vendors that I have 
tested (Cisco & Juniper) do indeed have timer mechanism to delay when OSPF 
would be allowed to come up, which we have tested (useful to guard against 
flapping links). I am not sure if this "hold down" mechanism needs to be 
included in the draft.


Cheers,
Robert


Thanks,
Albert
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