Thanks for this, Jim. I'm going to deliberate on it. Statements about statements are not propositions.
There's linguistics , of course, which seeking to discover objective characteristics of statements. CB Jim Farmelant On Thu, 30 Dec 2010 09:40:33 -0500 c b <cb31450 at gmail.com> writes: > Rosa, > > "Marxist" philosophy without theses ? Without theory ? I think that claim has to be understood within the context of Wittgensteinian philosophy. For Wittgenstein the only genuine propositions are those about the external world since those are the only kinds of statements that can be confirmed or disconfirmed. Therefore, statements in mathematics and logic did not qualify as genuine propositions in Wittgenstein's view since they can be analyzed as being either tautologies if true, or contradictions if false. As Wittenstein put it in the Tractatus: ----------------- 6.1 The propositions of logic are tautologies. 6.2 Mathematics is a logical method. The propositions of mathematics are equations, and therefore pseudo-propositions. 6.3 Logical research means the investigation of all regularity. And outside logic all is accident. 6.4 All propositions are of equal value. 6.5 For an answer which cannot be expressed the question too cannot be expressed. The riddle does not exist. If a question can be put at all, then it can also be answered. Later on, Wittgenstein writes: The propositions of logic therefore say nothing. (They are the analytical propositions.) 6.12 The fact that the propositions of logic are tautologies shows the formal -- logical -- properties of language, of the world. That its constituent parts connected together in this way give a tautology characterizes the logic of its constituent parts. In order that propositions connected together in a definite way may give a tautology they must have definite properties of structure. That they give a tautology when so connected shows therefore that they possess these properties of structure. 6.13 Logic is not a theory but a reflexion of the world. Logic is transcendental. Later on also: 6.113 It is the characteristic mark of logical propositions that one can perceive in the symbol alone that they are true; and this fact contains in itself the whole philosophy of logic. And so also it is one of the most important facts that the truth or falsehood of non-logical propositions can not be recognized from the propositions alone. And eventually: 6.53 The right method of philosophy would be this: To say nothing except what can be said, i.e. the propositions of natural science, i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy: and then always, when someone else wished to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions. This method would be unsatisfying to the other -- he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy -- but it would be the only strictly correct method. 6.54 My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.) He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly. 7 Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. ---------------------------------- For Wittgenstein, propositions of philosophy are pseudo-propositions. At worst they nonsensical like the propositions of traditional metaphysics. At best, they turn out to be propositions of logical analysis which are still a species of pseudopropositions. Hence, that's why for Wittgenstein there cannot be theses or theories in philosophy. _______________________________________________ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
