It amazes me that this rubbish is considered the cornerstone of 20th 
century philosophy. From formalism to the censorship of thought. 
Ultrasophisticated juvenalia. I can see what Rosa--is Rosa really a she 
or really a Rosa or Lichtenstein?--sees in this. It prevents the 
self-reflection of a Brittrot sectarian.

On 12/30/2010 12:18 PM, Jim Farmelant wrote:
> On Thu, 30 Dec 2010 09:40:33 -0500 c b<>  writes:
>> Rosa,
>> "Marxist" philosophy without theses ? Without theory ?
> I think that claim has to be understood within the
> context of Wittgensteinian philosophy.  For
> Wittgenstein the only genuine propositions
> are those about the external world since
> those are the only kinds of statements that
> can be confirmed or disconfirmed.  Therefore,
> statements in mathematics and logic did not
> qualify as genuine propositions in Wittgenstein's
> view since they can be analyzed as being either tautologies
> if true, or contradictions if false.  As Wittenstein put it in the
> Tractatus:
> -----------------
> 6.1
> The propositions of logic are tautologies.
> 6.2
> Mathematics is a logical method.
> The propositions of mathematics are equations, and therefore
> pseudo-propositions.
> 6.3
> Logical research means the investigation of all regularity. And outside
> logic all is accident.
> 6.4
> All propositions are of equal value.
> 6.5
> For an answer which cannot be expressed the question too cannot be
> expressed.
> The riddle does not exist.
> If a question can be put at all, then it can also be answered.
> Later on, Wittgenstein writes:
> The propositions of logic therefore say nothing. (They are the analytical
> propositions.)
> 6.12
> The fact that the propositions of logic are tautologies shows the formal
> -- logical -- properties of language, of the world.
> That its constituent parts connected together in this way give a
> tautology characterizes the logic of its constituent parts.
> In order that propositions connected together in a definite way may give
> a tautology they must have definite properties of structure. That they
> give a tautology when so connected shows therefore that they possess
> these properties of structure.
> 6.13
> Logic is not a theory but a reflexion of the world.
> Logic is transcendental.
> Later on also:
> 6.113
> It is the characteristic mark of logical propositions that one can
> perceive in the symbol alone that they are true; and this fact contains
> in itself the whole philosophy of logic. And so also it is one of the
> most important facts that the truth or falsehood of non-logical
> propositions can not be recognized from the propositions alone.
> And eventually:
> 6.53
> The right method of philosophy would be this: To say nothing except what
> can be said, i.e. the propositions of natural science, i.e. something
> that has nothing to do with philosophy: and then always, when someone
> else wished to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he
> had given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions. This method
> would be unsatisfying to the other -- he would not have the feeling that
> we were teaching him philosophy -- but it would be the only strictly
> correct method.
> 6.54
> My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me
> finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through
> them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder,
> after he has climbed up on it.)
> He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly.
> 7
> Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.
> ----------------------------------
> For Wittgenstein, propositions of philosophy
> are pseudo-propositions.  At worst they
> nonsensical like the propositions of traditional
> metaphysics.  At best, they turn out to be
> propositions of logical analysis which are
> still a species of pseudopropositions.
> Hence, that's why for Wittgenstein there
> cannot be theses or theories in philosophy.
>> CB

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