Shane Bauer's articles noted in the interview I just posted.
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/06/behind-the-lines-syria-part-one/
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/06/behind-the-lines-syria-part-two/

Excellent pieces. Summarized here,
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/06/five-biggest-takeaways-shane-bauer-syria-civil-war/
.

Trailer: Introducing “Behind the Lines”
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PIkVOfKwh3U>
Michael Pugliese


On Sun, Jun 23, 2024 at 8:28 AM Michael Pugliese via groups.io
<[email protected]> wrote:

> Via,
> https://newlinesmag.com/review/chomskys-america-centric-prism-distorts-reality/
>
> A sense of the embarrassing level of Chomsky’s knowledge about Syria can
> be seen in the same video interview in which he claims that there was no
> uprising in Syria in 2012 (according to our subaltern knowledge, the
> uprising started in March 2011) and then implies that, if there were
> protesters, they were there alongside the Islamic State and other jihadist
> groups.
>
> We get an equally interesting glimpse into Chomsky’s mode of thought when,
> on the issue of humanitarian intervention after the chemical massacre of
> 2013, he asks the same Syrian doctor and activist: Who should the Americans
> bomb in Syria? The regime? Because that would of course undermine the
> “resistance front” to jihadists.
>
> That is alluded to here.
>
> In the years since August 2013, Chomsky has said little about Syria. And
> to the extent he has, his silences have been more appreciated. Speaking at
> Harvard in September 2015, Chomsky scolded a Syrian doctor
> <https://youtu.be/JFiCg67cDTs?t=57m40s> for asking if the US should
> intervene to protect Syrian civilians. "If you attack Assad, you are
> undermining resistance to the Islamic State and al-Nusra, who'll then take
> over," he said: "Is that what you want for Syria?"
>
> Elsewhere he criticized the "meaningless" US strategy
> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uv7EKQ6Rrrs> because it wasn't
> supporting the forces that "are really combatting ISIS": "Iran, PKK, and
> the Assad regime". In an appearance on UK's Channel 4 News
> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YmshN5b92Ic>, he claimed IS was now
> "almost a representative of a large part of Sunni Islam". And where was
> Chomsky getting all these insights? "One of the main commentators on the
> region… one who's been most informed and accurate: Patrick Cockburn."
>
> Via
> https://www.newarab.com/opinion/chomsky-and-syria-revisionists-lefts-moral-cul-de-sac
>
> The embedded hyperlink,
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JFiCg67cDTs&t=3460s , pointing directly
> to that exchange at the Harvard Kennedy School, being questioned by a
> Syrian Doctor.
>
> Besides Patrick Cockburn, Reese Ehrlich, early on, was a source for
> Chomsky.
>
> Inside Syria
> The Backstory of Their Civil War and What the World Can Expect
> REESE ERLICH - FOREWORD BY NOAM CHOMSKY
> <https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781633882362/Inside-Syria-The-Backstory-of-Their-Civil-War-and-What-the-World-Can-Expect>
> Based on first-hand reporting from Syria and Washington, journalist Reese
> Erlich unravels the complex dynamics underlying the Syrian civil war.
> Through vivid, on-the-ground accounts and interviews with both rebel
> leaders and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Erlich gives the reader a
> better understanding of this momentous power struggle and why it
> matters.Through his many contacts inside Syria, the author reveals who is
> supporting Assad and why; he describes the agendas of the rebel factions;
> and he depicts in stark terms the dire plight of many ordinary Syrian
> people caught in the cross-fire. The book also provides insights into the
> role of the Kurds, the continuing influence of Iran, and the policies of
> American leaders who seem interested only in protecting US regional
> interests.Disturbing and enlightening at once, this timely book shows you
> not only what is happening inside Syria but why it is so important for the
> Middle East, the US, and the world.
>
>
> I don't see that Chomsky disputing that there was an uprising here.
>
> Discussing America’s role in the Syrian civil war: A Conversation with
> Noam Chomsky <https://chomsky.info/20220517/>Noam Chomsky Interviewed by
> Raghav KaushikMay 17, 2022. *Countercurrents*
> <https://countercurrents.org/2022/05/discussing-americas-role-in-the-syrian-civil-war-a-conversation-with-noam-chomsky/>
> .
>
> *Q: Let us begin by discussing the initial US response to the Syrian
> uprising. *
>
> NC: In the early stages of the opposition to the savage Assad regime, the
> US stood aside.  It had a very easy way to support the opposition, which
> didn’t carry the obvious risks of direct confrontation (namely, bringing
> the Russians in and escalating the atrocities).  The easy way was to
> encourage Israel to mobilize its forces along the northern border, a move
> that would not produce any objections from the international community and
> which would compel the regime to withdraw its forces from a number of
> frontline positions and relieve the pressure on the opposition. It was not
> done, apparently never considered.
>
> It’s reported that at the same time that the US was strongly supporting
> Assad in this way, a small CIA operation was supporting the opposition.  If
> so, the most likely conjecture is that the US (and obviously Israel) wanted
> to be sure that Assad would be weakened, even if victorious.
>
> *Q: Commenting on the US policy on Syria, Gilbert Achcar states that:
> “Now, what has been the most important intervention of the Obama
> administration in Syria? To answer this question, let us compare its
> attitude toward the Syrian opposition to the way the United States dealt
> with the mujahideen who fought the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan.
> Washington supported the Afghan mujahideen, along with the Saudi kingdom
> and the Pakistani military. It is well known that it armed them with
> anti-aircraft missiles, Stinger missiles. Compare that to Syria. Not only
> did the United States not deliver any such weapons to the Syrian
> uprising—even in 2012, when it was still dominated by what could be
> described as a democratic opposition. But it even forbade all its regional
> allies from delivering such weapons to the Syrian insurgents. Turkey
> produces Stinger missiles under U.S. license, but it wasn’t allowed to
> deliver a single one of them to the Syrian opposition—nor were the Gulf
> monarchies. That was the crucial intervention of the United States in the
> Syrian conflict. And that is what allowed Bashar al-Assad’s regime to
> remain in place. It allowed him to maintain a monopoly of air power, which
> enabled his regime to even drop barrel-bombs from helicopters—a most
> indiscriminate and devastating type of bombing.” Do you agree with Achcar’s
> assessment?*
>
> NC: I think Achcar is making a fair point here. It would be interesting to
> look into why the US took this position. But I think the Obama
> administration reservations on supplying Stinger missiles to the opposition
> are part of a more general concern. These missiles are easily
> transportable, and if they fall into the wrong hands, could become a major
> threat to commercial aircraft. In contrast, drawing Assad’s troops to the
> southern border posed no threat. Failure to do that is the decisive
> evidence that the US-Israel were not opposed to Assad’s remaining in power.
>
> *Q: Now let’s discuss the post-2013 American policy, specifically the CIA
> program to arm the rebels. It is clear from all reporting, e.g., Shane
> Bauer’s, that the CIA program was (a) big – a billion dollar program, one
> of CIA’s biggest covert operations, (b) lethal – it supplied TOW
> (tube-launched, optically tracked, wireless-guided) anti-tank missiles to
> the opposition, and (c) anti-Assad in its goals.*
>
> NC: It’s pretty clear that a few years later, Obama had joined the main
> European allies in thinking that Assad might be removed.  It is clear that
> the CIA was by then sending advanced anti-tank weapons that blocked the
> offensive actions of Assad’s army, dismissing the warnings by
> correspondents on the ground (and anyone who bothered thinking) that this
> might incite direct Russian intervention, destroying the weapons and
> sharply escalating the atrocities. As happened. At this point Obama backed
> off, not wanting to move on to likely nuclear war.
>
> *Q:  Interestingly, Bauer’s piece indicates that what you described was
> not just the position of journalists on the ground, but also understood by
> the White House itself. Bauer interviewed Philip Gordon, the White House
> coordinator for the Middle East from 2013 to 2015. This is what Gordon
> stated referring to the Russian intervention: “It was the logical
> continuation of what we had already seen, which is that the more that we
> intervene, the more they intervene,”*
>
> NC: Very interesting comment by Gordon.
>
> *Q: What according to you was the motivation for the CIA program? As
> you’ve stated in the past and confirmed by your answers above, the US “may
> not like the (Assad) regime, but it is nevertheless a regime that is well
> practiced in accommodating their demands and any unknown alternative might
> prove worse in this respect.” *
>
> *Bauer offers an explanation for why Obama launched the CIA program in the
> summer of 2013. “The decision in the summer of 2013 to directly arm the
> rebels may have had just as much to do with an escalating proxy war against
> Iran as it did with Assad’s use of chemical weapons. For more than a year,
> the Free Syrian Army had controlled al-Qusayr, a strategically important
> town near the Lebanese border and the highway between Damascus and the port
> of Tartus. In May 2013, al-Qusayr came under an assault led not by the
> Syrian army, but by Hezbollah, the Lebanese militia with decades of
> experience in guerrilla warfare. In less than three weeks, al-Qusayr fell
> to the regime. It was Hezbollah’s first major offensive in Syria, and many
> Syrians felt betrayed to see an organization they had revered for its
> opposition to Israel now acting as an occupier. Thousands of Hezbollah
> fighters were said to have entered the country to help the regime retake
> Aleppo and other opposition strongholds. In Washington, Hezbollah’s
> involvement was seen as evidence of Iran putting its finger on the
> scale……In June 2013, one month after Hezbol­lah’s attack began, the White
> House publi­cized the intelligence community’s findings on chemical weapons
> and Obama decided to arm the rebels.”*
>
> NC: The facts are correct. The speculation is conceivable, though I know
> of no evidence for it.  A simpler explanation seems to me to be that the
> US-Israel wanted to keep Assad weak, even if remaining in power. But I
> don’t see much point in debating a policy decision about which we have no
> evidence.
>
> *Q: Many activists argue that the opposition was forced to bear arms due
> to Assad’s brutality and had to get arms from wherever they could get them
> to defend themselves. *
>
> NC: One can debate whether the CIA should or should not have sent
> weapons.  I took no stand on it, so I’m not relevant to this debate.
>
> *Q: The topic of the American role in Syria divided the US left, roughly
> between those who exclusively focused on the CIA program and its impact,
> and those who exclusively focused on the pro-Assad nature of US policy in
> the early days of the uprising. Do you have any thoughts on these
> disagreements?*
>
> NC: I honestly don’t see the disagreement.  Few to my knowledge – I can’t
> think of one – have discussed the pro-Assad component of US-Israeli policy,
> namely refusing to draw his forces to the South to relieve the opposition.
> After that, US policy vacillated depending on circumstances.
>
> The only disagreement I see is whether we have to rigidly impose a
> pro-/anti-Assad position to Obama or whether we can consider how policy was
> adjusted to circumstances and – crucially — over whether we should have
> concern for the fate of Syrians, as Cockburn and Glass had when they warned
> about the consequences of sending heavy arms to the opposition – correctly
> as it turned out.
>
> *Q: Another point of controversy – this one concerns your views, but does
> not pertain to the core of your arguments which are captured above, but the
> way in which you present them – appears to be your emphasis of the legality
> of what Iran and Russia did. What you say is correct – Iranian and Russian
> interventions were not acts of aggression – but it doesn’t seem
> significant. Many activists, myself included, do wonder why you bring it
> up. The core of your argument is unaffected by the legality of what
> Iran/Russia did. If anything, as a lot of the reaction indicates, it is
> clearly distracting people from the core issues.*
>
> NC: As far as I recall, I once responded to the claim that the
> Russian-Iranian intervention was illegal by pointing out that it is not.
> That sentence is my total emphasis on the legality of what they did. The
> rest is bitter condemnation of their primary role in the horrendous
> atrocities.
>
> In response to tantrums about this correct statement, I have occasionally
> reiterated it.
>
>> 
>
>


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