Dialogue is not duologue - essentially we are all in it. I know what Francis means, but honestly think the general dialogue is in an even worse state than confrontation with the know-all. The techniques of judgement suspension are little known by arguers. I got the same feelings as Ian on Obama today and have noted the same reservations as Chris. I have suspended my judgement on him, but am still open to evaluation of what he makes me feel. I essentially feel conned by his sermon, even though it has content I want to believe in. Nothing touches me objectively - any objectivity is a worked-on, worked- through position. One can be pretty objective and pretty angry at the same time. Most people still think objectivity is some kind of emotion-value-free state or balanced reporting (usually highly mannered when observed closely).
On 20 Jan, 22:41, Molly Brogan <[email protected]> wrote: > open and honest dialogue with someone who is > completely convinced that he is right and that, therefore, other > opinions count for nothing > > this position does not allow dialogue. Dialogue by definition, > requires a suspension of judgment. Debate is the format for right and > wrong. > > On Jan 20, 1:54 pm, frantheman <[email protected]> wrote: > > > Defeasable reasoning is - beyond the serious reflective thinkers you > > cite, Neil, and other similar models, such as Popper's for the > > development of scientific knowledge and the open society - so deeply > > grounded in common sense, that one is inclined to think it's too > > obvious to even mention. And yet, as you point out, this approach to > > problems is so lacking as to be almost invisible and impotent. > > > We have raised attributes such as aggressiveness, competitiveness, > > certainty and success to cardinal virtues and forgotten values such as > > humility, reflection and respect. Our advocates are taught to see the > > arguments of others as points to be countered rather than opinions > > they could learn from. Whether it's atheists regarding believers as > > superstitious fools and believers atheists as unethical liars, or > > Palestinians Israelis as imperialistic landgrabbers and Israelis > > Palestinians as fanatical terrorists, confrontational (self-)certainty > > promulgates destructive conflict and blocks growth and progress. > > > I think, like you, there are better ways of takling problems or, > > perhaps better, recognising the possibilities they contain for us. > > > There is one question, however, for which I don't have an answer; how > > do you engage in an open and honest dialogue with someone who is > > completely convinced that he is right and that, therefore, other > > opinions count for nothing? > > > Francis > > > On 20 Jan., 13:14, archytas <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > I've become interested in something called defeasible reasoning of > > > late. I rather like the idea because it lets us argue from the > > > perspective that one might be wrong. I can't get any moral authority > > > from golden salamanders, so I'm interested in defeasible obligations, > > > which give rise to defeasible inferences about what we are, all things > > > considered, obliged to do. Thus I think we should act as though > > > mankind is screwing up big-time and get more control of global > > > warming, even if the evidence eventually turns out to have been > > > misinterpreted. The ideas are not new. David Ross, in 1930, > > > discussed the phenomena of prima facie obligations. The existence of a > > > prima facie obligation gives one good, but defeasible grounds, for > > > believing that one ought to fulfill that obligation. When formal > > > deontic logic was developed by Chisholm and others in the 1960s, the > > > use of classical logic gave rise to certain paradoxes, such as > > > Chisholm's paradox of contrary-to-duty imperatives. These paradoxes > > > can be resolved by recognizing that the inference from imperative to > > > actual duty is a defeasible one. > > > Prediction always involves an element of defeasibilty. If one predicts > > > what will, or what would, under some hypotheis, happen, one must > > > presume that there are no unknown factors that might interfere with > > > those factors and conditions that are known. Any prediction can be > > > upset by such unanticipated interventions. Prediction thus proceeds > > > from the assumption that the situation as modeled constitutes a closed > > > world: that nothing outside that situation could intrude in time to > > > upset one's predictions. In addition, we seem to presume that any > > > factor that is not known to be causally relevant is in fact causally > > > irrelevant, since we are constantly encountering new factors and novel > > > combinations of factors, and it is impossible to verify their causal > > > irrelevance in advance. This closed-world assumption is one of the > > > principal motivations for McCarthy's logic of circumscription > > > (McCarthy 1982; McCarthy 1986). > > > > Now this may be a bit clumsy, but I would hope all could see (say) > > > that Chris and I could agree on what we ought to try to do about > > > "global warming" based on a shared agreement that are arguments are > > > defeasible (and possibly bullshit ridden). This is an altogether > > > different stance in argument than points scoring, ad hominem and the > > > rest. One might have to be careful in language when religious figures > > > with surgical instruments are around, but circumscription allows the > > > possibility that one's opponents may be right and takes into account > > > what we don't currently know and that our opinions change in the flow > > > of time forward.. I know I do not have a second sister, due to the > > > absence of one - but would be convinced to change my mind should one > > > appear. I know there is no 10.55 a.m. train into town, as none is > > > listed. I have never knowingly sensed dark matter and have worked > > > without knowing about it. My work might well take a different tack if > > > the LHC finds the stuff. The point, I guess, is that we don't know > > > much about the nature of the argument we so readily enter into, and > > > how restricted it often is. I believe we could have much deeper, > > > multi-voiced arguments about what we should do and would find one very > > > loud, censoring tone preventing us taking circumspect action - our > > > primitive and brutal notion of what an economy is. > > > > I doubt anyone here would want to read these papers, but some might be > > > interested to note the area they come from. > > > > McCarthy, John M. and Patrick J. Hayes, 1969, “Some Philosophical > > > Problems from the Standpoint of Artificial Intelligence”, in Machine > > > Intelligence 4, B. Meltzer and D. Mitchie (eds.), Edinburgh: Edinburgh > > > University Press. > > > –––, 1977, “Epistemological Problems of Artificial Intelligence”, in > > > Proceedings of the 5th International Joint Conference on Artificial > > > Intelligence, Pittsburgh: Computer Science Department, Carnegie-Mellon > > > University. > > > –––, 1982, “Circumscription — A Form of Non-Monotonic Reasoning”, > > > Artificial Intelligence, 13: 27-39, 171-177. > > > –––, 1986, “Application of Circumscription to Formalizing Common-Sense > > > Knowledge”, Artificial Intelligence, 28: 89-111. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups ""Minds Eye"" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/Minds-Eye?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
