Alan, there are a number of issues in your post which I would like to take up:
On 7 Jul., 04:17, Alan Wostenberg <[email protected]> wrote: > Sure, OM. But the key point - which Fran illustrates in that failure > to unequivocally condemn chattel slavery -- is if abortion is not > intrinsically immoral, nothing is. > This is a pretty sweeping statement, for which you offer no justification whatsoever. Even on the basis of natural law theory, it can be - and is - argued that abortion is permissible in certain circumstances. The usual example discussed is that of ectopic (extra- uterine) pregnancies, usually in the Fallopian tube. In cases where spontaneous abortion has not taken place (around half) medical intervention (either surgery or MTX -abortifacient drug treatment) is necessary, otherwise both mother and embryo die. The traditional Catholic teaching allows for abortion in this case, describing the situation as "indirect abortion" and using an argumentative device called the "argument of the double effect." According to this teaching, doctors may remove the fallopian tube as a therapeutic procedure to save the woman's life. A consequential effect of this is the destruction of the fetus, but, as the intention of the operator was not to kill the fetus but to save the woman, this is justifiable. I have always had problems with this line of argument, but the point I really want to make here is that the primary school of natural law/ intrinsic immoral actions (traditional Catholic ethics) has to resort to the concept of intention here, in order to justify a particular action in a particular situation. If abortion is an intrinsically immoral act, in your words, "always and everywhere wrong, for anybody", then it is also wrong in the case of an ectopic pregnancy - even if the consequence of not acting is the death of both mother and fetus. > For a person who already believes nothing is intrinsically immoral, of > course believes abortion is not intrinsically immoral. And this has > consequences for reasoned debate, because here's another example of an > intrinsically immoral act: lying. > The question as the whether lying is an intrinsically immoral act is something moral philosophers have debated for as long as there has been moral philosophy. What about lying to save innocent lives from certain destruction (the easiest example is the SS patrol asking the houseowner, "Are there Jews hidden in your house?")? What we have here is what we frequently have in the area of difficult moral decisions - a conflict between different moral norms. And such norms, as I defined them in my original post, cannot be absolute. In paarticular situations, norms can help by giving us guidelines, but in the end, the moral decision remains with the agent - and this is the source of an analysis of the (im)morality of a particular action in a particular situation, by a particular agent. > Now if a person really disagrees, that renders communication > impossible, for a person who believed it, might well be lying in an > internet forum. So to deny that there are intrinsic evils makes > rational discourse impossible. But the purpose of minds eye forum is > reasoned discourse. So surely we all agree: lying is intrinsically > immoral. The person who says he thinks lying is sometimes justified > could be lying about that, so out of charity, should be ignored. > > But if If lying is one example of an intrinsically immoral act, > perhaps there are others. I put forth chattel slavery as one. For if > lying is always and everywhere wrong, how could what seems an even > greater greater evil of chattel slavery not be intrinsically evil? > And if chattel slavery which treats him as a property not person is > never justified, then how could deliberately taking the life of an > innocent person ever be justified? > It strikes me that you are trying to use the form of the scholastic disputatio in this post. This however requires that the original premises are sound and that each step of the argument follows logically and clearly from the previous one. The statement that to disagree that lying is intrinsically evil makes rational discourse impossible is simply not true. You seem to be trying to base this on the argument that someone who denies the intrinsic immorality of lying cannot be trusted not to lie in a dialogue. This is a conflation of moral principles (which individuals may or may not have and, more importantly, even if they have them, may or may not adhere to) and rationality. In the end, rational discourse is based on the agreement of the parties concerned to interact truthfully, and is a matter of trust. Furthermore, in rational discourse, the only aspects about which one can knowingly lie are issues of fact, and the liar must always reckon with the possibility that the lie will be exposed - so that the strength of one's argument, in most cases, depends on the truth of the facts used to support it. > And this is the starter premise on the abortion question: it is always > and everywhere wrong, for anybody, to take the life of an innocent > person. OK so far? > This statement, while noble and idealistic, rules out practically all forms of modern warfare. Even one bomb dropped which kills one innocent child is, according to this statement, morally impermissible. In which case, to give just one example, we would all be saluting "Sieg heil!" today. Francis --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups ""Minds Eye"" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/Minds-Eye?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
