Let me try to broaden the scope of the discussion a bit. As I see it, there are three (or four, if you include direct divine revelation - but this is beyond the area of purely rational discourse) basic approaches to finding a foundation for moral conduct:
1. Natural law theories: This is the position taken by Alan, and I think our dialogue here has sufficiently elaborated the pros and cons of this method. 2. Virtue based theories: An approach with a long tradition, from Plato to Iris Murdoch (in western philosophy). Most virtue-based theories ultimately go back to an examination and contemplation of the meaning of "the good." If I understand him correctly, ornamental mind tends in this direction, so I will leave further elaboration to him! 3. Rational acting subject theories: The greatest (in my view) of these is that set out by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Kant sees the foundation of all morality in the Categorical Imperative - defined in Wikipedia as "an absolute, unconditional requirement that asserts its authority in all circumstances, both required and justified as an end in itself." Kant, in "The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals" sets out the CI in three maxims, which follow from each other: 1. "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." 2. "Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end and never merely as a means to an end." 3. "Therefore, every rational being must so act as if he were through his maxim always a legislating member in the universal kingdom of ends." The beauty of this approach is that it frees us from a compulsion to examine individual acts and puts the focus on the responsible, freely acting agent. Freedom and responsibility - I know of no better foundation for moral conduct. Francis On 7 Jul., 18:07, frantheman <[email protected]> wrote: > Alan, there are a number of issues in your post which I would like to > take up: > > On 7 Jul., 04:17, Alan Wostenberg <[email protected]> wrote:> Sure, OM. But > the key point - which Fran illustrates in that failure > > to unequivocally condemn chattel slavery -- is if abortion is not > > intrinsically immoral, nothing is. > > This is a pretty sweeping statement, for which you offer no > justification whatsoever. Even on the basis of natural law theory, it > can be - and is - argued that abortion is permissible in certain > circumstances. The usual example discussed is that of ectopic (extra- > uterine) pregnancies, usually in the Fallopian tube. In cases where > spontaneous abortion has not taken place (around half) medical > intervention (either surgery or MTX -abortifacient drug treatment) is > necessary, otherwise both mother and embryo die. The traditional > Catholic teaching allows for abortion in this case, describing the > situation as "indirect abortion" and using an argumentative device > called the "argument of the double effect." According to this > teaching, doctors may remove the fallopian tube as a therapeutic > procedure to save the woman's life. A consequential effect of this is > the destruction of the fetus, but, as the intention of the operator > was not to kill the fetus but to save the woman, this is justifiable. > I have always had problems with this line of argument, but the point I > really want to make here is that the primary school of natural law/ > intrinsic immoral actions (traditional Catholic ethics) has to resort > to the concept of intention here, in order to justify a particular > action in a particular situation. If abortion is an intrinsically > immoral act, in your words, "always and everywhere wrong, for > anybody", then it is also wrong in the case of an ectopic pregnancy - > even if the consequence of not acting is the death of both mother and > fetus. > > > For a person who already believes nothing is intrinsically immoral, of > > course believes abortion is not intrinsically immoral. And this has > > consequences for reasoned debate, because here's another example of an > > intrinsically immoral act: lying. > > The question as the whether lying is an intrinsically immoral act is > something moral philosophers have debated for as long as there has > been moral philosophy. What about lying to save innocent lives from > certain destruction (the easiest example is the SS patrol asking the > houseowner, "Are there Jews hidden in your house?")? What we have here > is what we frequently have in the area of difficult moral decisions - > a conflict between different moral norms. And such norms, as I defined > them in my original post, cannot be absolute. In paarticular > situations, norms can help by giving us guidelines, but in the end, > the moral decision remains with the agent - and this is the source of > an analysis of the (im)morality of a particular action in a particular > situation, by a particular agent. > > > > > > > Now if a person really disagrees, that renders communication > > impossible, for a person who believed it, might well be lying in an > > internet forum. So to deny that there are intrinsic evils makes > > rational discourse impossible. But the purpose of minds eye forum is > > reasoned discourse. So surely we all agree: lying is intrinsically > > immoral. The person who says he thinks lying is sometimes justified > > could be lying about that, so out of charity, should be ignored. > > > But if If lying is one example of an intrinsically immoral act, > > perhaps there are others. I put forth chattel slavery as one. For if > > lying is always and everywhere wrong, how could what seems an even > > greater greater evil of chattel slavery not be intrinsically evil? > > And if chattel slavery which treats him as a property not person is > > never justified, then how could deliberately taking the life of an > > innocent person ever be justified? > > It strikes me that you are trying to use the form of the scholastic > disputatio in this post. This however requires that the original > premises are sound and that each step of the argument follows > logically and clearly from the previous one. The statement that to > disagree that lying is intrinsically evil makes rational discourse > impossible is simply not true. You seem to be trying to base this on > the argument that someone who denies the intrinsic immorality of lying > cannot be trusted not to lie in a dialogue. This is a conflation of > moral principles (which individuals may or may not have and, more > importantly, even if they have them, may or may not adhere to) and > rationality. In the end, rational discourse is based on the agreement > of the parties concerned to interact truthfully, and is a matter of > trust. Furthermore, in rational discourse, the only aspects about > which one can knowingly lie are issues of fact, and the liar must > always reckon with the possibility that the lie will be exposed - so > that the strength of one's argument, in most cases, depends on the > truth of the facts used to support it. > > > And this is the starter premise on the abortion question: it is always > > and everywhere wrong, for anybody, to take the life of an innocent > > person. OK so far? > > This statement, while noble and idealistic, rules out practically all > forms of modern warfare. Even one bomb dropped which kills one > innocent child is, according to this statement, morally impermissible. > In which case, to give just one example, we would all be saluting > "Sieg heil!" today. > > Francis --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups ""Minds Eye"" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/Minds-Eye?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
