Hi Platt --
> I think you may have some mistaken ideas about the MOQ. That is a high probability. [Ham, previously]: > Since "Intellectual quality" is just a Pirsigian metaphor for conscious > perception, what this suggests to me is that the Value of the S/O divide > is > the source of experience. [Platt]: > "Conscious perception" in the MOQ is pure, direct awareness prior to > intellection of any kind. So it isn't "intellectual quality." It is simply > Quality. "Quality is a direct experience independent of and prior to > intellectual abstractions." (Lila, 5) Okay, I stand corrected. In that case, Pirsig's "pure, direct awareness" is what I call "sensibility" (to distinguish it from experiential awareness which is "not pure".) Then Bo's assertion that "intellectual quality ought to be the VALUE of the SQ divide" refers to pure (i.e., undifferentiated) Value. Still, it suggests that Value is the source of intellection, which is my thesis, and once something is intellectualized (experienced) it is differentiated. [Platt]: > Pirsig's "primary source" cannot be an object since the MOQ's perspective > views the subject-object division as a necessary illusion created by > intellect. "Quality, on which there is complete agreement, is a universal > source of things." (Lila, 6) Note the absence of any division. That would be a correct objective statement, except that "the MOQ's perspective" is not what creates the illusion. The illusion is created by the intellect which "views the subject-object division." Note the presence of the division. My point is that when we experience Value we make it relational -- we relate it to "things". Pure value-sensibility is pre-intellectual. As Bo asserts, it is the Value of the S-O divide, a relational dualism. The Value that we EXPERIENCE is differentiated. In either case, Value cannot be the "primary source". [Platt]: > In his post to Ron, Dan Glover got it right: "Once a person realizes there > are no subjects and objects then there is only Dynamic awareness of static > quality patterns of value." "Dynamic awareness" (relational) and "static quality patterns" (differentiated) does not make a person's realization primary or absolute. Even objects are eliminated from the intellect, the "person" is aware of himself as an entity apart from what he has eliminated. He couldn't be a person without "being". Are you and Dan suggesting that realization can reduce the subject and its objects to Quality? Think about it, Platt. What is Qualilty without sensibility? > I'm afraid you still believe the subject-object division is primary > reality and that pure experience is "relational" rather than indivisible. > I'm reminded this quote from William James: > > "Pure experience' is the name I gave to the immediate flux of life which > furnishes the material to our later reflection with its conceptual > categories." The subject-object division is indeed primary to existence. But existence is not the primary reality. Again, I maintain that there is no "pure experience". All experience is differentiated or relational. In my view, James chose the wrong "name" for the "flux of life". He should have said: "Sensibility ... furnishes the Value to our later reflection (intellection) with its conceptual categories." > In other words, subjects, objects, relationships and other intellectual > categories used in any metaphysic are subsidiary reflections of primary > reality, i.e. Quality. > > But, I could be wrong. You could be wrong metaphysically, but you do a commendable job of reworking Pirsig's Quality thesis into an arguable proposition. Best regards, Ham Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
