Hi Dan (the discussion picks up below) > >From: "Platt Holden" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > >Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > >To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > >Subject: Re: [MD] subject / object logic > >Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2007 09:37:09 -0500 > > > >Hi Dan, > > > > > >Pirsig doesn't claim that the "universe of distinguishable things" is > > > >false. > > >Dan: > > > I suspect you might want to read the entire quote again. Mr. Pirsig is > > > clearly making a case for using static and Dynamic value as a starting > >point > > > in his metaphysics and not subjects and objects (things). Static > >patterns > > > become things in our cultural point of view. If it is not a false point > >of > > > view then why does he spend so much time explaining this point? > >Platt: > >I'm thinking of the following passage where Pirsig says SOM isn't false, > >just that the MOQ is better: > > > >"Or, using another analogy, saying that a Metaphysics of Quality is false > >and a subject-object metaphysics is true is like saying that rectangular > >coordinates are true and polar coordinates are false. A map with the North > >Pole at the center is confusing at first, but it's every bit as correct as > >a Mercator map. In the Arctic it's the only map to have. Both are simply > >intellectual patterns for interpreting reality and one can only say that in > >some circumstances rectangular coordinates provide a better, simpler > >interpretation." (Lila, 8) > > Hi Platt > > Yes I can appreciate this. I could have better phrased my statement. > > > >[Platt] > > > >His > > > >point is that instead of being collections of particles and atoms as > > > >science alleges, things are collections of moral values. "If one comes > > > >from a cultural tradition where an electronic assembly is primarily a > > > >moral > >order > > > >rather than just a neutral pile of substance, it is easier to feel an > > > >ethical responsibility for doing good work on it." (Lila, 30) > > > >[Dan] > > > You seem to be using "thing" as a slang term to mean anything you like > >it to > > > mean.
> >Platt: > >Perhaps our difference is semantic. Using Merriam-Webster's definitions I > >go with "3 a: a separate and distinct individual quality, fact, idea, or > >usually entity." Maybe you think of a thing as " 3 d: an inanimate object > >distinguished from a living being." > > Dan: > There are over 20 definitions of "thing" at dictionary.com. Perhaps we both > have to be more specific at what we mean. [Discussion picks up here] [Platt] Yes, and perhaps Pirsig should have been more specific when he wrote "the universe of distinguishable things." > >[Platt}] > > > >Perhaps you think of a "thing" solely as a physical object that casts a > > > >shadow whereas I think of a "thing" as any phenomena of experience, > > > >including ideas, emotions, and Pirsig's patterns of value. Since my > > > >question failed to make that clear, I apologize. > > > >[Dan] > > > No apology necessary. But I think your use of the term "thing" has led > >to > > > confusion, especially using it interchangeably with static patterns of > > > value. I am quite sure that Mr. Pirsig says Quality is not a thing. > >Platt: > >I agree. Quality is not a thing. It cannot be defined. But to me a pattern > >is a thing (like an electronic diagram of a radio) and a value is a thing > >(like this radio is better than that one.) Anyway, can we agree that > >static patterns of inorganic and biological values can be called things, > >like atoms and aardvarks? > > Dan: > We could but it might lead to more confusion than if we simply called atoms > and aardvarks static quality patterns of value. Yes, but if we did that would anyone know what we were talking about? To name static patterns of value seems essential for clarity and understanding, justifying Pirsig's use of names for such patterns throughout Lila whether it be a "stove," a "boat" or "Phaedrus" himself. . > > > >(skip) > > > > > >[Dan] > > > > > People exist as a collection of static quality patterns of value, > >not as > > > > > objects or things. We value people. That's why we care about what > > > >happens to > > > > > them. > > > >[Platt] > > > >People exist. They are real. They are not illusions. That's all I > >wanted to > > > >hear. > > > >[Dan] > > > You want to hear that the self exists. You're changing the context here. > > > > >If > > > people are real then it means that the self is real. It means the > >individual > > > is not an empty concept. Sorry. That is not what I said. > >Platt: > >I agree people hear what the want to hear. So to clarify you believe that > >1) people are not real, 2) the self is not real, 3) the individual is not > >real. They are all illusions, figments of our imagination. Is that your > >position? > > Dan: > I think it is better to say people are a collection of static quality > patterns of value. When we try to frame the question in terms of real or > illusion we tend to think of objects as being solid and verifiable. Ask a > physicist what an atom is made of and they will answer 99.99999999% empty > space. There is virtually nothing there. An atom is an emtpy concept. Yet > put a collection of atoms together and they give the notion of being solid > and real. > > I believe people are real in the sense that they are patterns of value. The > self too is a collection of patterns of value. But if we try and find the > self, there's nothing there to find. The self is an empty concept. Put all > the patterns together though and the self gives the notion of being solid > and real. I think we can find the self easily in DNA, fingerprints, unique body configurations, unique personal behaviors, unique thoughts and many other ways. So I would contend that the self is sold and real. If nothing else, the concept of selfishness is meaningless unless the concept of self as a reality is accepted. > Illusion vs real seems to be a subject and object notion that is better > defined in the MOQ like this: > > "But if there is no substance, it must be asked, then why isn't everything > chaotic? Why do our experiences act as if they inhere in something? If you > pick up a glass of water why don't the properties of that glass go flying > off in different directions? What is it that keeps these properties uniform > if it is not something called substance? [...] The answer provided by the > Metaphysics of Quality is similar to that given for the "causation" > platypus. Strike out the word "substance" wherever it appears and substitute > the expression "stable inorganic pattern of value." Again the difference is > linguistic. It doesn't make a whit of difference in the laboratory which > term is used. No dials change their readings. The observed laboratory data > an., exactly the same, The greatest benefit of this substitution of "value" > for "causation" and "substance" is that it allows an integration of physical > science with other areas of experience that have been traditionally > considered outside the scope of scientific thought. Phaedrus saw that the > "value" which directed subatomic particles is not identical with the "value" > a human being gives to a painting. But he saw that the two are cousins, and > that the exact relationship between them can be defined with great > precision. Once this definition is complete a huge integration of the > humanities and sciences appears in which platypi fall by the hundreds. > Thousands." (LILA) I agree with Pirsig's view. But nowhere does he suggest by changing the vocabulary that a glass of water becomes an illusion. "The data are the same." > Dan comments: > > So instead of asking of people are real or figments of imagination, it seems > better to ask: do we value people? The answer is yes. To think in terms of > value instead of substance doesn't change people yet it changes our > perception of people. Do we value people? In general, yes. But I don't value people who are dedicated to killing me or my family. So it would be dangerous to give blanket value approval to every one. Thanks for responding, Dan. Platt Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
