Hello everyone >From: "Platt Holden" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Subject: Re: [MD] subject / object logic >Date: Sat, 22 Sep 2007 08:23:05 -0500 > >Hi Dan (the discussion picks up below) > > > Dan: > > There are over 20 definitions of "thing" at dictionary.com. Perhaps we >both > > have to be more specific at what we mean. > >[Discussion picks up here] > >[Platt] >Yes, and perhaps Pirsig should have been more specific when he wrote "the >universe of distinguishable things."
Dan: Perhaps, though I have no problem understanding what he means within the context that he's set up. > > > > >[Platt}] > > > > >Perhaps you think of a "thing" solely as a physical object that >casts a > > > > >shadow whereas I think of a "thing" as any phenomena of experience, > > > > >including ideas, emotions, and Pirsig's patterns of value. Since my > > > > >question failed to make that clear, I apologize. > > > > > >[Dan] > > > > No apology necessary. But I think your use of the term "thing" has >led > > >to > > > > confusion, especially using it interchangeably with static patterns >of > > > > value. I am quite sure that Mr. Pirsig says Quality is not a thing. > > >Platt: > > >I agree. Quality is not a thing. It cannot be defined. But to me a >pattern > > >is a thing (like an electronic diagram of a radio) and a value is a >thing > > >(like this radio is better than that one.) Anyway, can we agree that > > >static patterns of inorganic and biological values can be called >things, > > >like atoms and aardvarks? > > > > Dan: > > We could but it might lead to more confusion than if we simply called >atoms > > and aardvarks static quality patterns of value. >Platt: >Yes, but if we did that would anyone know what we were talking about? Dan: They would start by reading LILA. It is a long road to understanding but others have blazed a trail to follow. >Platt: >To >name static patterns of value seems essential for clarity and >understanding, justifying Pirsig's use of names for such patterns >throughout Lila whether it be a "stove," a "boat" or "Phaedrus" himself. . Dan: Well yes. I didn't say anything about not naming static quality patterns of value to distinguish them from each other. I assumed that what we're talking about is not in the naming so much as it is in the generalized nature of reality. > > > > > > >(skip) > > > > > > > >[Dan] > > > > > > People exist as a collection of static quality patterns of >value, > > >not as > > > > > > objects or things. We value people. That's why we care about >what > > > > >happens to > > > > > > them. > > > > > >[Platt] > > > > >People exist. They are real. They are not illusions. That's all I > > >wanted to > > > > >hear. > > > > > >[Dan] > > > > You want to hear that the self exists. You're changing the context >here. > > > > > > >If > > > > people are real then it means that the self is real. It means the > > >individual > > > > is not an empty concept. Sorry. That is not what I said. > > > >Platt: > > >I agree people hear what the want to hear. So to clarify you believe >that > > >1) people are not real, 2) the self is not real, 3) the individual is >not > > >real. They are all illusions, figments of our imagination. Is that your > > >position? > > > > Dan: > > I think it is better to say people are a collection of static quality > > patterns of value. When we try to frame the question in terms of real or > > illusion we tend to think of objects as being solid and verifiable. Ask >a > > physicist what an atom is made of and they will answer 99.99999999% >empty > > space. There is virtually nothing there. An atom is an emtpy concept. >Yet > > put a collection of atoms together and they give the notion of being >solid > > and real. > > > > I believe people are real in the sense that they are patterns of value. >The > > self too is a collection of patterns of value. But if we try and find >the > > self, there's nothing there to find. The self is an empty concept. Put >all > > the patterns together though and the self gives the notion of being >solid > > and real. >Platt: >I think we can find the self easily in DNA, fingerprints, unique body >configurations, unique personal behaviors, unique thoughts and many other >ways. So I would contend that the self is sold and real. If nothing else, >the concept of selfishness is meaningless unless the concept of self as a >reality is accepted. Dan: These are all static quality patterns of value that make up the self: biological, social, and intellectual. I see no arguement that these patterns make the self real and solid. Self is a concept albeit empty. >Dan: > > Illusion vs real seems to be a subject and object notion that is better > > defined in the MOQ like this: > > > > "But if there is no substance, it must be asked, then why isn't >everything > > chaotic? Why do our experiences act as if they inhere in something? If >you > > pick up a glass of water why don't the properties of that glass go >flying > > off in different directions? What is it that keeps these properties >uniform > > if it is not something called substance? [...] The answer provided by >the > > Metaphysics of Quality is similar to that given for the "causation" > > platypus. Strike out the word "substance" wherever it appears and >substitute > > the expression "stable inorganic pattern of value." Again the difference >is > > linguistic. It doesn't make a whit of difference in the laboratory which > > term is used. No dials change their readings. The observed laboratory >data > > an., exactly the same, The greatest benefit of this substitution of >"value" > > for "causation" and "substance" is that it allows an integration of >physical > > science with other areas of experience that have been traditionally > > considered outside the scope of scientific thought. Phaedrus saw that >the > > "value" which directed subatomic particles is not identical with the >"value" > > a human being gives to a painting. But he saw that the two are cousins, >and > > that the exact relationship between them can be defined with great > > precision. Once this definition is complete a huge integration of the > > humanities and sciences appears in which platypi fall by the hundreds. > > Thousands." (LILA) >Platt: >I agree with Pirsig's view. But nowhere does he suggest by changing the >vocabulary that a glass of water becomes an illusion. "The data are the >same." Dan: "No one has ever seen substance and no one ever will." (LILA) Dan comments: If no one has ever seen substance then what are we seeing if not illusion of substance? > > > Dan comments: > > > > So instead of asking of people are real or figments of imagination, it >seems > > better to ask: do we value people? The answer is yes. To think in terms >of > > value instead of substance doesn't change people yet it changes our > > perception of people. > >Do we value people? In general, yes. But I don't value people who are >dedicated to killing me or my family. So it would be dangerous to give >blanket value approval to every one. Dan: Oddly enough, I don't know of anyone who is dedicated to killing me and my family so I guess I felt safe making that blanket generalization. When I sold my home of 17 years the buyers made me put locks on the doors as prior to that I never felt the need. What if someone stopped by and I wasn't home and they needed to use the bathroom or the phone or something? How would they get in if they found the doors locked? Do you really feel someone is out to kill you? Do you know who it is? How do you protect yourself? Do you sleep with a gun under your pillow? I'm sorry. It all sounds quite scary and quite foreign to me and I feel bad that anyone would have live with something like that hanging over their heads. > >Thanks for responding, Dan. You're welcome. And thank you too, Dan Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
