DMB,

DMB said:
More specifically, what's the difference between adopting radical empiricism on 
one hand and on the other saying that we should change the subject? 

I haven't forgotten about the common rejection of SOM and all that, but 
classical emphasizes experience and neoprag emphasizes language and that 
largely shapes their overall character. Rorty seems more interested in 
producing a kind of anti-positivism and adopts parts of classical pragmatism to 
serve that end. Anyway, this difference makes classical and neopragmatism into 
distinctly different creatures.

Matt:
I would, after a fashion, object to the use of "emphasize" simply because I 
don't think it's a difference between emphasizing our experience of the world 
and emphasizing the language we use to talk about the world.  I think both 
classicals and neos do both at different times, or at the least can do both at 
any time they wish.  I think the difference is the way in which they talk about 
stuff, the idiom of experience and idiom of language.  Dewey talks about 
epistemological problems in terms of experience, Sellars, Quine, Rorty in terms 
of language.  I won't deny that there are differences between the epochs, but I 
think as history sweeps forward, just as T. S. Eliot thought Modernism was a 
huge break from Romanticism, people looking back will see fewer differences and 
more continuities.

My Rortyan contention with radical empiricism is that if one becomes a radical 
empiricist, then the end point is that there is eventually very little to say 
about epistemology as distinct from the sociology of knowledge.  Cartesian 
epistemology was an area of inquiry that was distinct from the practices of 
accumulating knowledge, and if radical empiricism is what we call the 
demolition of that problematic, we are left to focus on the various practices 
of the various areas of inquiry, which is what Dewey did move on to after a 
fashion.  The connection between radical empiricism and Rorty's slogan of 
"changing the subject" is that radical empiricism closes one subject to move to 
another.  Dewey's not trying to underwrite knowledge, as traditional 
epistemology had composed itself (like by trying to prove the existence of an 
external world), he's trying to help our practice of gaining knowledge, e.g. by 
trying to clear away the bad ways in which we had tried to describe the process 
of gaining knowledge and replacing them with new descriptions.  One way: 
inquiry isn't a matter of trying to represent an object better, inquiry is 
about resolving a doubt.  The former creates a meta-problem for inquiry: how do 
we know we're representing an object better?  This requires an answer in 
addition to the stuff that the inquiry actually does.  The latter, pragmatist 
formulation does not, because the parallel question would be: how do we know 
we've resolved a doubt?  This question can be answered fairly simply with, 
"BECAUSE I DON'T DOUBT IT ANYMORE, DUMBASS!"  There is no extra area of inquiry 
created, which closes the old area, and changes, or if you prefer, refocuses 
our attention on a different area.

Part of why I want to make this connection between radical empiricism, 
psychological nominalism, and Rorty's slogan is because I think you are playing 
on an ambiguity when you say, as you often have, that "a Rortyized version [of 
Pirsig's philosophy] takes the metaphysics and the quality out of the 
metaphysics of quality."  I would halt Ian from saying that I or Rorty would 
agree to this formulation because one of the things I've constantly tried to do 
is point out the ambiguity of the word "metaphysics" in Pirsig's usage as 
compared to Rorty's usage.  Rorty's enemy is the appearance/reality distinctive 
version of metaphysics, which you agree is not the version Pirsig is using.  
The version Pirsig uses is something wide like, "a general framework of 
understanding," and in this sense there's nothing to theoretically object to, 
as it is just like Sellars' definition of philosophy as "seeing how things, in 
the widest possible sense, hang together, in the widest possible sense," a 
definition that Rorty adheres to.  What Pirsig calls his "Metaphysics of 
Quality," I would transmute to "Philosophy of Quality," and I don't think 
anything in particular is lost.

What requires more ink is, as Ian points out, the "Quality" bit, because both 
you and I ascribe different importance to its usage in Pirsig's philosophy.  In 
my eyes, as in Ian's, part of this hangs on why we use "pure" at all in our use 
of "experience."  You think it is very important that we do, I don't.  In my 
attempts to explain Pirsig's use of Quality, I emphasize two of his 
formulations: his reduction of experience to reality to value, making all three 
philosophically quasi-synonymous, and his anti-definition of Quality.  The 
former destroys the Cartesian problematic of representationalism, while also 
insightfully making the Deweyan extrapolation that "reality is an evaluative 
term." The latter destroys the Platonic problematic of essentialism: Quality is 
an anti-essence, a statement about the relational play of all points of 
definition.  Reality cannot, en ensemble, by defined because it is in a 
constant state of evolution, change, flux.

If I'm not totally off, I think you would agree with both of those 
formulations, but you would insist that Pirsig's philosophy is not only 
incomplete, but disastrously impaired if a third is not added: the bit about 
pure experience, the pre-intellectual cutting edge of experience.  To my mind, 
these passages in Pirsig are reducible to the first two formulations.  You 
think there is dangerous amputation happening.  I'm just not sure why we need 
to say that "Dynamic Quality is the lived, flux of pure experience" as opposed 
to "Dynamic Quality is the lived, flux of experience."  Pure experience has to 
contrast with something, and I'm not sure what it is.  People are at pains to 
deny the obvious contrast of "impure experience," and I can understand why, 
since calling static patterns, en ensemble, impure seems just about as 
hazardous as saying that reality has an essence.  Why is democracy, which would 
otherwise be called one of the greatest static patterns we've come up with, 
impure?  We can give many kinds of answers (ranging from a Buddhistic 
maya-style answer to a Churchillian "but it's the best we got" answer), but 
most of them seem disingenuous since the implication is that there is something 
purer than democracy that it is a lesser form of.  Purity just seems out of 
place when talking about static patterns.  I think it creates a needless 
pathos, one that the masochistic/ascetic might go in for, but not one for a 
pragmatist.

I would agree to a Deweyan construal of Pirsig's DQ/static patterns 
distinction.  From a metaphysical standpoint, DQ is the flow of lived 
experience and static patterns are the train of past experiences with which we 
interpret new experience.  When an anomaly occurs, we seek to accommodate it as 
best we can, but sometimes it calls for an entire reappraisal of the train.  
From an epistemological standpoint, the Dynamic point of view is the one in 
which we live life as it happens.  The static point of view is a special case 
in which we look at the way in which we have been living life.  In the former 
we are looking forward, out past the head of the train, in the latter we are 
looking behind ourselves at the train of experiences that shape how we are 
living life.  The first is non-reflective, instinctual living of life, the 
second reflection on our instincts (which is no less instinctual, since it 
requires a special set of instincts to guide the process--hence the apparent 
problem of "boot-strapping" and the search for a final resting place, a 
foundation to avoid infinite regress).

But in none of these construals do I see an important need to use "pure," 
"direct," or "pre-intellectual."  Insisting on them looks either suspicious or 
insular.

DMB said:
Language does kinda produce reality. As Pirsig puts its, the world we inhabit 
is built of analogies. I believe Matt and I essentially agree on this point, 
but Matt pushes it to the extent that language becomes a kind of closed system. 
Rorty's aversion to epistemology has a way of sealing off everything 
non-linguistic. If it can't be presented in the form of a sentence, it doesn't 
count. When his let's-change-the-subject attitude is added to this, we get a 
pragmatism that can't very well include Pirsig's primary empirical reality 
precisely because it is pre-linguistic. This exclusion not only has an impact 
on the mysticism of the MOQ, it also moves the emphasis from direct everyday 
experience to conversation.

Matt:
I don't see the push.  Rorty's point is that language is _not_ a closed system. 
 It is an open, evolving system.  In fact, pushed to its limits, Rorty's 
philosophy of language makes us suspicious that we should even be using 
"system" in conjunction to "language".  (Davidson once put the point by saying 
that if "language" is construed in any of the ways that philosophers have 
usually done it, then there's no such thing as "language," which I take to be a 
Deweyan point of view that our marks and noises are just evolved tools like 
arms and hammers.)  Rorty doesn't seal off the non-linguistic, he is just being 
careful not to treat the non-linguistic the way philosophers since Plato have 
been treating it.  That, I would suggest, is what produces the strangeness you 
feel.  Rocks, lakes, beauty, all of these things count.  Rorty is just trying 
to move us away from a representationalist account of language, and part of 
that problematic, so he argues, is the idea that there are some things we 
inherently cannot express through language, some things that cannot be 
"presented in the form of a sentence."  Language isn't, in this sense, in the 
expression or presentation business.  

Instead of claiming that some things are ineffable, that some things--as you 
put it--"can't be presented in the form of a sentence," I've tried to suggest 
that some things are just difficult to talk about.  I take part of Dewey's 
means/end continuum to be, in reference to the evolution of language, that 
metaphor expands our language by overshooting what we can currently make sense 
of and eventually creating a space where sense is made.  On this account, when 
we have difficulty putting something into words, it is not because we sense our 
words falling short of a target, as if we see the target perfectly well, it is 
because we sense that there are problems in the words we are using.  Ironing 
out these problems creates new meanings and words, and thus creates new logical 
space.  We don't have an idea of what we want to say that we are falling short 
of, we have an idea of what we _don't_ want to say that we want to avoid 
(Stanely Cavell has put this point brilliantly in an old paper about Austin and 
so-called ordinary language philosophy*).  Whitehead's "dim apprehension," on 
my reckoning, isn't an apprehension
of something just ahead of me, it is an apprehension that there is a
problem behind me.

A good encapsulation of why I don't like your formulations of the problem is 
because when you say, "moves the emphasis from direct everyday experience to 
conversation," I want to know when conversation is not something I do directly 
everyday.  This is the problem with saying that static patterns are indirect, 
or impure, with saying that reflection is indirect.  If we collapse the 
experience/reality distinction, then reflection is as direct as any other 
experience to reality and it would seem to be as in point to say, in the 
philosophical manner and level at which we are speaking, that playing soccer is 
as indirect an experience of baseball as reflection about baseball is an 
indirect experience of baseball.  We get the point that talking about or 
thinking about baseball is not the same as playing baseball, but so is playing 
soccer not the same as playing baseball or thinking about baseball.  Direct and 
indirect seem out of point, if for no other reason than once you collapse the 
Cartesian problematic, you are always directly experiencing whatever it is you 
are experiencing because there is no longer a distance between knower and known.

DMB said:
It's not something given to fixed concepts, not something that words can pin 
down. He wants to say that quality is known in experience and manifests itself 
in ways that are constantly novel, surprizing and unique. This emphasis on 
experience is undercut by Rorty's insistence on the primacy of conversation. 
He's not making the good into a Platonic form, but the effect is similar. His 
emphasis on language makes fixed, static forms into the coin of the realm.

Matt:
Might there not be a good reason why, even as you said, Rorty talks about the 
primacy of _conversation_?  Conversation, unlike possibly language, definitely 
refers to a lived, dynamic experience.  Even more, as I intimated above, the 
very existence of a thing called "language" that is made up of fixed, static 
forms is a myth--part of the work on the philosophy of language that Sellars, 
Quine, Davidson, Rorty and others have been at is that language is _not_ this 
fixed thing that we place on top of the flux of experience.

The choice between the idiom of experience and the idiom of language, I would 
continue to argue, is insignificant at the level of destroying Cartesianism.  
You might agree, but continue that we don't just want to destroy Cartesianism, 
we want to do other things, too.  I would certainly agree, but point out that 
not only does Rorty not preclude the use of other idioms, does not preclude the 
doing of other things, but that I think pressuring this point on Rorty would be 
like me saying that all of Pirsig's talk about experience leaves out the 
wonderful things that poets do with words (try fitting "'Twas brillig, and the 
slithy toves/Did gyre and gimble in the wabe;/All mimsy were the borogoves,/And 
the mome raths outgrabe" into an experience).  Or worse, that Pirsig's 
philosophy precludes the playing of baseball, that reading and writing 
philosophy precludes going out and watching a sunset.  You might think that 
absurd, particularly since Pirsig is at pains to try and point out to us that 
there are other things in life than philosophy, but as absurd as you find that 
accusation, I find it absurd that an economist, after writing a book about the 
importance of economics, must write, "But you might also spend your time 
watching a sunset, hunting tigers, eating apples, reading poetry, having sex, 
smoking a cigarette, doing shrooms, killing parental figures,..."--a list that 
could go on indefinitely--so as not to accidentally preclude other activities.

Matt

*Cavell builds three insights out of how Austin writes as a better
beginning towards a description of how ordinary language philosophy
proceeds:

"(1) that one can as appropriately or truly be said to
be looking at the world as looking at language; (2) that one is seeking
necessary truths 'about' the world (or 'about' language) and therefore
cannot be satisfied with anything I, at least, would recognize as a
description of how people in fact talk—one might say one is seeking one
kind of explanation of why people speak as they do; and even (3) that
one is not finally interested at all in how 'other' people talk, but in
determining where and why one wishes, or hesitates, to use a particular
expression oneself."

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