Steve/Ham

Pirsig suggest that what we experience is only
experienced because it matters to us, if it does not
matter we do not notice it. Experience is what we
value, positively and negatively.

David M


----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Ham Priday" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Thursday, January 24, 2008 12:39 AM
Subject: Re: [MD] The End of Faith


> Steve --
>
>> I don't pay a whole lot of attention to your writings on
>> the philosophy of essence.  Am I right to say in your
>> philosophy subjects are aware of other subjects, objects,
>> and values?
>
> But of course!  Are you as a valuing subject not aware of other subjects,
> objects and values?
>
>> In the MOQ, subjects and objects are inferred from value.
>> They are aesthetic creations of the intellect rather than
>> inherent to an objective universe.
>
> Inferred from whose value?  Value does not exist by itself.  Subjectivity
> (or cognizant awareness) is not an "inferred" property; it is proprietary 
> to
> the self, which is essentially value-sensibility.  Physical existence is a
> dichotomy in which sensibility is split off (or negated) from Essence and
> assumes an individuated form--being-aware.  Being is the subject's 
> awareness
> of Essence, as derived from its value-sensibility.  Objects are 
> experiential
> (aesthetic?) creations of the intellect which differentiates value into
> things and events in space/time.
>
>> The MOQ does not assume that the MOQ itself is
>> the most reasonable philosophical system. In fact it
>> explicitly supports multiple truths.
>
> Since no one has access to absolute Truth, does "multiple truths" mean the
> MOQ  supports multiple ontologies, universes, or belief systems?  In any
> case, that's news to me.  Has Pirsig stated this in writing?
>
> [Steve, previously]:
>> In evaluating whether faith is a good or bad thing we don't need
>> to define what intellectual quality is or prove the "validity of
>> reason."  We only need to say that it is bad to believe things
>> that are of low intellectual quality which in MOQ terms is obvious.
>
> [Ham, previously]:
>> Why is it not an elitist position to make MOQ the authority
>> on what one should believe?
>
> [Steve]:
>> In saying "in MOQ terms [this] is obvious" I was assuming that people
>> familiar with the MOQ would equate "intellectual quality" with "what
>> is good to believe." So since faith means believing things that are
>> of low intellectual quality (allowing for everyone to be their own
>> judge of what has intellectual quality), then faith is the idea that
>> it is good to believe things that are bad to believe. Obviously that
>> is bad.
>
> Obviously people who support the MOQ equate it with "what is good to
> believe".  But that's begging the question.  Why is it "bad" to believe
> something else?  How is one to know that something else is "of low
> intellectual quality"?  Because an MOQist tells him so?  I'm sorry, but
> that's elitism, Steve.
>
>> All beliefs are not based on faith.
>
> Again, that's your definition of belief.  Since all knowledge is the
> province of intellection, in my view even the most profound conviction is
> based on faith.
>
> Regards,
> Ham
>
>
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