dmb asked Matt: The notion of discrete levels demolishes what desired work?
Matt: Being able to say in a conflict "this side is the more moral side." True, as Ian said, if we don't know what the levels are, that's a problem. But further, say we class them: was it really immoral for gravity to pull Icarus down from the heavens, or was gravity just doing what it does? The frame of many moral questions is different than Pirsig's philosophy. I'm suggesting that the "discreteness" of the levels make them unsuitable for most uses of our new found clarity, that we need more talk about how different these levels are and what that means in practice, because that's going to be the kind of clarity received from Pirsig. dmb says: Hmmm. Still not sure I follow you here. We certainly have a problem to the extent that we don't know what the levels are. And there is no end to the debates about what goes where, not least of all because that placement is the whole point. I mean, for the moral codes to work one needs to rightly understand where Pirsig is drawing his lines. It also helps to understand something about why he draws them where he does. Much there is also an obvious and absolutely crucial element that has never been discussed, as far as I know. And that obvious and crucial element is an informed opinion about the subject matter in dispute. I mean, the levels will NEVER work as a tool for analysis if we don't have a pretty good idea what it is that's being scrutinized. The discussions about the end of faith, for example, have included "definitions" of the term that bear no resemblance to anything Sam Harris said or to what the dictionary says. If "faith" or anything else means a dozen things all a t the same time, then no generalization or abstract framework will ever be good enough to analyze any concept. The notion of discreteness, I think, is mostly just a matter of cranking up the volume and could otherwise be thought of as distinctness. He's saying the lines drawn between levels marks a qualitative difference. He's saying that the difference is NOT just a matter of greater complexity or merely a matter of degree, but a difference in kind. And I think its important to realize that this is a generalization about what we observe already in the ordinary reality we all know. You know, he's classifying the all the stuff we find referenced in encyclopedia. The line drawn between the social and intellectual levels gives us the most trouble because, unlike the other lines, we don't commonly find the distinction Pirsig brings out. Think about how much of Lila is devoted to that line. Quite a lot. And its tied to countless real-life examples. I mean, the line is drawn where it is based on his observations of history and it's political conflicts, especially the conflicts between tradi tional beliefs and intellectual values. This happens to be the stuff I studied as an undergrad (intellectual history) and being in radio for years made me into a news junkie. This baggage might be a curse as well as a blessing, but I have no problem plugging it all into the MOQ's framework. To put it simply, it works for me. And I don't just mean I like it, but I actually use it when listening to debates, the news, or watching Sam Harris. Sometimes it works on movies and such too. And the issue of "faith" in American culture has got to be one of thee best candidates for this form of analysis. The stupidity of Victorian morals and Rigel's judgmental friends, the Scopes Monkey Trial and Hitler's Germany, the FDR intellectuals and Pirsig's anti-theism. Even if it doesn't work for you, you'd at least admit that Pirsig hopes it address the kind of issues Sam Harris is raising, no? That's how I see it. When I talk about the conflict between social and intellectual values, I'm talk ing about what's on the news tonight and on the ballot in November. Its about this culture right now and how it might be better in the future. Its not hard to see how a Rorty fan like yourself might resist such a line (between social and intellectual). Maybe you're even thinking its impossible to find a place outside of the two rival sides in order to assess them, which is what it takes to draw such a line. But I don't think the distinction requires a god's-eye view, just a knowledge of history. A little navel gazing wouldn't hurt either, because the top two levels are the stuff we're made of, belief and opinion wise. There seems to be an all-or-nothingism about Rorty's pragmatism that would say we can't draw such a line. Somehow the rejection of objectivity and objective truth paralyzes him. But I don't see why the loss of that perfect and fictional yardstick should be construed to mean we can't use a more humble standard. Seems to me that "truth" was all tangled up in theology until yesterday. I think Pirsig is saying that "truth" is what we find most excellent among static intellectual patterns, and just for now, which is considerably less grandiose than God's eternal truth or the absolute truth or whatever. I think faith-based beliefs are the most predominant contemporary forms of the Platonism and essentialism you love to hate so well. There you'll find a level of certainty about eternal truths that makes scientific objectivity look like weekend in Vegas. (What are doing for spring break, by the way?) _________________________________________________________________ Shed those extra pounds with MSN and The Biggest Loser! http://biggestloser.msn.com/ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
