dmb says: Yes, of course Leo stood on shoulders, as we all do, but that isn't even close to what I was "trying" to tell you. And I did not learn about this example from any issue of Scientific American Mind. I learned about it by way of a site devoted to the work of Sir Ernst Gombrich, a philosopher of aesthetics who died in 2001.
[Krimel] Ok, well let me recommend the SciAm Mind article for your attention. It gave a pretty thorough treatment of the matter and is at least four years more up to date. [dmb] But let me take a different approach. It was Heidegger's phenomenological insight that we never experience the so-called sense data of which you make so much. My favorite example is the slamming of a door, because it is such a common experience. If one thinks about that experience its pretty easy to see that our understanding of what it is and what it means is immediate. Depending on the situation, you know right away that someone is angry or that the wind is blowing or you are immediately startled and perplexed. There is no sense data, no sound to ponder and decode. You just have an immediate impression. Later this might be altered by subsequent experience. The one who just stormed out of the room might be heard to say, "sorry" or "ouch" or you might hear a car start up and drive away. But the idea that the meaning of this event is to be found in the acoustic waves hitting the ear drum is really a rather old-fashioned idea. You'll find such notions in David Hume and other Modern philosophers but today we'd call that "naive realism". [Krimel] I have only passing acquaintance with Heidegger so I can only comment on the example you present, as you present it. I do plan to listen to two college courses on Heidegger later this year but unfortunately that can only happen when time allows. You seem to think that the example you give is outside of sensory experience. Where did the knowledge that a slamming door can be associated with anger or wind come from? Of course perception and the creation and modification of cognitive structures include the integration of the present with past experience. Memory is vital to the process. But memory is the result of past experiences that depended on sense data. I do recall mentioning that we are pattern recognizers and meaning makers. Both rely on our ability to recall the past. We could not detect patterns without memory. The making of meaning involves, at least in terms of information theory, the reduction in uncertainty. By comparing our history of past events with present stimuli we are able to, for example, limit the possible meanings of the sound of a door slamming. [dmb] And, as Gav pointed out, you're working with the assumptions of SOM when making such points. [Krimel] Only in the strawman sense of SOM. As I mentioned to gav I don't see the duality. With regard to sensation I talked about the transduction of energy into electrochemical impulses. I would be happy to talk about how those impulses effect changes in our neural networks by affecting the patterns of neurons firing and the strength of the connections between and among those neural pathways. Or perhaps the role of genetically encoded memory... [dmb] And Wow. I like the sassy comebacks and don't mind the insulting little jabs, but I think you can do better. [Krimel] Sorry to disappoint. I'll work on it another time perhaps. [dmb] You've obviously run off to ask Mr. Google and in your mind this constitutes "homework". But dude, this is not just weak. Its irrelevant. You haven't even come close to addressing the point, which is that conceptions and not sense dat largely determine perceptions. [Krimel] Yes, I have outsource a lot of cognitive functioning, particularly memory, to Mr. Google. I did however read the article. I'll try using some college search engines next time if it will make you feel better. Nevertheless, I think the SciAm Mind article went straight to the heart of what we were saying. Leo was not trapped by his conceptions he was able to over come his preconceptions to a very large degree. I seriously don't think I miss or failed to address your points at all. [dmb] This is a point Pirsig makes when he says that SOM doesn't acknowledge that there is a social level between "mind" and "matter". [Krimel] I think you miss the point that there is no distinction between "mind" and "matter". They are not different irreducible substances whether mediated or unmediated. Rather than rejecting the dualism of SOM you seem to embrace it. [dmb] Care to take another crack at it? [Krimel] Backacha. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
