----- Original Message -----
From: "Krimel" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Thursday, July 31, 2008 2:52 PM
Subject: Re: [MD] Tit's
[Krimel]
Experience is perceived as unitary because we are able to synthesis a
sense
of unity out of disparate sensations. For example we can feel something
round and distinguish a ball from an orange purely through the sense of
touch and we can translate that into a visual image.
Speaking of an orange. Here's another way to look at it.
Referent Objects: Orange
According to Madhyamaka, mental labeling, which is always conceptual,
entails:
. a mental label,
. a basis for labeling,
. a referent object (imputed object, labeled object). The referent object is
what a label, word, or concept refers to.
Consider the case of the verbal conceptual cognition of a conventional
commonsense orange with the audio category and meaning/object category
orange.
Specifically Gelug
In terms of the mental labeling:
. The mental label is the audio category orange and, usually in addition, a
meaning/object category orange - both being metaphysical entities.
. The basis for labeling may be a spherical shape of orange color - an
objective entity.
. The referent object is a commonsense orange - a nonstatic collection
synthesis (tshogs-spyi) as an objective entity.
It is important not to identify the referent object with either the basis
for labeling or the mental label itself.
. The referent object is not the same as the basis for labeling. The colored
shapes that appear when seeing or thinking of a commonsense orange are not
the actual orange. We do not eat a colored shape when we eat an orange.
. The referent object is not the same as the mental label. An actual orange
is not the word or concept orange, nor is it a conceptual category.
. An actual orange is what the audio category orange and meaning/object
category orange refers to when labeled on the basis of appropriate colored
shapes.
In terms of the conceptual cognition:
. The appearing objects are not simply the audio and meaning/object
categories orange, but rather the audio and meaning/object categories truly
existent orange.
. The conceptually implied object (object existing as cognitively taken) is
a truly existent orange. This is what the conceptual category (the concept)
of "an orange" implies (zhen, clings to) and corresponds to.
Thus,
. what the conceptual category of "an orange" refers to (non-truly existent
commonsense oranges, as objective entities) is not the same as what the
conceptual category of an orange corresponds to (truly existent oranges,
which do not exist at all).
. In other words, the referent object of a conceptual cognition is not the
same as its conceptually implied object.
In short:
. We see a non-truly existent commonsense orange, which nevertheless appears
to be truly existent.
. We then conceptualize it as a truly existent commonsense orange.
. In conceptual cognition, we mentally fabricate the conceptually implied
object (a truly existent orange) and project it onto the referent object (a
non-truly existent orange as an objective entity that we can see).
http://www.berzinarchives.com/web/en/archives/sutra/level5_analysis_mind_reality/cognition_theory/level_b_fine_analysis/appearance_cognition_nonexistent_phenomena/appear_cogn_nonex_gelug.html#n74982f4c0c84b1c812
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