Ron, Bo, Ian, Ham, Platt, Gav and all MOQers: Gav wrote: ...where are we when we are in SOM?...we are in the world of western industrial alienation. we are divorced from the ground that gives meaning to our ideas, or to be more accurate SOM obfuscates or devalues this ground of being.
Bo replied: Yes, but the MOQ has no "Western industrial alienation" level so the question still stands. Pirsig says that the MOQ does not abolish the S/O distinction so it must have a place inside the MOQ, and - as in my well known opinion - it's the intellectual level, everything points to such an interpretation. dmb says: Thanks to some recent help from Ron, it seems pretty clear to me now that there are at least two different things going on here and they are conflated and confused in various ways. I'm talking about SOM and essentialism. These are not identical. SOM is a kind of essentialism, but there are other kinds, although the former is usually a subset of the latter. I say "usually" because the MOQ retains SOM in a non-essentialist way. As is often said, subjects and objects lose their metaphysical status within the MOQ and are instead understood to be concepts derived from experience and handed to us by the cultural eye glasses as we acquire language. SOM is usually essentialist in the sense that it takes subjects and objects as the ontological ground of experience. Scientific materialism is essentialist in the sense that it takes objective reality as ontologically real, as what actually exists. As Ron said of essences, "think of it as objecthood. As isolated entities in a vacuum". If logic has been "predicated on truth in being" since Aristotle, as he and Paul explain, then truth has been what corresponds to objects and these entities are thought to be what actually is, what actually exists. But this is approximately the opposite of what Plato says and he's the original essentialist. Aristotle's metaphysics of substance rejects and reversed Plato's theory of forms and yet they're both essentialists. I'd like to suggest that a similar thing happens here. The MOQ rejects SOM and essentialism. The latter is so important that it might be better to say the MOQ rejects som AS essentialism, AS an ontological ground. It can reject this essentialist element even while it accepts "subjects" and "objects" as useful concepts. That's how it has a place in the MOQ, Bo. Its gonna get confusing if I don't speak about you guys in the third person... I think Gav makes a good point but it doesn't quite address the question about "where we are when we are in SOM". I think scientific objectivity has produced an affliction we call alienation and the objectification of nature in particular is a freaking disaster but I suspect Bo's question goes in different direction. Alienation is a consequence of SOM but Bo is interested in the nature of the levels themselves, thus he rejects Gav's answer because there is no "alienation level". Instead of trying to answer Bo's question, I'd make a case the question only makes sense if the MOQ is a rival form of essentialism. This is probably the source of many such questions and the basis of the theory that SOM and intellect are the same thing. In other words, Bo takes the levels of the MOQ as an ontology, as what actually exists, rather than an intellectual description that categorizes experience. I mean, the MOQ says that experience IS reality, that reality is phenomenal and not ontologica l. This same idea came up in the TITs thread when I was talking to Krimel, where I'd said there are no things-in-themselves in the MOQ. Anyway, if the MOQ's levels are taken as an essentialist claim, as an ontological claim, then it would raise the question of how SOM can exist within it. It would seem like a claim that one universe can fit inside another, like reality can have two different shapes at the same time. If SOM and the MOQ are seen as two ways of conceptualizing experience, of cutting up the phenomenal reality with that analytic knife, then there is no such problem. The phenomenal reality can be carved up any number of ways or it can simply remain uncarved. The essentialist interpretation would explain why Bo says, "Pirsig may have been cowed into recanting because LILA's intellect is a bit ambiguous and has led to a decade of discussion". But I don't think Pirsig recanted in LILA so much as he clarified things, the knife analogy being one of many explanations. I think the discussion has gone on so long because of the various confusions introduced by MOQers. So basically, I think there are lots of problems when we try to reject SOM without also rejecting essentialism. Bo has not called himself an essentialist and it is partly just a hunch. But it does have a basis in what the man says. Here is one of the most recent examples of Bodvian essentialism... Bo said to gav: There emerges a level-like relationship between intellect and the metaphysics that has reduced it from reality itself (SOM) to a mere static level. That's why SOM is "evil" to the MOQ .... while in the competitive phase that is, after the MOQ has achieved dominance intellect is the highest and best static value. It has (in your words) "taken mankind to the zenith of technological expansion", the "nadir of nihilism" was due to its former metaphysics role. dmb says: Its true that the MOQ reduces SOM to a set of static patterns, to a set of ideas ABOUT reality, the MOQ also says the same thing about itself. The MOQ is also a set of intellectual patterns. See, if the MOQ's levels are taken as an ontology then it has to replace SOM entirely. We have to get rid of it because it does not correspond to the actual nature of reality, which is a pluralism composed of DQ and the 4 levels rather than a dualism composed of subjects and objects. But this would be the mistake of trading one essentialism for another essentialism. On this view, the static levels are something like things-in-themselves, the new ontological ground that replaces the old ontological ground. But as in the art gallery analogy, the MOQ says there is no ontological ground to which our intellectual descriptions must correspond. As Matt Kundert might put it, the phenomenal reality doesn't have any joints such that we have to carve it up this way or that to be "right". These intel lectual descriptions, metaphysical systems and the various worldviews can exist side by side. There are reasons to think some are better than others, but this does not depend on their proximity to how things "really" are. This is true of the MOQ as well. There are reasons to think it is better than SOM, but not because its truer in any absolute sense. In other words, it rejects essentialism even with respect to itself. When we take the MOQ otherwise, it produces a lot of fake problems as to the "real" nature of the levels. Bo said: ...when we rationalize we are at the intellectual level because reasoning is distinguishing the objective from the subjective, i.e: SOM! dmb says: That's a very odd definition of reasoning. Isn't it obviously true that the intellect can make all kinds of distinctions? Isn't it obviously true that intellect can distinguish between SOM and the MOQ? The metaphysics of substance and the metaphysics of quality are rival intellectual descriptions, not rival realities. Platt said: We think we're in SOM whenever we think. But we're actually in MOQ all the time. Ian said: Blimey, I agree with Platt again ... "We think we're in SOM whenever we think. But we're actually in MOQ all the time." That's a neat way to put the problem we have arguing to anything like conclusions, because our thought and talk is (mostly) hidebound by our SOMist heritage. Even those of us that just "know" we are MoQists, can help tripping up over the SOMism in our arguments, thought or expressed. (Is this the "Ker-Ching", in the Ron / DMB thread ?) dmb says: The Ker Ching moment came in seeing what essentialism means and how SOM relates to essentialism, as described above. I don't agree with the assertion that Ian and Platt agree upon here. They seem to equate SOM with intellect just like Bo, if not for the same reasons that Bo does. I suspect it is a distorted version of a pretty good idea, a paralyzing interpretation of some decent anti-essentialists notions. In order to conclude that we're "hidebound" otherwise doomed to think in terms of SOM, one would have to also conclude that Pirsig's deconstruction of SOM is "hidebound" by SOMist heritage. Not to mention James and Dewey and the tetra lemma. The fact that this assertion continues to be made in the face of such obvious and relevant counter-examples is extremely frustrating. Pirsig's non-SOM thinking and this thinking is supposedly familiar to us all. In this context, frankly, the assertion is pure nonsense. Asserting it is not only obviously wrong, its destructive. If SOM i s the problem and SOM is equal to intellect, then intellect is the problem. Yikes! That's the paralysis I speak of and it has done as much damage as anything else in terms of preventing a fruitful discussion. I suspect this is the basis for Ian's general disrespect for definitions and the basis of Platt's anti-intellectualism. Even if there were no other reasons to deny that intellect and SOM were identical, no obvious counter examples, these consequences would be enough reason to reject it. In the MOQ, it is DQ, the primary empirical reality, the undifferentiated phenomenal reality, that can not be defined. It is ahead of definition. It is reality in the sense that it is experience and we "know" it in that non-cognitive, as yet undefined sense of knowing. But metaphysics and and intellectual descriptions are nothing without good definitions. To reject essentialism and SOM is to reject a certain definition of reality but that is not at all the same as rejecting definitions per se. The MOQ is full of them. This would make a little more sense in the context of a discussion about mystical experience, but conventional concepts are perfectly appropriate in the everyday conventional world. And they're absolutely crucial wherever one wishes to discuss metaphysics. I think the assertion might be a bad interpretation of the idea we cannot escape from the mythos, that we can only think in terms of the concepts and thought categories handed down to us through language and culture. On this view, I suppose, all of that is SOM-based. But Pirsig points out that the MOQ is derived from that same mythos and insists that it couldn't be otherwise. It is derived from some deeply hidden, submerged roots of that culture but it comes from the same mythos all the same. This is another reason to deny that we're fated to think in terms of SOM, that SOM is a subset of the terms in which we can think. Finally, to equate intellect with SOM denies the possibility of reading and understanding the post you just read and, hopefully, understood. Thanks. _________________________________________________________________ Get more from your digital life. Find out how. http://www.windowslive.com/default.html?ocid=TXT_TAGLM_WL_Home2_082008 Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
