Hi Platt,
On Dec 18, 2008, at 4:01 PM, Platt Holden wrote:
The excerpts you cite from Pirsig say that experience and DQ are the
same
whereas in other passages he says experience and Quality are the same:
"Quality is a direct experience independent of and prior to
intellectual
abstractions." (Lila, 5)
Steve:
He could have added, "and dynamic quality is the leading edge of
experience that leaves static patterns in its wake."
Platt:
Does this mean atoms experience? Pirsig answers in Lila's Child, note
30:
"I think the answer is that inorganic objects experience events but do
not
react to them biologically, socially or intellectually. They react to
these
experiences inorganically , according to the laws of physics."
Steve:
Makes sense to me.
Platt:
If the levels can be identified by the reactions of their experiencing
participants as Pirsig suggests in that answer, then the levels might
be
better named as follows:
Inanimate (Inorganic)
Instinctual (Biological)
Institutional (Social)
Individual (Intellectual)
Ineffable (Aesthetic)
These names have a several of advantages. 1)The basic static nature of
the
lower levels as being static (objective) is made clear. 2) The social
level
is clearly identified as human (as Pirsig insists). 3) The importance
of
the arts in putting us in touch with DQ is highlighted ("Beauty leads
the
way forward" -- Gelernter)
Steve:
Plus they all start with I! Inanimate seems like an uneeded change
then. Plus, inorganic patterns include motion.
I'm not sure what this has to do with clarifying "experiencing
participants" for each level of evolution.
PLatt:
Well, one thing leads to another and I'm afraid I've gotten away from
the
original point, namely, that the experience of animals and babies is
limited to generalized Quality prior to the intellectual abstractions
of
Dynamic and static.
Steve:
Except that Pirsig specifically used an infant to explain what he meant
by dynamic quality. I have some sympathy with the view that patterns
refer to intellectual abstractions like the building of analogues upon
analogues of ZAMM. But he also says that we don't actually think our
way through chains of deductions with these analogues, we just respond
based on them, so I think these analogues are better thought of as
patterns that are more like habits than intellectual activity. I think
that animals, rocks, and trees can be thought of as having habits which
can be changed or reinforced in response to dynamic quality, the
leading edge of experience. If inorganic objects experience as Pirsig
says, then that experience has a leading edge. Right?
Best,
Steve
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