At 04:36 PM 1/17/2009, you wrote:
[Marsha]
"In the MOQ there are no things in themselves." (Copleston)
http://robertpirsig.org/Copleston.htm
[Krimel]
This is a statement in reference to Copelston not to Kant. It reads in
context as follows:
[Copelston}
In the second half of the nineteenth century idealism became the dominant
philosophical movement in the British universities. It was not, of course, a
question of subjective idealism. If this was anywhere to be found, it was a
logical consequence of the phenomenalism associated with the names of Hume
in the eighteenth century and J. S. Mill in the nineteenth century. For the
empiricists who embraced phenomenalism tended to reduce both physical
objects and minds to impressions or sensations, and then to reconstruct them
with the aid of the principle of the association of ideas. They implied
that, basically, we know only phenomena, in the sense of impressions, and
that, if there are metaphenomenal realities, we cannot know them...
[Pirsig]
This is what the MOQ states. Right away it diverges from the absolute
idealism that follows. Quality is a phenomenal reality.
[Copelston]
...The nineteenth-century idealists, however, were convinced that
things-in-themselves, being expressions of the one spiritual reality which
manifests itself in and through the human mind, are essentially
intelligible, knowable...
[Pirsig]
In the MOQ there are no things in themselves.
[Krimel]
I see no refutation here just a statement on the par with, "gosh it's ugly."
I agree that many in the MoQ perhaps even Pirsig especially, treat it as
though it were pure phenomenology. Or to say it another way is it purely an
examination of internal subjective states. But if we regard "reality" as a
process, then this seems to me that to focus all of the attention on a
particular part of the process, the perceiver, and to claim that the
perceived is a phantom that doesn't exist at all. What Kant says of TiTs is
that they are unknowable as such. But this is not to say that what is known
is not derived from them or is not a reflection of them. In his account of
Kant's position Pirsig points out how the "idea" or phenomenon of motorcycle
is a process of perception that comes into "being" as the interaction
between something external and the observer. Claiming that there is nothing
external is not that same thing as claiming that the external can not in
principle be fully known. I would see Kant as saying the later and I do not
see Pirsig as abolishing this. That would be abolute idealism even solipsism
and as you can see above Pirsig says, "This is what the MOQ states. Right
away it diverges from the absolute idealism that follows. Quality is a
phenomenal reality."
Greetings Krimel,
Sorry, it wasn't a good time to go through the entire paper so I just
sent you the URL. So you don't buy static _patterns_ of value. Or
you think that spov are independent entities? You think there are
independent objects, things-in-themselves? And subjects that
perceive them too?
Marsha
.
.
The Universe is uncaused, like a net of jewels in which each is a
reflection of all the others in a fantastic, interrelated harmony without end.
.
.
Moq_Discuss mailing list
Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc.
http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org
Archives:
http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/
http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
