Krimel and Andre --
[Krimel to Andre]:
The disservice I am referring to specifically is the claim that the
Quality
of ZMM is called DQ in Lila. There are two ways to understand this.
The first and the one I think Pirsig and dmb use, is that DQ IS Quality.
As a result there is no Quality in the Metaphysics of Quality only DQ
and SQ. Aside from being awkward; it turns the MoQ into a form of
dualism which I believe Pirsig would specifically like to reject.
[Andre]:
I am still not quite sure what the problem is Krimel ( I'm a bit thick
sometimes). You say 'there is no Quality in the Metaphysics of Quality
only
DQ and SQ'. But... this is the first slice Pirsig made!! Quality sliced
into
DQ/SQ!
[Krimel quoting Paul Turner]:
I suggest that the view that 'Quality' remains something above and
beyond static and Dynamic Quality within the MOQ structure is
incorrect. I think the confusion arises from the transition between
the two books. In ZMM there is no reference to 'Dynamic Quality',
being that 'static quality' is not referred to in any clear way.
As I see it, at a certain point in LILA the single term 'Quality' is
effectively replaced(*) with the two terms - 'static quality' and
'Dynamic Quality'.
May I suggest another possibility for the confusion which does not impugn
Andre's understanding of "Quality sliced into DQ/SQ?
The author advised Turner: "Today I tend to think of Quality as covering
both Dynamic and static quality." So, as far as Pirsig is concerned,
Quality (as either DQ or SQ) still equates to Value. The so-called
"dualism" or division presents itself only in the context of patterns, of
which the perceiving subject is alleged to be composed. For me, the problem
you're debating is not semantic but conceptual, and it has to do with
Pirsig's dismissal of the perceptive Self. What I'm suggesting is that
there is no pattern until something is perceived, and perception is a
function of experience. Only a sentient individual can perceive, but "a
collection of interacting patterns" does not define an integrated subject.
The question as to whether the subjective self is "real" or "illusory" is a
topic for another discussion. But for experience to be "the cutting edge of
reality" it must be cognizant experience, that is, the proprietary awareness
of a cognizant agent. It is this agent which recognizes Quality (Value) as
patterns (of experience). The Value remains the same (DQ, if you will) but
the perception or intellection of it is patterned by the observing agent.
(It is not coincidental that I define the psychic self as
"value-sensibility", since this definition avoids the necessity of positing
Quality(Value) with a dual nature.
Without attempting to inject my ontology into the MoQ, I would suggest that
"SQ" be used in the context of SOM and that "DQ" be reserved as the referent
for Quality in the broader "metaphysical" context implied by the author.
Does this make any sense, or are you folks unwilling to accept subjectivity
as the integrated awareness of an individual self?
Respectfully offered,
Ham
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