David M.B.. 3 Mar. you said..
> I'm going to expand my criticism. I've already been saying that you > don't understand the MOQ but now I'm going to say that you don't > understand SOM either. ZAMM's on the emergence and growth of SOM is the most convincing reading I know. > The way you construe it, rejecting SOM is not just an attempt to solve > the philosophical problems that arise from it (such as the mind-body > problem) but rather a matter of rejecting all kinds of useful > intellectual distinctions. I mean, it looks like you would construe the > MOQ as rejecting the very existence of mind. Of course the MOQ rejects "mind" because it rejects SOM where matter and mind are the only constituents. And NB any way we interpret the 4th. level, SOM is within intellect's premises. I definitely don't reject "useful intellectual distinctions" but see them as the highest and best static value. Are we on the same planet? > And you are WAY to quick to dismiss every philosopher as a SOM > philosophologist. That's just anti-intellectual. It's paralyzing. It's > a conversation stopper. Plus, as I've tried to explain several times, > it's just plain wrong. As usual, William James would be exhibit "A" in > the case. He is an anti-SOM academic philosopher. And this if you look > at what he did it should be clear that one can be opposed to SOM while > still maintaining the distinction between concepts and reality. I not only doubt, I know that one can't be opposed to SOM while maintaining the reality/language distinction, the S/O is intellect's STATIC value, but not metaphysically valid. However if one sees MOQ as an intellectual pattern - then naturally - SOM rules universally. > If you look at what he did it is completely obvious that he does > exactly that. And you don't even need to go off and read James' books, > although it sure wouldn't hurt. Look again, for nth time, at what > Pirsig says in chapter 29 of Lila. "The second of James' two main > systems of philosophy ..was his RADICAL EMPIRICISM. By this he meant > that subjects and objects are secondary. As shown for the nth time ZAMM speaks of Preintellectual /Intellectual where the intellectual part is subjects and the objects. NOT about pre-concepts and concepts. > They are concepts derived from something more fundamental which he > described as 'the immediate flux of life which furnishes the material > to our later reflection with its conceptual categories.' LILA's Pirsig was just too keen on making W.James an ally and adapted his "pre-concept/concept" as matching his own "pre- intellect/Intellect. A grave mistake. > In this basic flux of experience, the distinctions of reflective > thought, such as those between consciousness and content, subject and > object, mind and matter, have not yet emerged in the forms which we > make them. THIS is something else and all correct. The Pre-everything has not yet spawned intellect's many S/Os. > Pure experience cannot be called either physical or psychical; it > logically precedes this distinction.In his last unfinished work, SOME > PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY, James has condensed this description to a > single sentence: 'There must alwasy be a discrepancy between concepts > and reality, because the former are static and discontinuous while the > latter is dynamic and flowing'. Here James had chosen exactly the same > words Phaedurs had used for the basic subdivision of the MOQ." In SOM there certainly is a discrepancy between concepts and reality, that's "...what every schoolboy knows". The first blunder was James' to associate the dynamic with pre-conceptual and the static with conceptual, the next was Pirsig's to accept THIS as corresponding to his own pre-intellectual/intellectual. Not the least in the compete MOQ where the first static fall-out isn't "concepts" but the static inorganic level and has nothing to do with concepts .....unless the lower levels are made into mind-patterns of a mind- intellect, but then SOM is back in strength. > This is not a matter of sneaking SOM in through the back door. Quite > the opposite. He's using the distinction between concepts and reality > to show that subjects and objects are concepts rather than reality. Intellect (subjects and objects) was the first fall-out in the proto- moq, but is enlarged since that to 4 fall-outs (intellect the last) Again, the static level being "concepts" is NOT the Q-idea; they are Static Patterns of Value. > It's incorrect to equate the "pure experience" of radical empiricism > with the objective reality of SOM for exactly this reason. But that's > what you keep doing, repeatedly. You're converting this alternative > back into SOM when in fact the whole point is to adopt this as an > alternative to SOM. I do NOT equate pure experience with SOM's 'O', I equate it with DQ. It's James' unholy pre-concept/concept that Pirsig adopted as equate to his own dynamic/static that messes up the MOQ. Yours incorrigible. Bodvar Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
