On Thursday 28 May 2009 11:28 AM Krimel writes to Andre and All:

> Andre and All,
> 
> I think as all have noted that the concept of self is problematic but I also
> think it is important to identify what the problem is. Part of the problems
> is, regarding the self as a thing rather than as a process; or to see it as
> discrete rather than continuous.
> 
> It is pretty obvious that Self is not a primary metaphysical concept.
> Selves, whatever they are or however we conceive of them can only be seen as
> metaphysical constructs from a purely phenomenological or self centered
> point of view. That is, they only seem metaphysical when viewed from the
> inside when we ask where we came from. But I think one of the key flaws in
> Pirsig's version of SOM is to focus on this particular version of the
> Mind/Body problem. And so the problem becomes about self versus other or
> subjective versus objective. This diverts attention from the more
> fundamental problems of whether knowledge arises from our senses or from our
> thoughts or whether physical substance (extension) is metaphysically
> different from mental substance (non-extension). There are many ways to talk
> about a self that do not appeal to any particular metaphysical assumptions
> at all.
<snip>

Hi Krimel, Andre, and All,

I do not know how to address written remarks to a wizard!  The inorganic
level with matter as SQ and Quantum, motion, gravity, or space as DQ lends
itself especially to the rigid logic of mathematics.  1 and 2 are logically
different.  The organic level, if you accept evolution, contains the
inorganic, but adds life as undefined and the rigid logic of mathematics
begins to return error messages.  I think DMB goes too far in assuming a
MYSTICAL apprehension of  DQ.  imho An instinctive faculty goes beyond
mathematics and is quite adequate when it embraces reality as DQ/SQ.

I agree the concept of self is problematic if quantity is seen to be prior
to quality.   The metaphysics of a concept can be enlightening.  The
metaphysics of abstraction creates a body/soul distinction.  The body is
material entity and the soul is a spiritual mind/will entity.   The self
becomes a conflation of a body and soul.  Aquinas following Aristotle who
developed metaphysics as SOM admitted at the end of his life: ³What I have
written is as straw!²  I interpret him as saying that you can¹t learn much
from a body/soul metaphysics .

Evolution is another metaphysical description of self.   Quantity and
quality, Inorganic, organic precede the social level so how are they
conceptualized? DQ/SQ is a better description than Body/Soul.  The self
seems to be a continuous process so there must be a conception of existence
as inorganic, organic, social,  intellectual?   For myself I appeal to an
evolution where the self is conceptualized at the social level.

To use quantity to conceptualize the individuality of a rock, plant or
animal in quantitative mathematical terms returns an error message in a
DQ/SQ description of evolution.  To deny the individuality of quality in the
evolution of self-awareness at the social level is misguided.

 Imho Evolution describes a hierarchy in existence.   All existence is not
equal.   ³Self ³ is a conceptualized representation of an individual at the
social level.  In communication ³self² is distinguished by using the word
³I² another word for ³self-awareness².  Can ³self² be conceptualized as SQ?
Sure but that does not deny the DQ preceding the concept.   ³Discrete rather
than continuous² can not only be said of creation but also of evolution in
an order in existence.

³It is pretty obvious that Self is not a primary metaphysical concept.² imho
Evolution to the social level is described as an evolution to self-awareness
beyond the organic level.  That leaves ³I² undefined but knowable in
evolution from an organic to a social being.  To argue that self is outside
metaphysics denies that evolution is a more precise formulation than SOM.
I do not think I understand your emphasis in using the word  ³primary² in
relationship to a metaphysical concept.

The ³metaphysical construct² is an SQ representation of DQ evolution.  DQ
remains undefined.  DMB wants to appeal to a ³mysticism² to conceptualize an
undefined DQ.  I don¹t agree.  I feel instinctive consciousness at the
social and intellectual levels conceptualizes DQ into SQ so that we can we
can communicate our thoughts while still accepting DQ as undefined.
³ Mystic² is neither fish nor fowl nor good red-herring!

The Social level is evolution to DQ self-awareness.  I do not see a problem
between knowledge arising from our senses or from our thoughts. Evolution
has meaning for existence!  Evolution to the social level does elevates the
organic and inorganic levels in us.

Your division of substance into Mental substance or Physical substance is
vague.  I prefer evolution to a Social Level of self-awareness.  If
metaphysics are assumptions MOQ is denied reality and welcome to ³what I say
is true².  And ³I have the guns to convince you².

Imho the conception of evolution identifies reality more clearly than the
conception of substance and accidents (which inhere in a substance).

Joe



On 5/28/09 11:28 AM, "Krimel" <[email protected]> wrote:

> Andre and All,
> 
> I think as all have noted that the concept of self is problematic but I also
> think it is important to identify what the problem is. Part of the problems
> is, regarding the self as a thing rather than as a process; or to see it as
> discrete rather than continuous.
> 
> It is pretty obvious that Self is not a primary metaphysical concept.
> Selves, whatever they are or however we conceive of them can only be seen as
> metaphysical constructs from a purely phenomenological or self centered
> point of view. That is, they only seem metaphysical when viewed from the
> inside when we ask where we came from. But I think one of the key flaws in
> Pirsig's version of SOM is to focus on this particular version of the
> Mind/Body problem. And so the problem becomes about self versus other or
> subjective versus objective. This diverts attention from the more
> fundamental problems of whether knowledge arises from our senses or from our
> thoughts or whether physical substance (extension) is metaphysically
> different from mental substance (non-extension). There are many ways to talk
> about a self that do not appeal to any particular metaphysical assumptions
> at all.
> 
> Willblake2's question highlights the problem with the assumption of no-self
> or with the idea of universal consciousness or metaphysical oneness. Why
> indeed don't I see what you see or remember what you do? There are
> distinctions between here and there, me and you. One view of the Self is
> that it is the accumulation of memories and experience that have occurred at
> this particular locus and as Pirsig notes they are different here than
> there. We may have similar tools of perception but we use them from
> different points of view. But "I" am not a thing "I" am the accumulations of
> remembered experiences and the patterns and processes that lead to their
> accumulation.
> 
> It is also important to note that children's understanding develops and
> changes over time and that children regardless of culture follow a similar
> developmental path. We begin by not distinguishing between what we know and
> what others know or between what we prefer and what others prefer. An
> understanding of the Self as both similar to and different from others grows
> with us as we mature. It is a product of both inborn propensities and
> specific interactions with the environment.
> 
> In short I think it is worthwhile to discuss different views of the Self and
> talk about what particular views mean and imply; or to talk about whatever
> metaphysical implications we see in various concepts of a Self.
> 
> But to claim it doesn't exist or that you and I do not exist? That seem like
> the kind of Aw Gi moment that comes from too much pie.
> 
> Krimel
> 
> -----------------------------
> Andre:
> Hi Willblake , are you serious or are you being facetious?
> Willblake2
> Perhaps I am displaying the my simplicity, but if individual
> consciousness does not exist, what is the I that is seeing though my eyes?
> 
> Andre:
> Perhaps we have all been hynotised into thinking that there is an 'I'
> Willblake2.
> Pirsig suggests that the confusion lies in the language we have inherited:
> "This Cartesian 'Me' this autonomous little homunculus who sits behind our
> eyeballs looking out through them in order to pass judgement on the affairs
> of the world. This self-appointed little editor of reality is just an
> impossible fiction that collapses the moment one examines it. This Cartesian
> 'Me' is a soft-ware reality, not a hardware reality'. This body on the left
> and this body on the right are running variations of the same
> program...(Lila p 204).
> 
> This last sentence sums it up for me. We are simply variations of the same
> program and the whole 'program' consists of static patterns of value and so
> are 'we'. These variations have come about through the different sets of
> analogues we use to interpret Quality cognitively whilst the primary reality
> is the same for all of us. And even our analogies are not, stricktly
> speaking our own...they are all from these boxcars making up the train.
> It seems to me, Willblake2, that we have built up a cult of the individual
> which serves religious, socio/political and economic ends but as I have
> tried to suggest a few times, the REAL differences between individuals are
> negligible. We all drink from the mythos and have built society, gods,
> dogma's, logic etc etc. Within a cult of individualsm you can blame the
> other for all the things that go wrong endlessly dividing, slicing, cutting
> up all that is whole and has been whole from the beginning. That is the mess
> we are in and stay in because we do not assume any responsibility for it.
> Taking responsibility for this yourself and not leave it up to your
> neighbour, Obama, Hu Jintao or your mother-in law. It starts within your
> heart, head and through your hands as a representative of these patterns of
> quality.
> I think the 'I', the unique 'I' does not exist.
> 
> I am interested in your views on this Willblake2 (following on from Bo, can
> you change your name? This sounds like talking with a computer program!!)
> 
> Cheers
> Andre
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