> [gav] > this statement presupposes SOM. > (subjective) experience begins (occurs after) the > transduction of energy > into neural impulses (object). > > it reduces experience to a physiological (materialistic) > base. > > [Krimel] > Regardless of the alleged advantages of radical empiricism, > it builds on > sensory empiricism. We can not experience relations between > our sense > impressions if we have no sense impressions.
gav: how can radical empiricism be built upon sensory empiricism? radical empiricism is *radical*: it presupposes nothing. sensory empiricism, as you would define it, presumes the subject and object and a mechanism by which one knows the other. one view is more empirical than the other and is therefore more basic. by def this is radical empiricism. [Krimel] Dave has requoted this so many times it should be burned into your screen. "To be radical, an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them any element that is directly experienced." James is not overturning sensory empiricism in the slightest. He is adding the connectedness of our senses; our ability to match faces and voices. It is the appreciation of figure ground relationships, innate rules for constructing faces and seeing how things relate. He is expanding empiricism to include both sensation and perception. But he says time and again that concepts or ideas or rationalism are derived from experience or perception. James says that sometimes we can see ourselves as subject and sometimes as objects but that we are not fundamentally either. James is pretty clear that perception is built from sensation and concepts is built from perception. > [gav] > i am not trying to be smart when i say that the logic of > this seems simple > and clear. what part of my efforts at explanation do you > have issue with? > > experience is happening simultaneously with the > transduction of energy into > neural impulses; neurophysiological activity is a > relatively prosaic > analogue of experience. > > [Krimel] > The idea of disembodied "experience" happening in the > absence of neural > impulses is a heavily fanciful analogue that might appeal > to the children of > especially uneducated adults if it was explained in a > soothing tone of > voice. gav: i didn't say anything about experience happening in the absence of neural impulses, though for trees and organisms without neurons it obviously does. [Krimel] It is a good thing you didn't talk about experience in the absence of neural impulses. That would have been silly. Your comment on trees comes close. [gav] the neural impulses don't cause the experience in humans - that is what i have been saying in plain language for a while now - they are concurrent; the neurochemistry is an analogue. for pete's sake read what i write man! slowly. the rest of your offering here is puerile. [Krimel] Those neural impulses are experience. You are just describing them from a different point of view. You are talking about what they feel like. I am talking about what they look like. gav: the mushrooms caused my experience to alter from the norm - more vivid, funnier, profound, connected; i am sure my brain chemistry was altered too. [Krimel] There are all kinds of things that can predictably alter your brain chemistry. In fact they can guarantee a change in your perception and behavior. One might say they cause a change in the way you understand and interact with the world. [gav] neural chemistry and brain states are synonyms so your question, as is often the case, doesn't make sense. [Krimel] I would only point out that consciousness IS a brain state, as are sleep, dream sleep, hypnosis, meditation, wakefulness and intoxication. So perhaps we come around to an agreement after all. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
