Krimel, John, Craig, Gav, Platt, et al --
This thread has been pecked at repeatedly since at least the end of May when
I lost all previous posts in a computer crash. Like many other topics on
this forum, the only consistency in the discussion is the general lack of
agreement.
If reductionism is reducing a concept to its simplest terms, and what we are
really talking about is epistemology (how we know), then there must be some
understanding of what a "knower" is. As Gav and Craig have pointed out,
Krimel's systems analysis clearly doesn't provide any insight here.
[Krimel]:
Experience BEGINS with transduction of energy into
neural impulses.
[Gav]:
Experience cannot begin with 'transduction of energy into neural
impulses', because 'transduction of energy into neural impulses' is a
concept *derived from experience* as all concepts necessarily are.
[Craig]:
I think what Krimel means is that the experience of EACH
INDIVIDUAL "BEGINS with transduction of energy into neural
impulses". 'Transduction of energy into neural impulses' is a concept
derived from experience, but the concept was around before most
of us began experiencing.
I don't know why Gav and Craig call "the transduction of energy" a concept,
since it is actually a process. But it does demonstrate that a systems
approach won't work as an epistemological theory. Nor does Platt's
assertion that "experience, consciousness, psychic energy, reality, and
Quality" are "all names for the same thing" help to clarify the issue.
Still, the beginning of experience is fundamental to understanding "how we
know" anything.
At the risk of offending the anti-SOMists, I would suggest that experience
begins with subjective sensibility which, in temporal terms, occurs at the
birth of an individual. All knowledge is sensible in that it is revealed to
the subject's conscious (psychic) awareness. Whether concepts are derived
from experience (or vice-versa) is immaterial because we are aware of what
we experience, and to say that conceptual knowledge is not part of our
experience is absurd.
Now, John raised an interesting point on 6/13 that appears to have been
overlooked. He was challenging dmb's statement that "In the MOQ, there is
always a discrepancy between concepts and reality."
[John]:
ALWAYS a discrepancy between concepts and reality? ALWAYS???
How do you know this? What possible proof could you offer to make
such a statement? I mean, if we all, every person on the planet, just
spent all our time conceptualizing every waking moment (in fact, I guess
we do) then wouldn't the bare fact of probability offer the possibility
that every once in a while, somebody got it right? If so, it would be
very difficult to prove, but obversely, it is also impossible to prove
contrary.
How would you know?
And if we're talking about concepts, well sometimes the reality I'm
conceptualising IS a concept. I'm talking about an emotional state
or a thought pattern which, since I'm referring to my own creation,
I oughta be the best judge on whether the concept of my reality concept
is real enough.
My concept of reality contains no discrepancy between concept and reality
when the reality I conceptualize is a concept I create.
John is on to something of significance to epistemology. In short, there is
no difference between the reality we conceptualize and the reality we know.
If existential reality is our subjective concept, then the known and
experienced reality is derived from conscious (psychic) sensibility. Since
the universe is the experiential creation (concept) of the individual,
differentiated existence is solipsistic. But inasmuch as individual
experience conforms to the laws and principles of nature, it is universal.
It should also be understood that neither subjective awareness nor its
objective concept is the true Reality.
I submit that this S/O epistemology clears up some of the confusion in this
discussion without contradicting the MOQ. Krimel can still apply his
systems theory to experience, Gav can continue to regard experience as
conceptual, and Platt can hold on to his "equivalency principle" of Quality.
Are we any closer to Reductionism, or have I just muddied the waters?
Respectfully,
Ham
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