[Marsha]
I must say it nice to think we agree.
[Arlo]
We do. And me too.
What's interesting to note is that there are two
key-points in ZMM where Pirsig references
"self-reference" and the subsequent paradox.
First is during his early experience in the
Acadamy, when he pondered on the nature of hypotheses.
"If Phædrus had entered science for ambitious or
utilitarian purposes it might never have occurred
to him to ask questions about the nature of a
scientific hypothesis as an entity in itself. But
he did ask them, and was unsatisfied with the
answers.... Phædrus' break occurred when, as a
result of laboratory experience, he became
interested in hypotheses as entities in themselves" (ZMM)
Here Pirsig describes the recursive paradox that
occurs when the scientific method is turned onto
itself. He comments on Einstein's response to
this recursive paradox, describing it as such
"There is no logical path to these laws; only
intuition, resting on sympathetic understanding
of experience, can reach them -- ." (ZMM)
Instead of heading Einstein's wisdom, modern
"science" has simply attempted to sweep the
paradox under the rug, and this is the first
glimpse we have of what would become Pirsig's main thesis in ZMM.
"What Phædrus observed on a personal level was a
phenomenon, profoundly characteristic of the
history of science, which has been swept under
the carpet for years. The predicted results of
scientific enquiry and the actual results of
scientific enquiry are diametrically opposed
here, and no one seems to pay too much attention
to the fact.... The major producer of the social
chaos, the indeterminacy of thought and values
that rational knowledge is supposed to eliminate,
is none other than science itself. And what
Phædrus saw in the isolation of his own
laboratory work years ago is now seen everywhere
in the technological world today. Scientifically
produced antiscience...chaos." (ZMM)
Pirsig then goes on to relate his reading of
Poincare, which contains this summation.
"Then, having identified the nature of geometric
axioms, [Poincare] turned to the question, Is
Euclidian geometry true or is Riemann geometry
true? He answered, The question has no meaning." (ZMM)
"The question has no meaning". In other words, "mu".
The second point of self-referential paradox
occurs in the Chairman's classroom.
"He shouldn't have cut it off, Phædrus thinks to
himself. Were he a real Truth-seeker and not a
propagandist for a particular point of view he
would not. He might learn something. Once it's
stated that "the dialectic comes before anything
else," this statement itself becomes a
dialectical entity, subject to dialectical question." (ZMM)
Here is a clear point where Pirsig describes the
paradox of self-reference. And this is why Pirsig
acknowledges that had Socrates NOT said "all this
is just an analogy", "he wouldn't have been telling the "Truth."" (ZMM).
Nor would Pirsig be.
At 11:47 AM 2/2/2010, you wrote:
Arlo,
I must say it nice to think we agree.
Marsha
On Feb 2, 2010, at 11:41 AM, Arlo Bensinger wrote:
> [Marsha]
> I think the MoQ tolerates paradox because...
>
> [Arlo]
> Agree. The passage you refer to is about
encoding experience via symbolic meaning. The
"analytic knife" passage from ZMM also goes over this ground.
>
> "From all this awareness we must select, and
what we select and call consciousness is never
the same as the awareness because the process of selection mutates it." (ZMM)
>
> Pirsig goes on to explain what continues to escapte Platt.
>
> "To understand what he was trying to do it's
necessary to see that part of the landscape,
inseparable from it, which must be understood,
is a figure in the middle of it, sorting sand
into piles. To see the landscape without seeing
this figure is not to see the landscape at all." (ZMM)
>
> This sets the stage for his subsequent "All
this is just an analogy" statement, indeed,
just as he comments on how Socrates would by
lying if he hadn't said this previously, so too
does this hold true for HIS statements of "truth".
>
> This is really not anything new, and was
formalized by Godel's Incompleteness Theorums.
Language, like "mathematics", is also a
formalized symbolic system subject to these
same limitations. It is not a failure of
language, nor is it "proof" of some absolute,
but a mu-recognition that all symbolic systems
powerful enough to make meaningful descriptions
of reality will always contain the paradoxes of
recursion and self-reference. I think that was
what Pirsig was talking about in the passage you provided.
>
>
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