Hey, Platt --
Direct experience occurs prior to division of S/O. This is all basic MOQ stuff. No wonder others question whether you have read Lila.
I own a copy of Lila and have read it. I just don't happen to agree with the implied ontology, at least as it has been interpreted. When I suggested that there is no such thing as "direct experience", that all experience is subject/object experience, you said:
Wrong. Prior to "differentiation of values into things and events," we experience "value per se." You can't differentiate something that hasn't been experienced first. That's just common sense. ;-)
Okay, since "common experience" isn't good enough for you, let's see if what you say makes common sense.
You say "Direct experience occurs prior to division of S/O." But if there is no Subject, there can be no Self to have experience. Does it make sense that there can be experience, "direct" or otherwise, without a subject?
You say "You can't differentiate something that hasn't been experienced first." I say you can and you do. That's exactly what esperience does: It differentiates Value into finite 'beings' -- something here, something there, something now, something then. It even defines the attributes and properties of the things experienced. Does Pirsig not call these phenomena "patterns of value"?
Well my friend, those like you locked in S/O existence believe the values you mention are subjective, i.e., not real, just all in your head, like sugar plum fairies.
That's an ad hominen argument, Platt. Value is neither subjective nor objective, as your revered author made clear. I don't quarrel with this. Sensibility is not a subject or object either. And even a sugar plum fairy can have value for a child who believes in it. (Incidentally, this demonstrates the possibility of an "imaginary value" that has no experiential justification.)
My point is simply that Sensibility must be divided into individual 'selves' in order to have experience. To make his theory work, Pirsig has externalized experience to the insentient world. You seem to have accepted the idea that molecules, trees, and possibly even rocks are experiential entities. This doesn't make sense to me, and it certainly is not a common sense notion.
But then, I don't base my philosophy on the inferences of a metaphorical book.
Best regards, Ham Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
